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Many accept that there are some acts that are ‘supererogatory’ or 
‘beyond the call of duty’. Risking one’s life to save others or 
dedicating one’s life to helping the needy are often thought to be 
examples of such acts. Accepting the possibility of acts of this sort 
raises interesting problems for moral philosophy, as many moral 
theories appear to leave no room for the supererogatory. While 
these problems are increasingly recognized in moral philosophy, 
there remain a number of debates that have failed to pay sufficient 
attention to the existence of acts of this sort. In this thesis I 
investigate the implications of accepting the possibility of 
supererogation for three of these debates. 
The first issue I investigate is the relationship between morality 
and self-interest. One popular view is that supererogatory acts are 
those that demand too much sacrifice from those who could 
perform them. However, I argue that looking at self-reported 
accounts and empirical psychological studies of moral exemplars 
gives us good reason to reject this view, as it has the implausible 
implication that those with less developed moral consciences are 
excused from obligations that apply to those with more developed 
moral sensibilities. We should accept, then, that performing an act 
of supererogation may be in line with an agent's self-interest. 
The next debate I examine concerns the connection between moral 
judgements and motivation. Motivational judgement internalists 
claim that there is a necessary connection between moral 
judgements and motivation. However, it is often unclear which 
moral judgements this view is supposed to cover. The claim is 
made about judgements of 'moral goodness', 'moral rightness' and 
'moral requirement'. I argue that internalists need to restrict their 
claim to moral obligation judgements.  
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I then examine how to give an account of the relationship between 
moral obligations and reasons for action. It is often claimed that 
moral reasons are overriding. A related view is moral rationalism, 
which holds that agents have most reason to act in line with their 
moral requirements. I start by examining the differences between 
these two views before looking at what form of either view it is 
plausible to hold if we accept the existence of supererogation.  
I finish by looking at whether accepting the existence of 
supererogatory acts goes far enough or whether there is a need to 
make room for additional deontic categories, such as 
suberogation, quasi-supererogation or forced supererogation. I 
will argue that none of the arguments put forward in defence of 
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In 2007 a man collapsed at a New York Subway station and fell 
onto the tracks as a train approached. Wesley Autrey, a fellow 
passenger, jumped down onto the tracks and held the other man 
down as the train came to a stop above their heads, saving the 
man’s life. This act seems especially morally valuable but does 
not seem to be morally required, rather it seems like an act that we 
would describe as being ‘beyond the call of duty’. Acts like these 
that go beyond what is morally required are called 
‘supererogatory’. Despite receiving a great deal of attention from 
theologians (particularly Christian theologians) the concept did 
not attract the attention of moral philosophers until relatively 
recently.1  
J. O. Urmson opened the contemporary discussion of the concept 
in moral philosophy.2 He argued against traditional accounts of 
the deontic categorization of acts that assume a three-fold 
classification whereby acts are divided into the morally 
obligatory, morally indifferent and morally forbidden. Moral 
obligations are acts that are good to perform and bad not to 
perform. Morally indifferent acts are those that are neither good 
nor bad to perform. Forbidden acts are those that are bad to 
perform and good not to perform. Urmson argued that this account 
leaves no room for acts that are good to perform but are not bad 
                                                        
1 For an overview of the theological origins of the concept see 
Heyd (1982 pp.15-34). 
2  Urmson (1958). However, while it is true to say that Urmson’s 
paper opened up the discussion of the concept in modern western 
philosophy, his paper was not the first to discuss the concept. As 
Rabinowicz notes (2000 p.79), Kotarbinski published a short note 
in 1914 in which he argues that utilitatarianism is unable to 
accommodate the supererogatory (1914/ 2000). Both Mill (1865 
10.337-8) and Sidgwick (1907 p.220) also seem to recognize the 
problem.  
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not to perform, such as the actions of saints and heroes. Urmson 
described saints as those who regularly go beyond duty by 
performing acts for the benefit of others rather than pursuing their 
self-interest and heroes as those who go beyond duty in protecting 
others rather than themselves. Such actions, and less spectacular 
cases of kindness and generosity, are morally valuable but go 
beyond what is demanded by ordinary morality and cannot be 
fitted into the tripartite model that had been assumed by moral 
philosophers.   
My aim in this thesis is to investigate supererogation and the 
implications of accepting the existence of acts of supererogation 
for moral philosophy. Before I begin this, though, I will look at 
the reasons why we might think that we should accept that acts of 
supererogation exist.  
0.1 Why We Should Accept That Supererogation Exists 
Urmson argued that for a normative moral theory to be acceptable 
it must make room for supererogation.3 He gave the following 
example to support this claim:   
We may imagine a squad of soldiers to be practising the 
throwing of live hand grenades; a grenade slips from the 
hand of one of them and rolls on the ground near the 
squad; one of them sacrifices his life by throwing himself 
on the grenade and protecting his comrades with his own 
body.4 
Urmson claimed that the soldier has clearly acted in a way that 
was good but not morally required.  
What is it about this act and others such as Autrey’s that leads us 
think that they are not morally required? There are two features of 
these acts that give us reason to think that they are not obligatory. 
                                                        
3 Urmson (1958 p.66). 
4 (1958 pp. 63). 
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First, it would be inappropriate to demand that someone perform 
either act. As Urmson points out, it would have been inappropriate 
for a superior to demand this act from the soldier.5 This gives us 
reason to think that this act is not morally required because when 
someone has a duty to act in a certain way it does seem 
appropriate to demand that they do so. In the words of John Stuart 
Mill:  
It is part of the notion of duty in every one of its forms that 
a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a 
thing which may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a 
debt.6  
If we accept that we can demand that people perform their duties 
but that it would have been inappropriate to demand that of either 
Autrey or Urmson’s soldier that they act as they did then this 
gives us good reason to think that their acts were not morally 
required. 
The second feature of these acts that suggests that they are not 
morally required is that it in both cases it would be inappropriate 
to blame someone who did not perform the act. Neither the other 
subway passengers nor the other soldiers seem to be blameworthy 
for failing to act in the way in which Autrey or Urmson’s soldier 
did.7 This is important because it is generally thought that there is 
a tight connection between moral obligations and 
blameworthiness.8 Mill makes something like this point in the 
following: 
We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply 
that a person ought to be punished in some way or other 
                                                        
5 (1958 pp. 63). 
6 (2001 p.49). 
7 Urmson (1958 pp. 63) makes this point about his example. It is 
also endorsed by Mellema (1991 p.5). 
8 Darwall (2006 p.97), Gibbard (1990 p.45), McElwee (2010 
p.400), Portmore (2011 p.43), Shafer-Landau (2003 p.192), 
Stroud (1998 p.176), Williams (1995 pp.40-44). 
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for doing it – if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow 
creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own 
conscience.9 
The point Mill is making here is that violating a moral obligation 
makes someone the fitting subject of negative reactions such as 
punishment, blame or guilt. Stephen Darwall is more explicit on 
the link between moral obligation and blame in the following: 
If I fail to act as I am morally required without adequate 
excuse, then distinctively second-personal responses like 
blame and guilt are thereby warranted.10 
If we accept this and think that those who were in a position to act 
as Autrey or Urmson’s soldier did but who failed to do so are not 
blameworthy, even in the absence of an excuse, then this gives us 
good reason to think that these acts were not morally required. 
We can summarize these two arguments in the following way: 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DEMAND: 
P1 If an act is morally obligatory then the agent can legitimately 
be demanded to perform it. 
P2 No one could legitimately demand that the soldier dive on the 
grenade.  
C Diving on the grenade is not morally obligatory.   
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM BLAME:  
P1 If an act is morally obligatory then the agent is blameworthy 
for failing to perform it (in the absence of an excuse). 
                                                        
9 (2001 p.48). 
10 (2006 p.26). 
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P2 The soldier would not be blameworthy for failing to dive on 
the grenade, even if he lacked an excuse.   
C Diving on the grenade is not morally obligatory.   
What we have, then, are two claims about the appropriateness of 
demands and blame (P2) which, combined with two claims about 
the concept of moral duty (P1), provide two arguments in support 
of Urmson’s claim that the soldier does not have an obligation to 
jump on the grenade.  
These arguments, combined with the assumption that the soldier’s 
act is morally good, show that a tripartite view of deontic 
categories involving the required, the forbidden and the indifferent 
is insufficient. The soldier’s act is neither required nor forbidden 
nor indifferent. In order to accommodate such acts in our deontic 
framework we must make a room for a new category of acts that 
are morally good but not morally required.  
So far we have looked at why we might think that these acts are 
not morally required. However, the existence of acts that are not 
morally required does not by itself give us any reason to reject the 
tripartite view of the range of deontic options. Acts that are neither 
required nor wrong can be easily accommodated in this view by 
the category of ‘moral indifference’. The reason that the acts we 
have considered create a challenge to the tripartite view is that as 
well as being neither required or forbidden, these acts are not 
morally indifferent either. Far from being morally indifferent, both 
of these acts seem to be acts of great moral importance and indeed 
to be the morally best course of action in these cases. There is, 
then, good reason to think that there are acts, such as Autrey’s and 
that performed by Urmson’s soldier, that are neither morally 
required, forbidden or indifferent.  
 14 
Another reason to be interested in the supererogatory is that this 
term picks out a recognizable concept in commonsense moral 
discourse. Most clearly, the phrase ‘beyond the call of duty’ is a 
familiar part of everyday moral talk. Moreover, while the term 
‘supererogation’ derives from Roman Catholic tradition,11 the idea 
that it is possible for an act to be morally good without being 
morally required is one that is present in many moral traditions. In 
Judaism, the concept of ‘beyond the letter of the law’ applies to 
acts of fairness and charity that exceed what is prescribed by the 
law.12 The idea is also present in Islamic ethics.13  
To sum up, the concept of supererogation is one that picks out a 
recognizable feature of commonsense moral discourse, is present 
across different ethical traditions and seems to be required to 
handle cases like Autrey and Urmson’s soldier. 
0.2 Supererogation and Normative Ethics 
Supererogation creates a challenge for normative ethical theories. 
In order to be seen as compatible with commonsense morality, a 
normative ethical theory must allow room for acts of 
supererogation. Urmson pointed out that it is far from clear that 
any of the normative ethical theories popular in the 1950s, when 
he wrote his paper,  (Kantianism, utilitarianism and Moorean 
intuitionism) could do so.14  
Since Urmson raised this challenge there have been many 
attempts to reconcile normative ethical theories with the existence 
                                                        
11 For an overview of the theological origins of the concept see 
Heyd (1982 Chapter 1) 
12 Moghaddam, Novoa and Warren (2012 p.798). 
13 See Carney (1983), Reinhart (1983) and Moghaddam, Novoa 
and Warren (2012 p.798). 
14 Though Urmson did argue that of these three, utilitarianism was 
best placed to do so. 
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of acts of supererogation.15 It is worth making clear at this stage 
that there are ways in which both consequentialists and 
deontologists can reconcile their views on the nature of moral 
value with the existence of acts that go beyond what is required. 
In this section I will survey some of the suggested ways in which 
consequentialists and deontologists might accommodate the 
supererogatory. My aim is not to show any advantages for one 
view over the other but simply to make clear that this is an issue 
we should take seriously regardless of our favoured view in 
normative ethics.  
Consequentialists hold that the moral value of an action is 
determined solely by the consequences of that action. Acts are 
morally valuable for consequentialists in so far as they bring about 
good consequences and bad in so far as they bring about bad 
consequences. The reason why it would be good for me to donate 
a kidney to someone who needs it is that this would bring about 
the good consequence of saving that person’s life. For 
consequentialists, then the good comes before the right. What it is 
right to do in any situation is determined by what it would be good 
to do, which is in turn determined by the consequences that will 
be brought about by the various actions available to the agent. 
Consequentialists give various accounts of what might count as a 
good consequence. Most famously, utilitarians hold that 
                                                        
15 Consequentialist attempts include Dorsey (2013), Portmore 
(2003; 2011), Slote (1984),Vessel (2010), Kantian attempts 
include Hill (1971) and Heyd (1982 Ch.3). For an attempt to 
reconcile virtue ethics with the possibility of supererogation see 
Brännmark (2006) and Kawall (2009). For an attempt to reconcile 
a form of Care Ethics with the existence of supererogatory acts 
see Slote (2007). See New (1974), Pybus (1982), Feldman (1986), 
Hale (1991) and Lockhart (2000 p.107) for attempts to deny the 
existence of supererogatory acts.  
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consequences are good in so far as they bring about pleasure and 
bad in so far as they bring about pain.  
This kind of value can be easily reconciled with the claim that acts 
of supererogation must bring about more moral value than the acts 
of obligation they go beyond. If an obligatory act brings about 
consequences with a certain value then acts of supererogation 
must bring about consequences that are more valuable. To return 
to the case of Urmson’s soldier, it is reasonable to expect that the 
consequences of the soldier jumping onto the grenade will be 
better than those that would result from his not doing so. Of 
course it may be difficult to reconcile this account with certain 
consequentialist accounts of moral rightness. Maximizing 
consequentialist theories, for example, might be thought to leave 
little room for acts that are of greater moral value than other 
permissible alternatives.16 Nevertheless, my point is simply that 
the consequentialist understanding of moral value seems to be 
easily compatible with the claim that acts of supererogation are of 
greater moral value than other permissible non-supererogatory 
alternatives.  
Deontologists give a very different account of moral value. For 
deontologists, whether or not an act is right or wrong is not 
determined by the value of its consequences. There is no one 
deontological account of moral value but one feature shared by 
deontological accounts is that the right is more important and 
should be determined independently from the good. What makes 
an action right is that it conforms to the moral law. There are, of 
course, various accounts of what the moral law is and where it 
comes from. Kant held that the moral law comes from principles 
                                                        
16 Though the two are not necessarily incompatible. See Portmore 
(2011) and Vessel (2010) for attempts to reconcile maximizing 
forms of consequentialism with the possibility of acts of 
supererogation.  
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of reason.17 Divine command theorists, on the other hand, hold 
that God determines the moral law.18 What makes both theories 
deontological is that they both hold that certain actions are right or 
wrong no matter how much good their performance will bring 
about. 
What unites deontologists, then, is that the right is prior to and 
independent of the good.19 By itself this seems to be perfectly 
compatible with what has been said so far about supererogation. If 
what is right is not defined in terms of what is good then wherever 
more than one permissible act is available there is room for one or 
more act to be more valuable than the others. As the act’s 
rightness is not a result of its goodness this view can easily allow 
that some right acts might be better than others. It is worth 
pointing out, then, that deontology is perfectly compatible with 
the existence of acts that are morally better than other permissible 
alternatives.  
However, what is less clear is whether a specifically deontological 
conception of moral value is compatible with acts of 
supererogation being more valuable than obligatory acts.  One 
way to understand a specifically deontological conception of 
moral value is that moral value is the value in performing one’s 
duty.20 This might seem to make deontology incompatible with 
giving an account of supererogation in terms of moral value. If 
one act is obligatory because it respects the moral law it is unclear 
how another act could be supererogatory by respecting that law to 
                                                        
17 For attempts to reconcile Kant’s moral theory with the existence 
of supererogatory acts see Heyd (1982 Ch.3) and Hill (1971). 
Others reject the claim that Kant’s moral theory leaves room for 
the supererogatory. See, for example, Baron (1995), Guevara 
(1999) and Timmermann (2005).  
18 For example Quinn (1978). 
19 Fried (1978 p.9). 
20 See Kant (1993 p.13). 
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a greater extent than the obligatory act. We might think that it 
would speak against any definition of supererogation if it were 
found to be incompatible with deontological accounts of value.  
A simple response to make at this point would be to accept that 
any deontological account that only finds moral value in following 
the moral law would be incompatible with supererogation. If 
moral value is solely brought about by observance of the moral 
law then there does not seem to be any means of ranking 
permissible acts as better or worse than each other. This, after all, 
is the reason why deontologists often seek to analyze 
supererogation in terms of duties.21 It is no failure of this account 
of supererogation, then, if it cannot be accommodated with an 
account of moral value that is incompatible with any unqualified 
account of supererogation. Perhaps deontologists wishing to 
accommodate supererogation should be revisionists about the 
concept and defend a qualified version of supererogation22 or 
explain why the acts that we think are supererogatory are actually 
best seen as duties.23  
In addition to this defence, though, it is worth pointing out that 
there are some deontological approaches that are compatible with 
the claim that acts of supererogation are more valuable than the 
available non-supererogatory alternatives. For example, Derek 
Parfit has argued that the most plausible version of Kant’s theory 
is Kantian contractualism, which he outlines as follows: 
Kantian Contractualism: Everyone ought to follow the 
principles that everyone could rationally will to be 
universal laws.24  
                                                        
21 See Hill (1971).  
22 As both Hill (1971) and Richards (1971) do. 
23 Baron (1995) defends this view.  
24 Parfit (2011 p.410). 
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Someone who holds this view could think that in addition to 
agreeing to a set of principles concerning the morally required, 
those in an original contracting position would agree to a set of 
principles about the supererogatory.25 Such acts would be ones 
that the original contractors would agree to encourage but not 
require. This would allow a deontologist to say that acts of 
supererogation are particularly valuable, as they are acts that 
would be encouraged by rational contractors. 
Likewise forms of deontology that allow consequences to play 
some role in determining the value of an action will be compatible 
with the claim that acts of supererogation are more valuable than 
obligatory acts. On some deontological accounts, the 
consequences of an act are relevant in assessing its moral value 
and may even play some role in determining what our duty is in a 
particular situation. For example, W. D. Ross held that if the 
consequences of performing a prima facie duty were sufficiently 
bad then this might make it permissible to omit the act.26 Such a 
theory remains a deontological one, for the most part it is our 
prima facie duties that determine what ought to be done, not the 
consequences of our actions. Any account that, like Ross’s, 
recognizes some form of consequential value will be able to say 
that when we have several different permissible acts to choose 
from, some of these might realize more consequential value than 
others. These acts would count as supererogatory.  
In response to the claim that specifically deontological accounts of 
moral value will be incompatible with a definition of 
supererogation that holds such acts to be more valuable than acts 
of obligation we can say two things. First, while this is true for 
                                                        
25 See Ashford (2003 p.282) for a similar account of 
supererogation for contractualists.  
26 Ross (2003 p.35). 
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deontological accounts that recognize only this kind of value, 
these accounts will be incompatible with any unqualified account 
of supererogation. Second, this account of supererogation will be 
compatible with deontological accounts that allow some room for 
moral value other than that of acting out of conformity to the 
moral law. 
0.3 The Plan Ahead 
So far we have seen why we should make room for supererogation 
and the challenges this presents for those attempting to give a 
normative ethical account of what makes acts right or wrong and 
good or bad,  
However, the challenge for moral philosophy does not stop here. 
Supererogation also creates problems for standard forms of 
deontic logic. This problem has motivated the search for 
alternative systems of deontic logic that can accommodate the 
supererogatory.27  
Supererogation also presents a challenge to those seeking to 
examine the relationship between moral reasons and moral 
requirements. The challenge of how to reconcile the existence of 
acts that are good but not required with the thought that there must 
be some connection between moral requirements and moral 
goodness is sometimes called ‘The Puzzle of The Good Ought Tie 
Up’ and is also known as ‘The Problem of Supererogation’ or 
‘The Paradox of Supererogation’.28  
                                                        
27 See Chisholm and Sosa (1966a; 1966b), Joerden (2012), 
McNamara (1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 2011). 
28 Heyd (1982 p.4) uses the term The Good-Ought Tie-Up. 
Chisholm and Sosa (1966b) call this The Problem of 
Supererogation and Horgan and Timmons (2010) call this The 
Paradox of Supererogation. 
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Both of these issues have generated substantial philosophical 
literatures. My aim in this thesis is to investigate previously 
unexplored or underexplored implications of accepting the 
existence of supererogatory acts. Given this aim I will not be 
addressing either of these issues directly, though where my 
discussion has implications for these two issues I will make this 
clear. Instead, I will explore three debates that up to now have 
paid insufficient attention to the supererogatory.  
The first issue I investigate, in Chapter 4, is the relationship 
between morality and self-interest. While discussions of this issue 
tend to acknowledge the importance of the supererogatory, I will 
argue that they frequently appeal to an implausible claim about the 
nature of supererogation. One popular view is that supererogatory 
acts are those that demand too much sacrifice from those who 
could perform them. However, I will argue that looking at self-
reported accounts and empirical psychological studies of moral 
exemplars gives us good reason to reject this view, as it has the 
implausible implication that those with less developed moral 
sensibilities are excused from obligations that apply to those with 
more developed moral sensibilities. We should accept, then, that 
performing an act of supererogation maybe in line with an agent's 
self-interest. 
The next debate I will examine, in Chapter 5, concerns the 
connection between moral judgements and motivation. 
Motivational judgement internalists claim that there is a necessary 
connection between moral judgements and motivation. However, 
it is often unclear which moral judgements this view is supposed 
to cover. The claim is made about judgements of 'moral goodness', 
'moral rightness' and 'moral requirement'. I argue first that there is 
no necessary connection between supererogation judgements and 
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motivation and second that this means that the internalist needs to 
restrict her claim to moral obligation judgements.  
The final debate I will examine, in Chapter 6, is how to give an 
account of the relationship between moral obligations and reasons 
for action. It is often claimed that moral reasons are overriding. A 
related view is moral rationalism, which holds that agents have 
most reason to act in line with their moral requirements. I start by 
examining the differences between these two views before looking 
at what form of either view it is plausible to hold if we accept the 
existence of supererogation.  
I finish, in Chapter 7, by considering whether making room for 
supererogation goes far enough. Some have argued that there is a 
need to make room for even more deontic categories, such as the 
suberogatory, the quasi-supererogatory and forced supererogation. 
I point out that many of the arguments for these claims fail to 
withstand serious scrutiny. 
However, before I begin to address these issues I first need to 
investigate how the term ‘supererogation’ should be defined. The 
first section of my thesis will be devoted to this project. I will 
start, in Chapter One, by giving a definition of supererogation. In 
the next two chapters I will examine two challenges to the 
sufficiency of this definition. The first challenge, which I will 
examine in Chapter Two, is that my definition allows for the 
possibility of acts of supererogation that are not praiseworthy. 
This is contrary to what has been called The Standard View of 
supererogation, according to which all acts of supererogation are 
praiseworthy. If we accept The Standard View then my definition 
will have failed as an account of the sufficiency conditions for 
supererogation. However, I will argue that The Standard View 
ought to be rejected and so my definition is unthreatened. Next, in 
Chapter Three I will examine David Heyd’s claim that only acts 
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performed with altruistic intent can be classed as supererogatory. 
Again, if we accept Heyd’s claim then the definition I defend in 
Chapter One will fail as an account of the sufficiency conditions 
for supererogation. However, I will argue that Heyd’s argument 
fails to give us reason to restrict supererogation to acts performed 






Chapter One: Defining Supererogation 
My aim in this chapter is to provide a definition of supererogation. 
My goal is to give an account that avoids making unnecessary 
commitments to controversial positions in moral philosophy. The 
reason for this is that these issues are ones that should be decided 
on their own merits rather than being prejudged by the definition 
of supererogation. 
There have been many attempts to provide a formal definition of 
supererogation. Roderick Chisholm, for example, defines 
supererogation as, “something which it would be good to do and 
neither good nor bad not to do.”1 M.W. Jackson describes 
supererogatory acts as acts that are “right to do but not wrong not 
to do”.2 David Heyd, meanwhile, says that an act is 
supererogatory if and only if: 
1. It is neither obligatory nor forbidden.  
2. Its omission is not wrong, and does not deserve sanction 
or criticism – either formal or informal.  
3. It is morally good, both by virtue of its (intended) 
consequences and by virtue of its intrinsic value (being 
beyond duty).  
4. It is done voluntarily for the sake of someone else’s 
good, and is thus meritorious.3 
 
Gregory Mellema offers another alternative, claiming that an act is 
supererogatory if and only if: 
1. The performance of the act fulfils no moral duty or 
obligation;  
2. The performance of the act is morally praiseworthy; 
                                                        
1 Chisholm (1963 p.10). 
2 (1986 p.294).  
3 (1982 p. 115) 
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3. The omission of the act is not morally blameworthy.4 
Clearly, then, there is much disagreement about how 
supererogation should be defined. Heyd even suggests that the 
concept is one “that cannot be captured by a strict formal 
definition.”5 
In this chapter, I will outline my positive claims about 
supererogation. I will be defending the following definition:  
Supererogation: An act, , is supererogatory for an agent A, at 
time t, if and only if -ing is better than the minimum that 
morality demands of A at t and there is no other obligation that 
forbids A from -ing or for which -ing is the minimum that 
morality demands of A. 
I will be defending my positive claims about supererogation 
against alternative ways of understanding supererogation. In the 
following two chapters I will examine and respond to arguments 
in support of adding extra necessary conditions to the definition. 
Before I get started on this it is worth making clear a point of 
methodology. In this chapter I wish to provide an analysis of 
‘supererogation’. However, the term ‘supererogation’ is a term of 
art, not one that is used in everyday language. As a result, our 
intuitions regarding the use of this term are likely to be unclear. 
Nevertheless, I think that whatever disagreements philosophers 
may have about the definition of the term, it is widely agreed that 
it is a technical term that is equivalent to ordinary language 
                                                        
4 (1991 p.13) 
5 (2011). 
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phrases such as  ‘beyond the call of duty’ and ‘above and 
beyond’.6  
While this point may seem uncontroversial, it is not universally 
accepted. Paul McNamara has argued recently that ‘beyond the 
call of duty’ should not be seen as equivalent to ‘supererogatory’.7 
The reason that McNamara gives to support his claim is that 
standard analyses of supererogation make praiseworthiness a 
necessary condition while this does not seem to be a necessary 
condition for being beyond the call of duty. This is the wrong way 
to approach the task of trying to understand what we mean by 
‘supererogation’ and I will explain why in Chapter 2. For now 
though I wish to say only that our analysis of ‘supererogation’ 
should be informed by the way that the equivalent terms in 
ordinary language are used. If we find a clash between our 
analysis and the use of the ordinary language term then we should 
question our analysis before questioning the equivalence of the 
terms. In this chapter, then, I will be looking at what it is to judge 
something to be supererogatory by considering our intuitions 
regarding the correct uses of the ordinary language phrases such 
as ‘beyond the call of duty’ and ‘above and beyond’. 
The first point to note about the phrase ‘beyond the call of duty’ is 
that this contains both a positive and a negative claim. The 
negative claim is that an act that meets this description will not be 
a duty. The positive claim is that an act that meets this description 
will go beyond duty. In other words, the definition of  
‘supererogation’ must contain both a positive and a negative 
element.8 I will start this chapter by looking at what the negative 
                                                        
6 See Dorsey (2013 p.356), Ferry (2013), Heyd (1982 p.1), 
Mellema (1991), Portmore (2011 p.91), and Weinberg (2011 
p.274). 
7 McNamara (2011 p.208).  
8 As Heyd (2011) notes.  
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element of this definition should be. I will then investigate what 
the positive element in the definition should be.  
1.1. Are Acts of Supererogation Morally Optional? 
In this section I will investigate whether being morally optional is 
a necessary condition of supererogation. Those who seek to give a 
reductionist account of supererogation have challenged this view. 
Qualified supererogationists seek to give an account of 
supererogation that makes such acts obligatory, albeit in a weaker 
sense than standard duties. I will argue that this approach should 
be rejected and we should seek an account of supererogation that 
makes these acts completely optional to perform or to omit. I will 
start by looking at why we might think that acts of supererogation 
are morally optional before going on to consider the objections 
that have been raised against this view. 
Before looking at the two competing positions it is worth getting 
clear on what is meant by ‘morally optional’.  A morally optional 
act is one that it is both permissible to perform and to omit. In 
other words: 
Morally Optional: An act A is morally optional if and only if: 
1) Performance of the act is morally permissible (the act is 
not morally forbidden).  
2) Non-performance of the act is morally permissible (the act 
is not morally required).  
The first part of this definition seems uncontroversial. For an act 
to be supererogatory clearly it seems reasonable to think that it 
must be permissible to perform. However, as we shall see later in 
the section, this view has been challenged by those that think it is 
possible for some acts of supererogation to be wrong for some 
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agents to perform.9 I will be responding to this argument later but 
it is worth noting at this point that there is at least a presumptive 
case in favour of the claim that acts of supererogation are always 
permissible to perform. 
The initial focus of this section will be on the second part of this 
definition. I will be investigating whether or not acts of 
supererogation are permissible to omit. There are some theorists 
who claim that supererogatory acts are obligatory, albeit in a 
weaker sense than other obligations. I will argue that we should 
reject this view. I will then defend the optional nature of 
supererogation against those who claim that some acts of 
supererogation may be wrong for some agents to perform. 
1.1.1 The Challenge of Qualified Supererogation 
I will start by outlining the competing positions. The debate about 
whether or not acts of supererogation are morally optional takes 
place between those who give a qualified account of 
supererogation and those who give an unqualified account. These 
two positions can be defined as follows: 
Qualified Supererogation: Acts of supererogation are not fully 
optional. They are acts that are required, albeit in a weaker sense 
than obligations.  
Unqualified Supererogation: In order for an act to be 
supererogatory both its performance and nonperformance must be 
fully morally permissible.  
To settle the debate between these two positions we must ask 
ourselves whether or not acts of supererogation are morally 
obligatory.  
                                                        
9 Straumanis (1984) and Stanlick (1999). 
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At first the question of whether acts of supererogation are morally 
obligatory may seem to be an odd one. If acts of supererogation 
go beyond duty then it may seem as if there is no question about 
their being anything other than morally optional. Being morally 
optional seems to be an essential part of what we mean when we 
say that an act is supererogatory.10 Initially, at least, unqualified 
supererogation has greater intuitive support than qualified 
supererogation. At the very least, then, the onus is on those who 
defend qualified supererogation to give us good reason to reject 
this.  
In addition to being in tension with how we think of 
supererogation, qualified supererogation also conflicts with how 
we think about cases of supererogation. When we consider people 
who perform acts of heroism there does not seem to be any sense 
in which we think that these acts were obligatory. Imagine a 
passerby who runs into a burning building to save the life of a 
stranger. Those who judge that this act is supererogatory would 
surely want to say that there is no sense in which the agent had a 
duty to perform this act.  
We must look then to the arguments given by qualified 
supererogationists to see if they give us good reason to reject 
unqualified supererogation. I will start by looking at Thomas 
Hill’s qualified supererogationist account and the reasons given to 
reject unqualified supererogation. Hill argues that we should 
accept a qualified account of supererogation, as this is compatible 
with his favoured normative ethical theory. I will argue that this 
does not give us reason to accept qualified supererogation.  
1.1.2 An Argument in Favour of Qualified 
Supererogation 
                                                        
10 This point is made by Zimmerman (1996 p.234).  
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The most prominent qualified supererogationist view is that 
defended by Thomas Hill.11 Hill argues that we can reconcile 
Kant’s moral theory with the existence of acts of supererogation if 
we hold that such acts fulfil wide scope imperfect duties.12 An 
imperfect duty is one that leaves some room for the agent to 
determine how it shall be fulfilled. To have an imperfect duty is to 
have a duty to adopt a maxim that leaves considerable room for 
the agent to determine how this maxim should be acted upon.13 
For example, if someone has an imperfect duty to help the poor 
then she is able to choose whether she does so by giving money to 
charity or by volunteering at a soup kitchen etc. These imperfect 
duties can vary in the width of their scope. The wider the scope, 
the more room that the agent has to determine how to fulfil her 
duty. Hill claims that when we have a wide scope imperfect duty 
to adopt a particular maxim (such as the maxim of beneficence) 
the act that conforms to this maxim can be both meritorious to 
perform and not demeritorious to omit.14 For my purposes, I am 
not interested in how Hill interprets Kant to fit with his 
interpretation of supererogation.15 Rather, I am interested in how 
Hill interprets supererogation to fit his understanding of Kant. The 
point Hill is making is that acts of supererogation are obligatory in 
some sense. While any individual act of supererogation may not 
be required we do have a duty to adopt maxims that will lead us to 
perform some acts of supererogation. This, then, is a qualified 
                                                        
11 (1971). Strangely, Heyd (2011) classes both Richards (1971) 
and Raz (1975) as defending qualified supererogation. This does 
not seem like the right way to class these views, as neither thinks 
that supererogatory acts are a special kind of duty. Rather, both 
understand these acts as ones that would be obligatory were it not 
for the presence of exclusionary permissions.   
12 Hill (1971 p.71). 
13 Hill (1971 p.62). 
14 Hill (1971 p.68). 
15 For criticism of Hill’s interpretation see Baron (1995 Ch.1).  
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account of supererogation, as it holds that there is a sense in which 
we do have a duty to perform acts of supererogation.  
There are two ways in which we might understand Hill’s 
argument here. We might take Hill to mean that when we can 
have an obligation to adopt a maxim of this sort and an obligation 
to act on that maxim but any individual act of this sort will be 
morally permissible. If we interpret Hill in this way then his view 
is perfectly compatible with Unqualified Supererogation, as both 
the performance and nonperformance of the supererogatory act 
would be fully morally optional.  
Alternatively, we might think that Hill’s account means that acts 
of supererogation are not fully optional. We might think that if we 
have an obligation to adopt a maxim and an obligation to fulfil it 
then there is a weak sense in which the possible ways of fulfilling 
the maxim are required. They are required in the sense that if we 
choose not to perform any of the other available ways of acting on 
the maxim then we are obliged to perform this act.  
Whichever way we interpret Hill, the reason given to support this 
account of supererogation is that it makes the concept compatible 
with his preferred ethical theory. This gives us one reason in 
favour of accepting qualified supererogation, it is claimed to offer 
a better fit with normative ethical theories than unqualified 
supererogation. More generally, we might think that qualified 
accounts of supererogation will be easier to accommodate in 
moral philosophy, as these accounts remove the need to make 
room for an entirely new category of action. 
1.1.3 In Defence of Unqualified Supererogation 
I will start by responding to the claim that qualified 
supererogation offers a better fit with certain normative ethical 
theories. This claim may well be true. However, I do not think that 
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this gives us good reason to accept qualified supererogation. 
Although Hill aims to analyze supererogation in terms of duty, 
what he actually achieves is something subtly but importantly 
different. What his argument shows is not that his ethical theory 
can accommodate supererogation but that it can allow for the 
existence of acts that are similar to supererogatory acts. What Hill 
seems to ignore is that acts of supererogation have a unique moral 
status that is not reducible to that of duty.16 This account abandons 
the idea that acts of supererogation are beyond duty.  
Of course, as I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
‘supererogation’ is a philosophical term of art and is open to being 
used in different ways. We might think that it is perfectly 
acceptable to say that being beyond duty is not part of being 
supererogatory. Nevertheless, as I pointed out in the introduction, 
while ‘supererogation’ is a term of art there is a general agreement 
about the sorts of phrases in ordinary language that are thought to 
pick out these acts. The phrase ‘beyond the call of duty’ is taken 
to be a typical example of such a phrase.  
It seems hard to deny that when an act is described as being 
‘beyond the call of duty’ this means that it is not morally 
obligatory, as it goes beyond what is morally required.17 This 
strikes me as an uncontroversial assumption to make about what is 
meant by this phrase. Accounts of supererogation that seek to 
deny unqualified supererogation should, then, be seen as 
revisionary. Those who claim that qualified accounts of 
supererogation are a better fit with existing normative ethical 
theories should be seen as attempting to show that the ethical 
theory defended by the author is compatible with the existence of 
                                                        
16 This point is made by both Heyd (2011) and Horgan and 
Timmons (2010 p.37). 
17 This point is made by Zimmerman (1996 p.234).  
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acts that are similar to supererogatory acts. Of course, this need 
not count against these ethical theories. If we see accounting for 
the intuitive appeal of the existence of supererogatory acts as a 
challenge that normative ethical theories should meet then a 
reasonable response to this challenge would be to show that an 
ethical theory is compatible with the existence of acts that are 
similar to supererogatory acts. What they fail to show is that being 
required is part of the meaning of ‘supererogatory’.  
Perhaps, though, it is right to defend a revisionary view. After all, 
for many low-key acts of supererogation the revisionary view 
seems plausible. It is reasonable enough to suggest that we have a 
general standing duty to help others though most individual acts of 
helping will not be required. Unfortunately for the defender of 
qualified supererogation, there are some supererogatory acts for 
which there does not seem to be any standing duty to perform. 
Sacrificing one’s life for a stranger when there is no special 
obligation to help, for example, does not seem like an act that 
there is a standing duty to perform. This act seems to go beyond 
any standing duties we may have.  
At the start of this discussion I argued that, given that 
supererogatory acts go beyond the call of duty, a reasonable initial 
assumption is that these acts are not in any sense obligatory. In 
addition, when we consider cases of supererogation it seems 
counter-intuitive to think that people are obliged to perform these 
acts. The onus, then, is on qualified supererogationists to show 
that this is not how we should think of supererogation. It is up to 
defenders of qualified supererogation to show us why we should 
abandon unqualified supererogation. I have looked at Hill’s 
argument in support of qualified supererogation and found that it 
fails to give us reason to abandon unqualified supererogation. I 
conclude that we should accept unqualified supererogation.  
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1.1.4 Is It Ever Wrong to Perform an Act of 
Supererogation? 
The final challenge to the claim that acts of supererogation are 
always morally optional comes from a different direction. Joan 
Straumanis and Nancy Stanlick both argue that there are some acts 
of supererogation that are morally wrong for members of certain 
groups to perform.18 In this section I will defend the optional 
nature of supererogation against this attack.   
The starting point of Straumanis’s argument is that in many of the 
world’s cultures women are assumed to have many more caring 
and child-rearing duties than men and that this is not morally 
justified.19 These societies condition their members to have these 
expectations through, “a ‘hidden curriculum’ of sex role 
socialization.”20 Women are expected to prioritize the needs and 
wants of their husband and children over their own goals while 
men are not, or at least not to the same extent. As a result, many 
women find themselves in a situation where they are viewed, by 
both themselves and others, as having a duty to perform acts that 
are actually supererogatory. Straumanis argues that in this 
situation when women conform to these expectations they 
reinforce the expectation that this is what women should do. The 
reason for this is that: 
We are each exemplars of the groups to which we belong. 
Whenever we perform according to the norms that are 
applied to that group, we reinforce those norms. To behave 
in exactly the expected ways, even for private reasons, is 
to validate the expectations of others that this is the right, 
natural, way for women or slaves or Blacks or poor people 
to behave.21 
                                                        
18 Straumanis (1984) and Stanlick (1999). 
19 (1984 p.3).  
20 (1984 p.4).  
21 (1984 p.10). 
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In other words, by exceeding familial duties women increase the 
pressure on other women to conform to these expectations. 
Straumanis argues that a woman who does this, “commits a tiny 
act of treason against some woman, somewhere, whose welfare 
depends upon that man's understanding of the truth.”22 As a result, 
women owe it to each other not to perform these acts of 
supererogation.  
Stanlick’s argument takes a different approach to arrive at the 
same conclusion. Drawing on the work of Jean Hampton23, 
Stanlick argues that we should reject the idea that selfless actions 
are always morally good.24 Moral behaviour must, according to 
both Stanlick and Hampton, involve self-regard; the recognition 
by the agent of her own standing as a person deserving moral 
recognition.25 As a result, we should not regard an act as morally 
good if it is performed by someone who fails to pay proper 
attention to her own status as a valuable human being. This leads 
Stanlick to conclude that: 
Supererogatory actions may not be permitted when they 
derive from or arise from character traits that are either not 
consistent with virtues relevant to supererogatory actions 
or when they are wrenched from a person by others, 
whether by their expectations or by their praise of 
“selfless” behavior in their own interest.26 
In other words, when an agent performs a supererogatory act 
without a proper regard for her own standing as a human being 
and source of moral claims then it is morally wrong.  
Both of these arguments create a problem for my claim that acts of 
supererogation are morally optional. If there are some 
                                                        
22 (1984 p.11). 
23 Hampton (1993). 
24 (1999 p.215). 
25 Hampton (1993 pp.147-149) and Stanlick (1999 p.216). 
26 Stanlick (1999 pp.217-8). 
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supererogatory acts that it would be morally wrong for some 
people to perform then we must reject the claim that being 
morally optional is a necessary condition of being supererogatory. 
To defend this claim we must find some problem with the 
arguments we have just considered. It is to this task that I will now 
turn.  
It is not important for my purposes to assess the strength of 
Straumanis’s or Stanlick’s argument for their practical conclusion 
that women have a duty not to exceed their familial duties or to 
recognize their own standing as human beings worthy of moral 
recognition. All I wish to claim is that if these arguments are 
successful then the acts performed by someone who acts wrongly 
in either of these ways cannot be supererogatory. What both 
Straumanis and Stanlick ignore is that an act cannot be 
supererogatory, at least in the moral use of the term, unless it is 
worthy of some form of positive moral evaluation. To see why, 
consider a teacher who has a duty to punish a disobedient pupil. 
Suppose the teacher punishes the pupil more than the required 
amount. In doing so he might exceed his duty to discipline 
appropriately but he cannot be said to have performed an act of 
supererogation. The reason for this is that to describe an act as 
supererogation is to make a positive assessment of the act. As I 
shall show in the next section, there are different accounts of what 
this evaluation might be. The positive component of 
supererogation could be analyzed in terms of ‘moral rightness’, 
‘moral goodness’ or ‘moral betterness’. For my purposes here, 
though, it is enough to note that whichever way we analyze the 
positive aspect of supererogation, Straumanis’ and Stanlick’s 
arguments can be shown to be unsuccessful.  
With this in mind let’s look again at the structure of both 
Straumanis’s and Stanlick’s arguments. The reason that 
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Straumanis thinks women owe it to each other not to exceed their 
familial duties is that by exceeding these duties they act in a way 
that will have a negative impact on the welfare of other women. 
The point that Straumanis is making here is that it is this negative 
impact that creates the duty not to exceed familial duties. This, 
though, shows the problem with Straumanis’s conclusion. If we 
have a duty not to exceed familial duties in these cases then it 
would be wrong to do so. This being the case, exceeding these 
familial duties clearly cannot be morally right. Nor it would seem, 
can it be morally good or morally better to do so. This, at least, 
fits with the traditional understanding of the link between moral 
wrongness and moral value according to which performing a 
wrong act can be neither morally good nor morally better than a 
permissible alternative.27 If exceeding these duties is not worthy 
of positive moral evaluation then it cannot be supererogatory to do 
so. 
Similarly, the reason that Stanlick thinks acts of supererogation 
can be morally wrong is that when they are performed by agents 
who do not have a sufficient sense of their own self worth these 
acts cannot be considered to be morally good.28 It would be 
morally better for such a person not to perform the act that 
exceeds her duty and this makes it morally wrong for her to 
perform the supererogatory act. This argument suffers from the 
same problem as that of Straumanis. The reason we are given for 
thinking that the act would be morally wrong is that it would be 
morally worse than the alternative acts available.29 Again, though, 
if this is the case then the act is not supererogatory as it is not one 
                                                        
27 See, for example, Chisholm (1963 p.7). 
28 (1999 p.218).  
29 It is worth noting that Hampton does not make the same 
mistake. At no point does she claim that a selfless act that is 
lacking in moral value would nevertheless continue to be 
supererogatory.  
 39 
that can be considered good, right or better than the permissible 
alternatives. This is certainly the case if we accept that morally 
forbidden acts are morally worse to perform than morally 
indifferent or obligatory acts. 
Of course, it is open to someone who is sympathetic to either 
position to reject this scheme but there is no reason given as to 
why we should do so. Moreover, such a view is going to appear 
somewhat bizarre. If one act is morally wrong and the other 
morally obligatory how could it be right, good or better to perform 
the first act? In addition, rejecting this account of the relationship 
between obligation and moral value does not seem to fit 
comfortably with what is motivating Straumanis’s search for a 
justification for the claim that women owe these duties to one 
another. Straumanis is searching for such a justification because 
she believes that this will be important in achieving the morally 
valuable goal of women’s liberation. Given this it seems 
reasonable to think that Straumanis’s view is that it is morally 
good for women not to exceed their familial duties. Similarly, the 
structure of Stanlick’s argument leaves little room for the rejection 
of this account of the relationship between moral value, moral 
requirement and moral prohibitions. The reason Stanlick gives for 
accepting that the selfless act is morally wrong is that it is morally 
worse than not performing this act. In doing so Stanlick seems to 
be implicitly appealing to this relationship between the deontic 
and the evaluative.  
To sum up, I have responded to Straumanis’s claim that it may 
sometimes be wrong to perform an act of supererogation by 
pointing out that this conflicts with the plausible thought that 
supererogatory acts must be better than the non-supererogatory 
alternatives and the thought that it is always morally worse to 
perform a morally wrong act than a morally obligatory act. Note 
 40 
that my response to both claims is not limited to the particular 
cases she considers but would apply to any attempt to defend the 
possibility of acts of supererogation that it would be wrong to 
perform by appealing to the possibility that some examples of 
such acts may be morally bad. 
1.1.5 Summary 
In this section I have defended the optional nature of 
supererogation against the challenge raised by both qualified 
supererogation and the claim that it may sometimes be wrong to 
perform an act of supererogation. In the next section I will outline 
the second component of my definition of supererogation. 
1.2. Supererogatory Acts as Morally Better Alternatives 
In the previous section I argued that supererogatory acts are 
morally optional, that is neither obligatory nor forbidden. This, 
though, is far from a complete definition of supererogation, as 
morally indifferent acts are also morally optional. In addition to 
this negative claim, we must add a positive component that 
distinguishes these acts from morally indifferent acts.30 While 
there has, for the most part, been widespread agreement about 
how to understand the negative component, attempts to define the 
positive component have been less widely accepted. Chisholm’s 
account of the positive component is that for an act to be 
supererogatory it must be,“something which it would be good to 
do”.31 Similarly, Heyd, puts the point in terms of moral goodness 
claiming that in order for an act to be supererogatory it must be, 
“morally good, both by virtue of its (intended) consequences and 
by virtue of its intrinsic value (being beyond duty).”32 Others, 
                                                        
30 As Heyd (2011) notes.  
31 Chisholm (1963 p.10). 
32 (1982 p. 115). Dorsey (2013 p.356) and Horgan and Timmons 
(2010 p.31) also put the point in terms of ‘moral goodness’. 
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however, put the point in terms of praiseworthiness. Mellema, for 
example, says that if an act is supererogatory then, “The 
performance of the act is morally praiseworthy.”33 Jackson offers 
another alternative, saying that supererogatory acts are, “right to 
do”.34 Finally, Michael Ferry defines a supererogatory act as one 
that “is better than the minimally permissible act”.35 
There are two key issues here. The first is whether to opt for a 
comparative account of the positive component or a non-
comparative account. While Ferry’s account defines the 
supererogatory in comparison to the other available acts, 
Chisholm, Heyd and Mellema do not. Once I have settled this 
issue, I must then decide which of the possible positive terms 
offers the best account of the positive component of 
supererogation. I will start, in §1.2.1, by addressing the first issue, 
arguing that we must define the positive component of 
supererogation in comparative terms. I will then, in §1.2.2, argue 
that ‘moral betterness’ is the best account of the positive 
component of supererogation. Finally, a comparative account 
must explain what the relevant object of comparison is. I will 
finish, in §1.2.3 by addressing this issue.  
Before we start this discussion it is worth making explicit a few 
points of methodology. First, our definition ought to make sense 
of the thought that acts of supererogation go beyond what is 
required by duty. For the purposes of the present discussion, what 
                                                        
Dancy (1993 p.127), Montague (1989 p.102) and Zimmerman 
(1996 p.234) appear to be making the same claim, though they use 
the term ‘moral value’ rather than ‘morally good’. 
33 (1991 p.13). Attfield (1979), Cohen (Forthcoming), and 
Peterfreund (1978 p.54) also put the point in terms of 
praiseworthiness.  
34 (1986 p.294). John Ladd defines the positive component in the 
same way (1957 p.127). 
35 (2013 p. 574). Similar definitions are given by Hannson 
(Forthcoming) and McNamara (1996a p.426). 
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this means is that we should seek an analysis of supererogation 
that presents an ethical classification that is distinct from both 
morally indifferent acts and acts that fulfil a duty in a minimal 
way. In addition, we want to give an analysis that picks out the 
central features of the concept rather than an analysis that picks 
out incidental features. Finally, we want to give an account of 
supererogation that does not involve commitments to substantive 
ethical positions. The goal in this section is to analyze the concept 
of supererogation so that we can then go on to look at the 
implications of this concept for ethical theory. It is important at 
this stage that the definition that we give is not needlessly 
prejudicing these later debates.  
1.2.1 The Need for a Comparative Account 
In this section I will argue that we should look for a comparative 
account of supererogation. As we saw above, some definitions of 
supererogation are clearly comparative. Ferrys’ definition, for 
example, defined supererogatory acts as those that are better than 
the minimally permissible act. Paul McNamara defends a similar 
definition.36 This, though, is not the only way in which people 
have defended a comparative analysis of supererogation. Dancy 
for example says that supererogatory acts are acts that “enjoy a 
very high degree of value, probably more value than any other act 
available to the agent.”37 Even though Dancy does not commit 
himself to the claim that supererogatory acts are always more 
valuable, this would be another way of giving a comparative 
account. Another way in which we might give a comparative 
account would be to say that supererogatory acts are ‘more 
praiseworthy’. 
                                                        
36 (1996), (2011). 
37 (1993 p.127). 
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However, many theorists working on the concept of 
supererogation do not define the concept in a comparative way. 
Mellema’s definition, for example, is that an act is supererogatory 
if and only if:  
1. The performance of the act fulfils no moral duty or 
obligation;  
2. The performance of the act is morally praiseworthy; 
3. The omission of the act is not morally blameworthy.38 
This definition is not comparative. Similarly, Chisholm’s 
definition of supererogatory acts as acts that are “good to do and 
neither good nor bad not to do,”39 does not involve any 
comparison. The purpose of this section, then, will be to 
determine whether or not the definition of supererogation should 
involve a comparison.  
The first point to note in favour of giving a comparative account 
of supererogation is that it seems to be suggested by the ordinary 
language phrase ‘beyond the call of duty’. Clearly, ‘beyond’ is a 
comparative concept, and so we might think that only a 
comparative account of supererogation will be able to capture this 
part of the ordinary language phrase that is equivalent to 
‘supererogatory’. At best, though, this provides only prima facie 
support for the claim that supererogation is a comparative concept. 
While it is worth paying attention to the ordinary language phrase 
used to pick out the supererogatory we should not let this settle the 
matter. It is possible, after all, that the phrase ‘beyond the call of 
duty’ could have become a dead metaphor the meaning of which 
has been transformed from the natural reading of the original 
metaphor. Certainly, if good reason can be found to give a non-
                                                        
38 (1991 p.13) 
39 Chisholm (1963 p.10). 
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comparative account then it is unlikely that the wish to respect the 
ordinary language phrase will carry much weight.  
In fact, Chisholm claimed that there is good reason to reject a 
comparative account. Chisholm argued that it is implausible to 
think that supererogatory acts are always morally better than other 
acts.40 Chisholm supports this claim by pointing out that we may 
be morally obliged to perform acts of great moral value. Acts of 
supererogation, on the other hand, can be small favours. 41 For 
example, let’s assume that firefighters have a moral obligation to 
run into a burning building to save someone’s life when they are 
on duty. It seems clear that a firefighter who risks his own life to 
save someone else’s will have performed a morally better act than 
someone who performs a small favour, such as helping a friend 
with her gardening. This seems incompatible with the claim that 
acts of supererogation must be morally better than other acts.  
Chisholm is right to point out that obligatory acts can be better 
than supererogatory acts. There are some duties that are morally 
better to perform than some supererogatory acts. However, it 
would be wrong to conclude, as Chisholm does, that, “We cannot 
say that the supererogatory must be better than the obligatory.”42 
What we should instead conclude, as Julia Driver acknowledges, 
is that supererogatory acts are better than the other acts available 
in that particular context.43 By focusing on the alternatives 
available to the agent at the time of acting this allows for the 
                                                        
40 Chisholm (1963 p.8), Driver  (1992 p.290) also makes this point 
but does not see it as a problem for a comparative account for the 
reasons given below.  
41 Both Heyd (2011) and Horgan and Timmons (2010 p.32) claim 
that small favours can be supererogatory. 
42 Chisholm (1963 p.8). 
43 Driver (1992 p.290). This point is also made by Dorsey (2013 
p.356), Hansson (2013), McNamara (1996a p.426; 1996b p.175) 
and Zimmerman (1996 p.235). 
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possibility of highly valuable obligatory acts and acts of 
supererogation that are of low value. Chisholm’s objection, then, 
does not cause problems for accounts that compare supererogatory 
acts to the other acts available to the agent in that situation rather 
than non-supererogatory acts in general.  
In fact the comparison with other acts available to the agent 
appears to be essential to adequately distinguishing acts that 
merely fulfil a duty from those that both fulfil a duty and go 
beyond it. To see why we should first note that there are often a 
range of ways in which we can fulfil a duty. Suppose I promise to 
get in touch with an elderly neighbour once a week. Given this 
promise it seems reasonable to think that I have a duty to do so. 
There are a number of ways I can do this. I can send a text 
message, send an email or go round and visit. Let’s stipulate that 
while the first two are equally acceptable, the final option will 
make my neighbour very happy, much more so than if I take one 
of the other options. In this case it seems reasonable to say that 
while all three acts fulfil my obligation to my neighbour, the final 
option goes beyond this and should be considered supererogatory. 
Without a comparative account it is far from clear how we could 
make sense of this. Presumably, all three of these acts are 
praiseworthy and good to perform. They are also morally optional 
in exactly the same way. For each of these acts we must either 
perform that act or one of the two other acceptable options. What 
is it, then, that makes the visiting option supererogatory? The 
answer has to be that although the other two options are both good 
and praiseworthy, the final option is morally better.  
Note that this problem is not one that is raised by the particular 
example under consideration. Rather, it is a problem that arises 
from the need to accommodate cases of ‘supererogatory 
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oversubscription’.44 Given that there are some cases of 
supererogation that also fulfil a duty, we need some way to 
distinguish these acts from other optional ways of fulfilling that 
duty. The relevant point for our purposes is that no non-
comparative term will allow us to do this. As both Claire Benn 
and McNamara point out, in order to make sense of cases of 
supererogatory oversubscription we need to make reference to the 
minimum that morality demands.45 By referring to the minimum 
that is required we can distinguish between those acts that merely 
fulfil a duty and those that not only fulfil a duty but also go 
beyond it. 
Mellema defends his account from this problem by offering what 
might appear to be a defence of a non-comparative account 
against this criticism. In order to handle cases of supererogatory 
oversubscription Mellama introduces a distinction between acts 
that fulfil a duty directly and those that do so indirectly.46 An act 
fulfils a duty directly only if the performance of the act is 
praiseworthy for no other reason than the fact that it fulfils a duty, 
while it does so indirectly if and only if it fulfils a duty and is 
praiseworthy for other reasons as well. Mellema then says that 
while acts of supererogation can fulfil duties, they can only do so 
indirectly. This proposal would allow Mellema to get the right 
result in the neighbour case. Visiting the neighbour rather than 
sending a text message or email is praiseworthy not only for 
fulfilling a duty but also because it helps to improve the 
neighbour’s mood. In Mellema’s terminology, this act fulfils a 
duty indirectly and, as a result, is supererogatory. This response 
                                                        
44 Benn uses this phrase to describe this kind of case (2014 p. 57). 
45 Benn (2014), McNamara (1996a p.426). 
46 (1991 p.37). 
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gets the right result in these cases and does so without including 
comparative terms in the definition of supererogation.  
However, this response is only plausible if it is understood in a 
comparative way. We can see why by looking again at the 
distinction Mellema draws between fulfilling an obligation 
directly and doing so indirectly. An act fulfils a duty directly if it 
is praiseworthy for no other reasons than the fact it fulfils a duty. 
There are two ways in which ‘the fact that it fulfils a duty’ can be 
understood. The first is in a de dicto sense. On this reading an 
agent fulfils a duty directly if the only reason she is worthy of 
praise is that she has acted in a way that has fulfilled a duty. 
Mellema’s proposal can also be understood in a de re sense. On 
this interpretation an agent who fulfils a duty directly is someone 
who is praiseworthy only for the reasons that it is praiseworthy to 
perform the specific act that is her duty. To see the difference 
imagine a firefighter who fulfils a duty to save a child from a 
burning building. On the de dicto reading, the firefighter fulfils the 
duty directly if the fact that she has fulfilled a duty is the only 
reason that she is praiseworthy. The de re reading, on the other 
hand, would class the firefighter as fulfilling a duty directly if she 
is only praiseworthy for the reasons that saving the child is 
praiseworthy (that it saves a life or that it brings about more 
happiness or better consequences etc.).  
Once we have distinguished between these two readings it should 
be clear that only the de re reading is plausible. After all, there are 
usually many reasons that make someone who performs a duty 
praiseworthy over and above the fact that they have performed a 
duty. Moreover, often the fact that they have performed a duty is 
not the most important reason why an agent deserves praise. For 
example, while the firefighter in the previous example may be 
praiseworthy in virtue of the fact that she has fulfilled some duty, 
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the main reason she is praiseworthy is that she has saved a life. 
The de dicto reading, then, would give the bizarre result that most, 
if not all, acts that fulfil a duty are supererogatory. 
If we accept this then we can see that Mellema’s response to the 
problem of supererogatory oversubscription turns his account into 
a comparative one. For in order for an act to fulfil a duty indirectly 
it must be praiseworthy for reasons that go beyond the reasons 
that performing the required act is praiseworthy. This means that 
this definition is making an implicit comparison to some 
minimally permissible way of fulfilling a duty.    
I have argued that we need a comparative account of 
supererogation in order to distinguish supererogatory acts from 
other optional ways of performing a duty. I will finish this section 
by briefly mentioning a puzzle that has arisen out of a failure to 
pay attention to the need for a comparative definition of 
supererogation.  
Jason Kawall has argued that a promise to perform an act of 
supererogation is one that is impossible to fulfil.47 The reason for 
this is that a supererogatory act cannot be one that merely fulfils a 
duty. However, if we accept that promises create obligations, then 
once we have made the promise we cannot perform an act that 
would otherwise have been supererogatory without fulfilling our 
duty to perform a supererogatory act. As a result, this act will now 
be merely fulfilling an obligation and so cannot be supererogatory. 
However, as Benn points out, if we pay attention to the fact that 
supererogation involves a comparison with the minimally 
permissible way of fulfilling an obligation then this puzzle 
disappears.48 It follows from a comparative account of 
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supererogation that in order to perform an act of supererogation 
there must be some alternative way of acting that is morally 
permissible but not supererogatory. The reason, then, that this 
promise is not one that can be kept is that there is no            non-
supererogatory way to fulfil this promise. As a result, there cannot 
be a supererogatory way to fulfil this promise either. It follows 
that there is no way that this promise can be fulfilled.49 This, 
though, should not be seen as puzzling, it simply follows from the 
fact that supererogation involves a comparison to non-
supererogatory ways of acting.  
 1.2.2 Evaluating Alternative Comparative Accounts: In 
Defence of The Betterness Analysis 
In the last section I argued that an adequate account of 
supererogation must be comparative. This raises two questions. 
First, we need to know what kind of comparison is being made. 
Second, we need to know what the relevant object of comparison 
is. In this section I will address the first question.  
As I have already shown, there are a number of terms that people 
have used to define supererogation. Some define supererogation in 
terms of ‘goodness’50, others in terms of ‘rightness’51, 
‘praiseworthiness’52 or ‘betterness’53.  This gives us four accounts 
of the kind of comparison being made.  
                                                        
49 Benn (2014 p.59). 
50 See Chisholm (1963 p.10), Driver (1992 p.286), Heyd (1982 
p.115), Horgan and Timmons (2010 p.31). Dancy (1993 p.127), 
Montague (1989 p.102) and Zimmerman (1996 p.234) appear to 
be making the same claim, though they use the term ‘moral value’ 
rather than ‘morally good’. 
51 Ladd (1957 p.127), Jackson (1986 p.294).  
52 Cohen (Forthcoming), Mellema (1991 p.13), Peterfreund (1978 
p.54).  
53 Ferry (2013 p. 574), Hannson (Forthcoming), McNamara 
(1996a p.426). 
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The Rightness Analysis: Supererogatory acts are those that are 
morally optional and more right than the minimally permissible 
acts.54 
The Praiseworthiness Analysis: Supererogatory acts are those that 
are morally optional and more praiseworthy than the minimally 
permissible acts. 
The Goodness Analysis: Supererogatory acts are those that are 
morally optional and bring about more good than the minimally 
permissible acts. 
The Betterness Analysis: Supererogatory acts are those that are 
morally optional and morally better than the minimally 
permissible acts. 
I will argue that The Betterness Analysis offers the best account of 
the comparison.  
We might think that the issue of which term we use to define the 
positive component of supererogation is an unimportant one. 
Given the long tradition of defining at least some of these 
different concepts in terms of each other we might think that it is 
of little consequence which term is used to define supererogation. 
For example, there is a long tradition of defining ‘goodness’ in 
terms of ‘betterness’.55 However, the thought that it does not 
matter which term we use to define supererogation is misguided 
for two reasons. First, saying that we can define one concept in 
terms of the other does not by itself give us a definition of either 
                                                        
54 Of course, we might worry that ‘right’ is not a graded predicate. 
This is just one of the concerns for this view that I will discuss 
below.  
55 See Åqvist (1968), Brogan (1919), Chisholm and Sosa (1966a 
p.246) Hansson (1990), Mitchell (1950 p.103) and Von Wright 
(1963). See van Benthem (1982) for an attempt to define ‘better’ 
in terms of ‘good’. 
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concept. Those who agree that ‘goodness’ is definable in terms of 
‘betterness’ disagree about what the correct definition is.56 
Second, the view that our ethical concepts can be defined in terms 
of each other is a controversial one.57 Those seeking to give a 
definition of ‘supererogation’ should set this question aside and 
focus on which term provides the best account of the positive 
component of supererogation. 
The first point to note is that we can dismiss The Rightness 
Analysis with little effort.  ‘Moral rightness’ is ambiguous as 
between ‘morally required’ and ‘morally permissible’.58 If we take 
‘morally right’ to be equivalent to ‘not morally wrong’ then it 
seems that the term should be understood to mean the latter. When 
people talk about ‘doing what is right’ we might take this to be 
closer to the former meaning. However we understand ‘moral 
rightness’, The Rightness Analysis is an unacceptable account of 
the kind of comparison being made when an act is described as 
supererogatory. If we take ‘morally right’ to mean ‘morally 
required’ then this account will be claiming that supererogatory 
acts are more required than obligatory acts. Clearly, this is an 
unacceptable account. If it makes sense to say that one act is 
‘more required’ than another then clearly it is the non-
supererogatory act that is more required than the supererogatory 
act. The other interpretation, that ‘morally right’ means ‘morally 
permissible’ does little better, as permissibility does not seem to 
be the kind of thing that comes in degrees. Even if permissibility 
does come in degrees, this does not seem to be the relevant kind of 
                                                        
56 Contrast, for example, the definition given by Brogan (1919) to 
that given by Chisholm and Sosa (1966a p.246). 
57 Gustafsson (2014) argues against defining either of ‘good’ and 
‘better’ in terms of the other. 
58 Ross (1930 p.6) understands ‘morally right’ in terms of 
‘morally required’ while Scanlon takes ‘morally right’ to mean 
‘morally permissible’ (1998 p.153).  
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comparison between supererogatory and merely obligatory acts. 
Suppose I promise to give ten pounds to charity and that as a 
result I have an obligation to do so. Now imagine that instead I 
give fifteen. Assuming that doing so does not fulfil any other 
requirements that I have, this looks like a clear case of 
supererogation. However, it seems wrong to say that the 
difference between the two acts is that giving fifteen pounds is 
‘more permissible’. The Rightness Analysis, then, does not seem 
to adequately capture the relevant comparison that is being made 
between supererogatory and non-supererogatory acts. 
At first look, The Praiseworthiness Analysis is a marked 
improvement on The Rightness Analysis. First, unlike rightness, 
praiseworthiness is a property that clearly comes in degrees. 
Second, it has a far better claim to be picking out the relevant 
difference between supererogatory and non-supererogatory acts. 
To return to the previous example, it seems reasonable to describe 
the giving of fifteen pounds as more praiseworthy than giving ten 
pounds. On closer inspection though, The Praiseworthiness 
Analysis should also be rejected. The reason why is that 
praiseworthiness is primarily a feature of agents. It is agents, after 
all, that are the subject of praise. That is not to say that we cannot 
describe an act as praiseworthy but when we do so what we really 
mean is that the agent is worthy of praise for performing the act. 
Of course, how someone acts plays an important role in 
establishing whether she is praiseworthy or not. However, it is not 
alone in determining how praiseworthy someone is. It is 
commonly thought that the motivation behind an action 
contributes to the praiseworthiness but not the moral status of the 
act. As John Stuart Mill puts the point, “the motive has nothing to 
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do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of 
the agent.”59  
Bearing this in mind allows us to see why The Praiseworthiness 
Analysis does not pick out the relevant form of comparison. To 
return to the previous example, let’s imagine two different 
scenarios in which I fulfil my duty to give ten pounds to charity. 
In the first I give ten pounds for the wrong reasons, perhaps to try 
and appear generous to impress those around me. In the second I 
do so for the right reasons, perhaps out of genuine concern for 
those that the money will help. In both cases I do no more than the 
minimum that is required of me. However, the second act is more 
praiseworthy than the first. If we accept that the first act is enough 
to fulfil the minimum that morality requires in this case then The 
Praiseworthiness Analysis will class the second act as 
supererogatory. This, though, is clearly the wrong result. The 
second act is more praiseworthy than the first, as doing the 
minimum that morality demands for the right reasons is more 
praiseworthy than doing so for the wrong reasons. However, the 
second act should not be considered supererogatory, as the act I 
perform in this case does not go beyond what I am required to do.    
This leaves us with two options: The Betterness Analysis and The 
Goodness Analysis. Like The Praiseworthiness Analysis, both of 
these analyses involve properties that come in degrees. Likewise, 
both seem plausible candidates for picking out the relevant 
difference between supererogatory and non-supererogatory acts. 
In the charity donation case it seems reasonable to think that 
                                                        
59 Mill (2001 p.18). What motives we must look for is subject to 
debate. We might think that the agent must be acting from the 
motive of duty as Kant (1993) does. Alternatively, we might think 
that an act is praiseworthy if it stems from good will, as Arpaly 
(2003 Ch.3) does. Finally, we might think, as Markovits (2010) 
does, that an act is praiseworthy if the agent’s motivating reasons 
coincide with the reasons justifying the act’s performance.   
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donating fifteen pounds is both morally better than donating ten 
and that it brings about more good. Finally, unlike The 
Praiseworthiness Analysis, both of the analyses involve properties 
of acts rather than agents.  
How, then, should we choose between the two? We might think 
that there is just no difference between the two.  If we accept John 
Broome’s claim that, ‘more good than’ is synonymous with ‘better 
than’ then there will be no difference between the two analyses 
and it will not matter which we choose.60 However, there is good 
reason to think that The Betterness Analysis should be preferred 
as it is the more neutral of the two. A strict deontologist who 
makes no consequentialist concessions, for example, might be 
wary about allowing for any discussion of the goodness of acts. 
Nevertheless, if someone who held this position allowed that some 
acts can be morally better than others then they might be able to 
accommodate supererogation. Someone else might disagree with 
Broome’s claim by arguing that there are two ways in which one 
act can be better than another. It can either bring about more 
goodness or it can bring about less badness (where these are not 
synonymous). If there is a distinction to be made here, there seems 
no reason to restrict supererogation to the former. It seems no less 
plausible to say that someone who sacrifices a great deal to 
prevent something bad from happening has performed a 
supererogatory act than to say the same about someone who 
brings about a great deal of good. Of course Broome’s claim may 
well be right. If it is then The Betterness Analysis is no different 
to The Goodness Analysis. However, if there is a distinction to be 
drawn between the two then The Betterness Analysis is the more 
plausible. In order to avoid pre-judging these issues, then, we 
should prefer The Betterness Analysis to The Goodness Analysis.  
                                                        
60 (2004 p.50). 
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1.2.3 How to Formulate The Betterness Analysis 
So far I have argued that we should define supererogation in terms 
of acts that are better than the minimum that morality demands. 
However, this definition leaves it unclear exactly how to 
understand ‘the minimum that morality demands’. There are three 
options that have been proposed. Michael Zimmerman suggests a 
time-relative account.61 According to this account, supererogation 
is defined in relation to what is the minimum that morality 
requires at a particular time. McNamara, on the other hand, 
defines supererogation in relation to the lowest ranked set of 
worlds in which the agent acts permissibly from the time of acting 
onwards.62 Finally, Sven Ove Hannson claims that we should 
understand supererogation in terms of the minimal way of 
fulfilling a particular obligation.63 There are two ways in which 
any account could be criticized. First, an account may class acts as 
supererogatory that should not be classed as such. Second, an 
account may fail to class acts as supererogatory that should be 
classed as such. In the remainder of this section I will argue that 
none of these ways of spelling out what is meant by ‘The 
Minimum that Morality Demands’ are able to avoid both 
objections. I will then give my own account of how this should be 
understood that avoids both of these objections.  
One way in which we might be tempted to define the relevant 
notion of the minimum for supererogation is in terms of the 
minimum that morality demands from us at a particular moment in 
time. In Zimmerman’s discussion of supererogation, he points out 
that by making supererogation agent and time relative enables us 
to explain why some obligatory acts are morally better than some 
                                                        
61 (1996 p. 236). 
62 (1996a.; 1996b; 2011). 
63 (Forthcoming). 
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supererogatory acts.64 If we make supererogation agent-relative 
then this allows us to say that while it would be supererogatory for 
a passerby to save a child from the burning building, it would not 
be supererogatory for a firefighter to do so. Similarly, making 
supererogation time-relative allows us to say that it would be 
supererogatory for the firefighter to help her friend with his 
gardening while off duty but not supererogatory to do so when she 
is supposed to be working. We might, then, be tempted by the 
following account of supererogation: 
Time-Relative Betterness Analysis: An act  is 
supererogatory for an agent, A, at time t, iff it is better than 
the minimum that morality demands of A at t.65  
This account avoids the problem of being overly restrictive. 
Clearly, an act cannot be supererogatory if it is no better than the 
minimum that morality demands from the agent at that time. 
There will, then, be no acts that should be defined as 
supererogatory that this definition will not class as such.  
However, this account does not avoid the problem of being overly 
permissive, as it will allow fulfilling imperfect duties in a minimal 
way to count as supererogatory. For example, suppose my friend 
is going to be in hospital for a week. I promise to visit at some 
point and as a result I now have a moral obligation to do so. 
Suppose that it makes no difference what day of the week I visit 
on. I make my visit on the first day of the week. According to The 
Time-Relative Betterness Analysis I have performed a 
supererogatory act. After all it was morally better to go to visit my 
friend than not to do so and morality did not require that I visit my 
                                                        
64 (1996 p.235). 
65 This account is suggested by Zimmerman’s discussion of 
supererogation (1996 p. 236), though, he does not set it out 
formally like this.  
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friend at that particular time. Clearly, however, this act is not 
supererogatory, as it merely fulfils my duty in a minimal way. We 
might think that we could avoid this problem if we supplement 
The Time-Relative Account with further necessary conditions. 
This is, I think, the right place to look for a satisfactory definition. 
However, before I examine how best to supplement this account, I 
will first explain why the alternative accounts are problematic. 
First let’s look at McNamara’s account. According to this 
proposal, an agent has a range of possible worlds that are 
accessible to her. Within this set of worlds is the subset of 
‘acceptable worlds’, those where she conducts herself permissibly 
from now on.66 The acceptable worlds are then ordered, such that 
the morally better the world, the higher it will be ranked. A 
supererogatory act, then, is one that occurs in some acceptable 
world but fails to occur in any of the lowest ranked acceptable 
worlds.67 This allows McNamara to give the following version of 
The Betterness Analysis: 
McNamara’s Betterness Analysis: An act  is beyond the 
call iff it occurs somewhere among the permissible 
alternatives but not among any of the minimal ones (and 
thus above them).68  
                                                        
66 We might worry that this is a misinterpretation of McNamara’s 
view. McNamara describes the acceptable worlds as the subset of 
those (accessible worlds) where, “she comports herself 
permissibly as of now," (2011 pp.212-213 emphasis added). 
Perhaps, this could be interpreted as meaning those worlds where 
the agent comports herself permissibly at this very moment rather 
than from now on. However, the latter reading is certainly the 
more natural one and McNamara has confirmed in personal 
correspondence that this is how it should be read. 
67 (1996 p.436). 
68 This is the exact wording McNamara gives for the concept of 
‘Action Beyond Morality’s Call’ (2011 p. 215). This is formally 
represented as follows SUp =df PEp & MI¬p (1996a p.429; 1996b 
p.177) where Sux: x-ing is supererogatory. PEx: x-ing is morally 
permissible. MIx: meeting morality’s demands minimally involves 
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Like The Time-Relative Analysis, McNamara’s account explains 
why an obligatory act may be morally better than a supererogatory 
act. When we make clear that a supererogatory act need only be 
better than the minimally acceptable accessible worlds, then we 
can see that these examples are no longer problematic. When an 
agent has an obligation to save someone from a burning building, 
choosing to help a friend with her gardening will not feature in 
any of the acceptable worlds. As a result, this would not count as 
an action that goes beyond duty.  
This account also avoids the problems facing The Time-Relative 
Analysis. The problem with this account was that it looked only to 
what is required at a particular time and so wrongly categorized 
the fulfilment of an imperfect duty in a minimal way as 
supererogatory. By looking to sets of worlds, McNamara’s 
account avoids this problem, as the worlds in which I fulfil my 
duties in a minimal way will be equally ranked. The world in 
which I visit my friend in hospital on day one would not be ranked 
any higher than the world in which I visit her on day two and so 
McNamara’s account will not class this act as supererogatory.  
However, McNamara’s account does face the problem of being 
overly restrictive.69 In McNamara’s account in order for an act to 
                                                        
x-ing. In earlier work McNamara took the concept of ‘beyond 
morality’s call’ to be equivalent to ‘supererogation’ (1996a). 
However, in later work, McNamara (2011) claims that 
‘supererogation’ requires the additional necessary condition that 
the act also be praiseworthy. In Chapter 2 I will argue that we 
should reject this claim.  
69 Hannson (Forthcoming p.4) claims that it is problematic that 
McNamara’s account is open to a version of ‘Ross’s Paradox’ for 
standard deontic logic. According to standard deontic logic, if p 
entails q and p is obligatory then q will be obligatory as well. This 
is problematic, as it generates odd obligations. For instance, 
suppose I have an obligation to post a letter and it would be 
forbidden to burn it. It follows from this that I have an obligation 
to either post the letter or burn it, as for any p, p entails p or q. 
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be supererogatory it must occur in at least one acceptable world 
that is accessible to the agent. In other words it must occur in a 
world where the agent conducts herself permissibly from now on 
and one that is accessible to her, given her abilities and 
disabilities. However, this rules out the possibility of an act that is 
supererogatory but only occurs in a world where the agent does 
not act permissibly from then on. To see why this is problematic, 
imagine that someone who responds to praise by becoming 
temporarily arrogant is passing by a burning building and hears 
cries for help coming from inside. The passerby’s arrogance 
consistently leads him to behave in a rude and short-tempered 
way. Thankfully, though, this arrogance only ever lasts a day. 
Let’s stipulate that in all of the possible worlds where he rescues 
the child, he is praised for doing so and, as a result, behaves in a 
rude and short-tempered way to those around him for a day. Let’s 
further stipulate that this behaviour is morally wrong, though only 
in a minor way.  
Now we must ask ourselves whether the fact that saving the child 
will lead the passerby to perform some minor wrongs should 
                                                        
This is problematic, as it looks like I can fulfil this obligation by 
burning the letter. McNamara’s Betterness Analysis is open to a 
similar objection. Suppose a mailman is in a position to rescue a 
child from a burning building and that doing so would be 
supererogatory. Fanning the flames, on the other hand, is morally 
forbidden. However, given that it is permissible to rescue the 
child, it will also be permissible to either to rescue the child or fan 
the flames. Moreover, both acts are precluded by doing the 
minimum. As a result, McNamara’s Betterness Analysis gets the 
odd result that it would be supererogatory either to rescue the 
child or fan the flames. However, McNamara has convincing 
responses to this problem (1996 p.431). First, as McNamara points 
out, this is a problem not for his account but for the combination 
of his account and standard deontic logic. Moreover, McNamara 
argues that the standard replies to this paradox are plausible here 
as well. Finally, we can avoid this problem altogether by 
stipulating that in order for an act to be supererogatory, it must not 
involve the performance of any impermissible acts. 
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prevent this act from being supererogatory? There doesn’t seem to 
be any reason to think that it should. We would think it perfectly 
permissible for the passerby to rescue the child, even though this 
will lead him to perform some minor wrongs. The world in which 
these acts occur also seems to be morally preferable to any in 
which the child is not saved. The case might be different if the 
passerby would perform major wrongs as a result of saving the 
child. If the passerby were to respond to the praise by embarking 
on a killing spree then perhaps it would not be permissible to save 
the child (though even then we might say that the saving of the 
child is permissible while the killing spree is not). In this case, 
though, this is an acceptable trade-off to make. This is not to say, 
though, that it ceases to be wrong for the passerby to behave in a 
rude and short-tempered way. The fact that it is permissible for the 
passerby to perform the supererogatory act even though he knows 
that this will result in his performing a wrong act does not change 
the fact that the wrong act is impermissible. Given that an 
acceptable world is one where the agent acts permissibly from 
then on, it seems possible for an act to be supererogatory even if 
there is no acceptable world in which it occurs. This is 
problematic for McNamara’s account as, on this account, an act is 
only supererogatory if it occurs in an acceptable world.  
 
Of course, it is open to McNamara to respond to this point by 
claiming that an act cannot be supererogatory if the only the 
accessible world in which the agent performs the act is one where 
she goes on to perform an impermissible act. Perhaps it could be 
claimed that it is never permissible for someone to act in a way 
that will lead her to act impermissibly. However, this approach 
involves making a commitment to a substantial first-order moral 
claim that a definition of supererogation would be better off 
avoiding. The question of whether it can ever be permissible for 
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an agent to act in a way that will lead her to act impermissibly is 
not one that our definition of supererogation should pre-judge.   
 
Another account of the relevant version of The Minimum That 
Morality Requires comes from Sven Ove Hannson, who offers the 
following analysis: 
Hannson’s Betterness Analysis: a supererogatory act is an optional 
action that is a better variant of another, obligatory action.70  
By looking to lesser ways of fulfilling particular duties Hannson’s 
analysis avoids the problems facing The Time-Relative Analysis. 
On this account, an act cannot be supererogatory simply because it 
is better than that which morality requires from an agent at that 
particular time. Visiting my friend in hospital on day one would 
not count as supererogatory, as it is no better than visiting on any 
of the other days. This account also avoids the problems facing 
McNamara’s account. By avoiding talk of ‘acceptable worlds’ 
Hannson does not commit himself to the claim that an act cannot 
be supererogatory if the only accessible world in which the agent 
performs the act is one where she goes on to perform an 
impermissible act.  
However, unlike McNamara’s account, this account is only able to 
speak about supererogation in relation to particular duties. There 
are two problems with this. First, this is unsatisfying, as we want 
to be able to say that that an act goes beyond any duty the agent 
had, not just that it has gone beyond one particular duty. Take the 
passerby example; we want to be able to say that saving the child 
in this case is just supererogatory. This is particularly important 
when we consider that whatever duty the passerby’s rescue is 
                                                        
70 (Forthcoming p.6). Hannson symbolizes this in the following 
way: p is supererogatory with respect to q if and only if 
p⊢q,Oq,¬Op,¬O¬p, and p>(q&¬p). 
 62 
supererogatory relative to (an imperfect duty to help people to 
some extent perhaps) would also apply to a firefighter. Relative to 
this duty, a firefighter would also be performing an act of 
supererogation, though of course relative to the duties of a 
firefighter she would not. What we want is a way of saying that 
while the passerby’s act would be supererogatory, the firefighter’s 
would not. If all Hannson’s account can offer is an account of 
what it is for an act to be supererogatory in relation to a particular 
duty then it will be unable to provide this.  
Hannson responds to this concern by introducing the new concept 
of ‘a substandard variant of an obligatory action’. He defines this 
as follows:  
An act p is substandard variant of an obligatory action, q, 
if and only if p is a variant of q, q is required, p is optional 
and q is better than p and q.71 
Having outlined this concept Hannson tentatively suggests that an 
act is supererogatory simpliciter if and only if it is supererogatory 
with respect to at least one other obligatory act, and substandard 
with respect to none.72  
However, this account will not work, as there will be some acts 
that are the minimally permissible way of performing an 
obligation that this account classes as supererogatory. To see why 
this is problematic, compare the cases of the passerby and the 
firefighter saving a child from a burning building. In order for the 
passerby’s act to be supererogatory, on this account, it needs to be 
a better version of some obligation (perhaps a general imperfect 
obligation to help those in need). However, the firefighter will 
                                                        
71 The more formal version Hannson gives is as follows:  p is 
substandard with respect to q if and only if p⊢q,Oq,¬Op,¬O¬p, 
and (q&¬p)>p. (Forthcoming p.6). 
72 (Forthcoming p.7). 
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presumably be performing a better version of this obligation as 
well. The difference between the firefighter’s act and the 
passerby’s is that while both will perform a better version of this 
duty, the firefighter’s act also fulfils another duty, a special 
firefighter’s duty to protect those endangered from fires. Now 
imagine that there is only one possible way for the firefighter to 
fulfil this additional duty in this context. This would mean that 
there is no substandard variant of the obligation available to her. 
This means that she has performed an act that is supererogatory 
with respect to some duty and substandard with respect to none. 
On Hannson’s account of supererogation simpliciter this act will 
have to be classed as supererogatory, even though all she has done 
is fulfil her duty in a minimal way.  
Note that this problem will arise in any situation in which relative 
to one source of duty we are acting in a minimally permissible, 
though not substandard, way and relative to another source we are 
going beyond what is required. Take, for example, special 
obligations that are generated by family or friendship 
relationships. If there is only one way of fulfilling these 
obligations and they all exceed our impersonal obligations to 
others then performing the minimally permissible act will be 
supererogatory. This shows that Hannson’s account of 
supererogation simpliciter is unacceptable. Supererogatory acts 
are supposed to go beyond duty; this is incompatible with these 
acts fulfilling duties in a minimal way.  
It might be thought that a simple amendment to Hannson’s view 
would allow it to avoid this problem. Perhaps we should say that 
in order to be supererogatory in a way that is not relative to a 
particular duty an act must be supererogatory with respect to the 
most important duty in play and substandard with respect to 
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none.73 This would get the right result in the previous case, as the 
most stringent duty in play for the firefighter is to save the child 
from the fire. As a result saving the child would not count as 
supererogatory.  
However, while this result gets the right result in this case it does 
so at a price. This new account of supererogation is overly 
restrictive, as it will prevent any act from counting as 
supererogatory whenever a more important duty is in play. This is 
the wrong result, as it looks like there are cases where we perform 
supererogatory acts that do not go beyond the most stringent duty 
in play. Suppose I have borrowed a large amount of money from 
my friend and that she needs to be repaid this money by the end of 
the week in order to avoid defaulting on her mortgage. Does the 
existence of this stringent duty mean that any act I perform this 
week that is not a better version of this duty cannot be considered 
supererogatory? Clearly not. To see why, suppose that on the way 
to meet my friend to repay her money I see someone struggling to 
carry home his shopping and offer to help him. This act seems like 
a plausible case of supererogation. However, this act does not 
seem like a better version of the most stringent duty that is in play. 
Whatever duty this goes beyond it does not seem plausible to 
think that it is the duty to repay my friend by the end of the week. 
However, on the revised version of Hannson’s account this act can 
only be classed as supererogatory if it is a better version of the 
duty to repay my friend, as this is the most stringent duty in play. 
Note that the problem for Hannson’s account is not simply that it 
gets the wrong result in this case but that it does so for a very odd 
reason. In this case the presence of the more stringent duty 
prevents the act of helping the stranger with his shopping even 
                                                        
73 Thanks to Elinor Mason for suggesting this response.  
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though doing so at this time is entirely compatible with the 
performance of that more stringent duty. 
A second problem with Hannson’s account is that it appears to be 
overly restrictive. While this account does well at handling cases 
of supererogatory oversubscription not all cases of supererogation 
fit this model. As both Julia Driver and Joel Feinberg point out, 
favours such as offering a stranger a match or helping a friend 
paint his house seem like cases of supererogation but do not fit 
easily into the over-subscription model.74 As Hannson 
acknowledges, this is a challenge for his account as it appears that 
there are some acts that are clear cases of supererogation but are 
not better variants of other obligatory acts.75 He gives the example 
of someone who passes an upset looking stranger in the park and 
spends a couple of hours comforting him. This act appears to be 
supererogatory but it is far from obvious what obligatory act it is a 
better version of. If this objection holds then Hannson’s definition 
is an overly restrictive account of supererogation.  
Hannson responds to this problem by claiming that the obligation 
that the act in the previous example goes beyond is a general 
obligation, perhaps to help people in need or to be kind to 
strangers.76 For our purposes, it is not the content of the obligation 
that is important but the resources it offers Hannson to respond to 
the problem. If we accept that there is a general obligation to be 
kind to strangers, and that this act exceeds this obligation, then 
this case is no longer problematic for Hannson’s account.    
There are, though, two problems with this response. First, it just 
seems odd to say that this act is a better version of the general 
obligation to help strangers or be kind to people. The more natural 
                                                        
74 Driver (1990 p.290), Feinberg (1968 pp.279-280). 
75 (Forthcoming p.7). 
76 (Forthcoming p.7). 
 66 
way of describing acts like this one is that the agent was under no 
obligation whatsoever to help. Second, as Hannson acknowledges, 
there may be some cases of supererogation where there is no 
lesser obligatory option available.77 For example, in Urmson’s 
example of the soldier who jumps on a live grenade to save his 
comrades, there does not appear to be any other course of action 
available that would help to save the other soldiers. Given that 
there is nothing short of this that the soldier could have done to 
protect his comrades it looks like if we accept that this act is 
supererogatory we must also accept that the soldier is under no 
obligation to protect his comrades here. Hannson responds to this 
objection in the following way:  
Arguably, our use of the term ‘supererogatory’ in such 
(rather unusual and untypical) cases is derived from 
analogies with similar cases in which there is an obligation 
to help that one goes beyond.78  
In other words, these cases are not really cases of supererogation 
they just appear to be so because they are similar in some ways to 
acts that are supererogatory. This response is unsatisfying, though, 
as the case we have considered appears to be a paradigm case of 
supererogation, not a marginal case. After all, it was this case that 
Urmson used to persuade others of the need for moral 
philosophers to address this concept. Unless Hannson can provide 
some independent reason to think that acts like this should not be 
considered supererogatory then this is a significant problem for 
his account.  
So far we have looked at three versions of The Betterness 
Analysis and found all to be wanting. McNamara’s Analysis was 
found to be overly restrictive. The Time-Relative Analysis, on the 
other hand, was too permissive. Finally, Hannson’s Analysis was 
                                                        
77 (Forthcoming p.7). 
78 (Forthcoming p.7). 
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a mixture of both, preventing some acts that should count as 
supererogatory from doing so and including other acts that should 
not count as supererogatory. However, of these three accounts The 
Time-Relative Analysis appears to be the most promising. The 
problem with this analysis is simply that it fails to provide the 
correct sufficiency conditions for supererogation. Of the three 
accounts though, it is only this one that is a plausible necessary 
condition for supererogation. It is worth investigating whether this 
account could be supplemented with further necessary conditions 
to give an acceptable account of the sufficiency conditions for 
supererogation.  
The problem with The Time-Relative Analysis is that there are 
some obligations which the agent has some choice over the exact 
time at which to fulfil them. This is problematic, as fulfilling these 
obligations in a minimal way is not supererogatory but it does 
satisfy the criteria given by this analysis. The solution to this 
problem is to add an additional necessary condition that prevents 
any acts that fulfil a duty in a minimal way from counting as 
supererogatory, as the following analysis does:   
The Revised Time-Relative Analysis: An act, , is supererogatory 
for an agent A, at time t, if and only if -ing is better than the 
minimum that morality demands of A at t and there is no other 
obligation that forbids A from -ing or for which -ing is the 
minimum that morality demands of A or a way of partially 
fulfilling the minimum that morality demands. 
This account avoids the problems facing the original Time-
Relative Analysis as the additional condition rules out the 
fulfilment of a duty in a minimal way as being an act of 
supererogation. However, it also retains the spirit of the original 
analysis in looking, primarily, to what is required from an agent at 
a particular time for the comparison case. We might worry that 
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including a necessary condition just to rule out the problem cases 
is somewhat ad hoc. This concern, though, is misplaced. The new 
condition is one that is suggested by the phrase ‘beyond the call of 
duty’. To go beyond duty, it is not enough that an act be a minimal 
way of fulfilling a duty. This condition simply captures this 
thought.  
This account also avoids the problems facing McNamara’s 
account, as it does not rule out the possibility of acts of 
supererogation that only occur in worlds where the agent does not 
act permissibly from then on. While this analysis does rule out the 
possibility of acts of supererogation that are impermissible, it does 
not rule out the possibility that an act may be permissible even if 
performing it will lead the agent to perform an impermissible act 
later. Nor does this analysis declare definitively that this is 
possible. On this account this issue will come down to whether it 
is morally permissible to make this kind of trade off. This is as it 
should be. Instead of being prejudged by our definition of 
supererogation, this issue is one that should be determined by first 
order moral theorizing.  
Finally, this account also avoids both problems facing Hannson’s 
analysis. The first problem for Hannson’s account was that it was 
unable to give an acceptable account of what it is for an act to be 
supererogatory simpliciter. We should not take this advantage too 
seriously, however, as it seems plausible that adding the same 
additional necessary condition to Hannson’s account would 
provide the same results. The real advantage for this analysis over 
Hannson’s is that it can accommodate cases of supererogation that 
do not fit the over-subscription model. Hannson’s Analysis 
needed to make the implausible claim that all acts of 
supererogation are better variants of other obligatory acts. The 
Revised Time-Relative Analysis, on the other hand, can allow that 
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an act can be supererogatory without being a better variant of an 
obligatory act. So long as an act is morally better than what the 
agent has to do at that moment and is neither forbidden nor the 
minimal way of fulfilling some duty, then this is enough for it to 
be supererogatory.  
In this section I have looked at problems for three ways of 
understanding The Betterness Analysis. I have argued that The 
Revised Time-Relative Analysis is able to avoid the problems 
facing all of the other accounts we have looked at. In the next 
section I will consider two objections that might be raised against 
the definition I have given by those who think we need to add 
extra necessary conditions to this definition. 
1.2.4 Objections and Responses 
One challenge that could be raised against the account I have been 
defending is that it does not go far enough. We might think that in 
order to be considered supererogatory an act must be not only be 
morally better than the minimum morality demands but 
significantly better. To see why we might think this, let’s imagine 
that I borrow some money from a friend and promise to repay her 
within a year. Let’s suppose that, although she has no immediate 
need for the money, it is slightly better from my friend’s point of 
view if the debt is repaid as soon as possible, perhaps because she 
is uneasy about a friend owing her money. Let’s suppose there are 
two possible acts available to me. I can repay the debt at the end 
of the year as agreed or I can repay her one day before the end of 
the year. We might think that it would be morally better, though 
only slightly so, to repay her a day earlier. According to my 
definition of supererogation, repaying a day early would count as 
supererogatory. This might strike some as odd. It would, after all, 
seem strange to say that I have gone beyond the call of duty here. 
This objection could be avoided by requiring acts of 
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supererogation to be significantly better than the minimum 
morality demands. 
This modification does however come at a cost. Responding to the 
objection in this way seems to open up space for a new category 
of acts that are like acts of supererogation in every way but are not 
considerably better than the minimum permissible acts they go 
beyond. Opting for this response creates a new category of acts 
that are permissible and better than the permissible alternatives 
but not by enough to be considered supererogatory. If we accept 
that, all else being equal, we should prefer a simpler theory to a 
more complicated one then it seems that creating a new category 
of acts should be considered a cost of this approach. Again, this is 
not a decisive objection to this line of response but it does give us 
reason to prefer an alternative response if one is available. Given 
this cost, if we can find an alternative way of responding to the 
problem that does not bring with it this cost, or any of comparable 
or greater significance, then we should prefer that way of 
responding to the theory.  
A better way to respond is to debunk the intuition. The first step of 
this response involves identifying the reason why it seems strange 
to describe the act that is only marginally better than the minimum 
that morality demands. I think that the reason why it would be 
strange to describe this act as beyond the call of duty is that we 
would think it odd to praise someone for acting in this way. Given 
that the obligation in this case has only been exceeded by a 
minimal amount it would seem strange to praise the agent in this 
example. This means that this objection should only worry us if 
we think that acts of supererogation are necessarily praiseworthy. 
Given that praiseworthiness does not form part of my definition of 
supererogation this is unproblematic for me. Of course, some 
explanation still needs to be given as to why it seems strange to 
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describe this act as supererogatory. However, if we accept that the 
reason that this seems odd is that this act would not be 
praiseworthy then the explanation that is needed will be one that 
explains why it seems counter-intuitive to describe an act as 
beyond the call of duty but not praiseworthy (for whatever 
reason). In Chapter 2 I argue that this intuition should be 
explained in terms of conversational implicature rather than truth 
conditional content. If this argument is successful and my 
debunking explanation is right then the claim that it seems odd to 
describe an act that is marginally better than a merely permissible 
alternative as supererogatory will cause no problem for my view.   
Another objection that might be raised against The Betterness 
Analysis is that because there is no requirement that a 
supererogatory act be morally good, it would be possible for an 
act to be supererogatory and morally bad. This may strike some as 
odd. It would certainly be weird for someone to describe an act as 
‘beyond the call of duty but bad’. This might tempt someone to 
add an extra necessary condition. This would give us the 
following definition: 
The Goodness and Betterness Analysis: An act, , is 
supererogatory for an agent A, at time t, if and only if -ing is 
better than the minimum that morality demands of A at t and there 
is no other obligation that forbids A from -ing or for which -ing 
is the minimum that morality demands of A and -ing is morally 
good.  
The difference between this hybrid account and The Revised 
Betterness Analysis is that if it is possible for an act to be morally 
optional and morally better than the minimum that morality 
demands without being morally good then this analysis will yield 
different results. While The Betterness Analysis will class such 
acts as supererogatory, The Goodness and Betterness Analysis 
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will not. For example, imagine a situation where we must choose 
to perform one of two morally bad acts.79 Suppose a murderer 
breaks into a school and tells the teacher that she will either kill 
five students in his class or kill three different students along with 
the teacher. The teacher must now make a choice. Either he tells 
the murderer to kill the five children or he tells the murderer to 
kill himself and three others. In this case we might be tempted to 
say that both acts are bad. Of course we might also think that one 
of these options is morally wrong and the other morally required. 
Alternatively, we might think that this is a genuine moral dilemma 
in which both acts are morally wrong. Nevertheless, I take it that it 
is not wildly counter-intuitive to think that although neither act is 
morally wrong both are morally bad, though the latter is better 
than the former. After all, we might think that to let five children 
die when there is a chance to intervene to allow less children to 
die is bad, while to dirty one’s hands by choosing which children 
will be killed is also bad. On top of this we might think that, 
though the latter act is better than the former, this is not the kind 
of act that we can demand from someone; perhaps because this act 
involves the teacher giving up his own life or perhaps because we 
think that as the teacher has made the education of children a 
major life project, it would be inappropriate to demand that he 
actively engage in helping the murderer.80  
The question we must now ask is if we accept this description of 
the situation then should we say that it would be supererogatory 
                                                        
79 Note that, though similar, this is different from a ‘moral 
dilemma’, at least as these are traditionally defined, as cases 
where an agent must choose between two wrong acts rather than 
two bad acts. For a defence of the claim that moral dilemmas exist 
see Marcus (1980), Nussbaum (1986 Ch. 2, Ch.3) and Williams 
(1973 Ch. 11).  
80 We might agree with Bernard Williams that it would be absurd 
to demand that someone act with such disregard for their own life 
projects (1973b p.116). 
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for the teacher to take the latter option? The answer is that we 
should. This is because there are two problems with accepting the 
alternative. First, there is nothing in the phrase ‘beyond the call of 
duty’ that seems to warrant this restriction. This phrase is a simple 
comparative one. When we describe an act in this way we are 
making a claim about that act compared it with what is morally 
required. If an act is morally better than what is required then this 
seems sufficient for the use of this phrase to be appropriate. 
Second, this approach creates the need for a range of new deontic 
categories. First, we must make a new category for acts that 
satisfy the other necessary conditions for supererogation but are 
morally bad. This, though, is just the beginning. If we accept that 
the goodness and badness of an act can vary so dramatically from 
the acts deontic status then presumably it will also be possible for 
an obligatory act to be morally bad and a prohibited act to be 
morally good. In the interests of parsimony, then, there seems 
good reason not to accept this extra condition.  
These points give us sufficient reason to think that the simpler 
definition is superior until given good reason to prefer the more 
restricted definition. However, the only reason that there seems to 
be to add this necessary condition is the oddness of saying that an 
act is ‘beyond the call of duty but morally bad’. Note, though, that 
it seems equally odd to describe an act as ‘morally wrong but 
morally good’ or ‘morally obligatory but morally bad’. There 
seems little reason, though, to think that we should include 
‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ in our definitions of ‘moral obligation’ 
and ‘morally wrong’. Moreover, if we did include ‘morally good’ 
in our definition of ‘moral obligation’ then there would be no need 
to do so for supererogation as well. If this were the case then 
supererogatory acts would also count as morally good, as these 
acts are better than at least one obligation.  
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1.3 Dorsey’s Radical Alternative 
In the previous section I investigated how to give a precise 
formulation of the claim that acts of supererogation go beyond 
duty. As became clear in the previous section, there are many 
different ways in which theorists have attempted to give such a 
definition and the differences between these competing accounts 
are often fairly subtle. All the accounts examined in the previous 
section agreed that supererogation should be understood as acts 
that are worthy of some positive moral evaluation but that are not 
morally required. In this section I will investigate a definition of 
supererogation given by Dale Dorsey that departs from this 
orthodoxy. I will start by presenting Dorsey’s definition. I will 
then explain why this definition fails to provide a satisfactory 
definition of supererogation.  
1.3.1. Dorsey’s Proposal  
Dorsey begins his discussion of supererogation by outlining what 
is puzzling about supererogation. Dorsey begins by outlining a 
traditional definition of supererogation as involving the following 
necessary conditions: 
Permissible not Required: If an act φ is supererogatory, φ 
is morally permissible, but is not morally required.81 
Morally Good: If an act φ is supererogatory, φ is 
especially morally good or meritorious in comparison to 
acts that fulfil obligations in a minimal way.82 
                                                        
81 This is how Dorsey characterizes this part of the traditional 
view of supererogation (2013 p.356). 
82 This is slightly different from the way that Dorsey formulates 
the traditional view but fits with how he introduces the puzzle 
(2013 p.358). 
 75 
Of course, as I argued above, this definition is not the best account 
of the traditional view but it is close enough to be accepted for the 
purposes of evaluating Dorsey’s proposal.  
The final piece of the puzzle is the thought that, “in any collection 
of potential 
actions a person might perform, it seems right to say that this 
person ought to perform the action that is supported by the 
strongest balance of moral reasons.”83 The puzzle, then, is that if 
what we are required to do is the act that is best supported by the 
moral  reasons then it looks like there can be no acts that meet 
both Permissible not Required and Morally Good, at least if we 
accept that the act that it would be most good or meritorious to 
perform is the act we have most reason to perform.  
 
Dorsey’s proposed solution to this puzzle is to reject the definition 
of supererogation given by Permissible Not Required and Morally 
Good. In its place Dorsey proposes the following definition of 
supererogation: 
Permissible not Required II: If an act φ is supererogatory, 
φ is rationally permissible, but is not rationally required.  
Morally Good II: If an act φ is supererogatory, φ is 
especially morally good or meritorious in comparison to 
other rationally permissible actions.84  
According to this new definition, supererogatory acts are morally 
good but not rationally required. As a result, this definition is 
compatible with The Good Ought Tie Up, as acts that the morally 
obligatory are those that are best supported by moral reasons. It is 
the rationally obligatory acts that can be morally surpassed. 
                                                        
83 (2013 p.359). Dorsey seems to be using ‘ought’ as equivalent to 
‘morally required’ here. It is worth noting that many reject that 
these are equivalent (eg. Chrisman (2012)). 
84 Dorsey (2013 p.371).  
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Dorsey also claims that this response to the problem does better 
than its rivals at handling cases of supererogation that would have 
been obligatory were it not for the fact that they require a non-
trivial sacrifice on the part of the agent.85 In the remainder of this 
section I will argue that Dorsey’s account ought to be rejected, 
regardless of whether it has these advantages. The reason for this 
is that it is unable to capture the intuitions that push us towards 
accepting the need for the category of the supererogatory. I will 
start by examining the reasons that we might accept that acts of 
supererogation exist. I will then explain why Dorsey’s account of 
supererogation fails to accommodate these intuitions.  
1.3.2 Evaluating Dorsey’s Proposal  
In the introduction we looked at why there is a need to make room 
for the category of the supererogatory. By making room for this 
additional category we are able to reconcile the moral goodness of 
the soldier’s act with the thought that it would be inappropriate to 
demand this act from him or blame him for failing to act in this 
way. In this section I will argue that, unlike the traditional view of 
the supererogatory, Dorsey’s definition is unable to reconcile the 
intuitions that created the need for a new deontic category.  This, I 
will argue, creates a dilemma for Dorsey’s view.  
Let’s begin by looking at why Dorsey’s definition of the 
supererogatory fails to reconcile the thought that the soldier’s act 
is morally good with the thought that it would be inappropriate for 
anyone to demand this act from him or to blame him if he had 
failed to act in this way.  As we saw in §1.3.1, Dorsey defines 
supererogatory acts as acts that are rationally permissible, not 
rationally required and especially morally good in comparison to 
other rationally permissible actions. However, this category of 
actions fails to make sense of the intuitions that Urmson claims 
                                                        
85 See Dorsey (2013 pp. 365-369 and 379-381).  
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give rise to the need to make room for the concept of 
supererogation. Accepting that there are acts that are rationally 
optional and especially morally good in comparison to other 
rationally permissible actions fails to explain how it is possible for 
the soldier’s act to be morally good yet for it to be inappropriate to 
demand that he perform it or to blame him for nonperformance. 
As we saw in §0.1, if we accept the conceptual claims about moral 
requirements then the inappropriateness of demands or blame 
gives us reason to think that the soldier’s act is not morally 
required. The puzzle then arises as to how the act can be morally 
good without being morally required. Dorsey’s proposed category 
fails to provide a solution to this puzzle. It can only make room 
for actions that are morally good but not rationally required. What 
we need to make sense of though are acts that are morally good 
but not morally required. If proposing a new deontic category is 
going to enable us to reconcile these intuitions then it is going to 
have to be a category of acts that are both morally good and 
morally optional. The category of actions that Dorsey proposes 
fails to resolve the problem that led us to seek out a new deontic 
category.  
It seems, then, that if Dorsey accepts that the reason to make room 
for the supererogatory is to enable us to make sense of the 
intuitions considered in §0.1 then he should also accept that his 
solution fails to accomplish this task. This, though, is not the end 
of the discussion. Dorsey could respond to this objection by 
denying that these arguments provide us with good reason to make 
room for the supererogatory. However, this approach faces a 
dilemma.  
First, taking this approach involves taking on the additional 
burden of giving some reason to deny both of the arguments put 
forward by Urmson. For as long as we accept these arguments we 
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are going to need to make room for a concept fitting the traditional 
definition of supererogation. Unless Dorsey provides some reason 
for us to reject these arguments then the need for a category fitting 
the traditional definition will remain. This is problematic, as the 
intuitive claims made by the second premise in each argument 
seem very plausible. It would be hard to deny that no one could 
reasonably demand that the soldier act as he did or blame him had 
he failed to do so. Similarly, the conceptual claims found in the 
first premise seem very plausible. One only need look at the 
number of supporters of each of the views to see this. In order to 
respond to these two arguments, then, Dorsey is going to have to 
deny at least two intuitively compelling claims.  
However, even if Dorsey were able to provide good reason to 
reject these arguments, a further problem remains. If we reject the 
arguments given in the previous section then there seems little 
reason to accept Dorsey’s account of the supererogatory. By 
denying these arguments Dorsey would also remove the need to 
make room for the concept. If we were to find a way to respond to 
these arguments then the next move would not be to find some 
other way to understand the supererogatory. Rather, it would be to 
simply abandon this category, as it would not be doing any work. 
This then is a dilemma for Dorsey’s account. Either Dorsey 
endorses the claims examined in the previous section or he 
doesn’t. If he does then he must accept that his account fails to 
solve the problem that the category of the supererogatory is 
supposed to solve. If he does not then he not only takes on the 
burden of providing a reason to reject both arguments, he also 
removes the need to make room for any category of the 
supererogatory and so his proposed reinterpretation of the concept 
is redundant.  
1.3.3 Objections and Replies 
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We might think that there is a way of making the second horn of 
the dilemma more acceptable. Perhaps Dorsey could embrace the 
latter option by claiming that although Urmson’s arguments 
should be rejected there are similar arguments that could be given 
to show the need for the category he proposes. If we reinterpret 
the claims made in the premises of both arguments to refer to 
rational requirements rather than moral requirements then this 
would provide us with the following two arguments to show that 
Urmson’s soldier is not rationally required to act as he did.  
THE REVISED ARGUMENT FROM DEMAND: 
P1 If an act is rationally required then the agent can legitimately 
be demanded to perform it. 
P2 No one could legitimately demand that the soldier dive on the 
grenade.  




THE REVISED ARGUMENT FROM BLAME:  
P1 If an act is rationally required then the agent is blameworthy 
for failing to perform it (in the absence of an excuse). 
P2 The soldier would not be blameworthy for failing to dive on 
the grenade, even in if he lacked an excuse.   
C Diving on the grenade is not rationally required.   
Of course for this response to work it would need to be shown that 
there is good reason to accept the first premise of these arguments. 
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This is problematic, as it is far from clear that there is good reason 
to accept the first premise of either argument. However, even if 
we think that it can be shown that blame and demands are always 
appropriate for rational requirements a further problem with this 
approach remains. The problem is that even if the revised 
arguments are effective they fail to provide any reason to create a 
new deontic category that fits the definition that Dorsey provides. 
While the original arguments showed that we could not divide 
morality into the required, the permissible and the forbidden these 
arguments pose no threat to this division. The fact that an act can 
be morally better than a rational requirement does not give us any 
reason to propose a new deontic category, it simply tells us that 
moral requirements are not rational requirements. While this result 
is interesting, it does not provide any reason to create a new moral 
category. The tripartite division of morality is unthreatened by 
either argument. Even if we accept the revised versions of these 
arguments, there is no reason to accept Dorsey’s account of the 
supererogatory. This response, then, fails to prevent Dorsey’s 
account being impaled on the second horn of the dilemma.  
Another response that Dorsey might make to this dilemma is to 
provide some other reason in favour of making room for this 
additional deontic category. Perhaps Dorsey could argue that he is 
not proposing such a category in order to solve the problem posed 
by Urmson’s argument. Rather he is trying to capture a feature of 
folk moral discourse. It is, after all, a feature of ordinary moral 
discourse that acts can be ‘beyond the call of duty’. Someone 
sympathetic to Dorsey’s view might be tempted to suggest that 
this account should be seen as an attempt to make sense of this 
feature of ordinary moral discourse.  
The problem with this response, though, is that if this is what 
Dorsey’s account of the supererogatory is setting out to achieve 
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then it is unsuccessful. In order for Dorsey’s account to be a 
plausible account of the concept being picked out by ‘beyond the 
call of duty’ we need to accept both that requirements of practical 
reasons are a feature of ordinary normative discourse and that 
these requirements are picked out by the term ‘duty’. It could 
plausibly be argued that the concept of a rational requirement 
plays some role in ordinary talk and thought. It seems reasonable 
enough to think that the concept of a requirement of practical 
reason is being appealed to when people make utterances like, 
“You must do your homework,’ or “You must take your 
medicine.” However, it is implausible to claim that it is this 
concept that is being picked out by the term ‘duty’. This can be 
seen if we substitute ‘have a duty to’ for ‘must’ in the previous 
utterances to read: ‘You have a duty to do your homework’ and 
‘You have a duty to take your medicine.’ It is clear that this 
substitution creates a change in meaning between the two 
sentences, at least if we took the original utterances to refer to 
rational requirements. These new utterances suggest a moral 
requirement not a rational requirement. Dorsey’s account then is 
not a plausible articulation of what is meant by the ordinary 
language phrase ‘beyond the call of duty’. This leaves Dorsey’s 
account back in the grip of a dilemma. If Dorsey’s account is 
supposed to articulate what is meant by the ordinary language 
phrase ‘beyond the call of duty’ then it is unsuccessful. If this is 
not what Dorsey’s definition is designed to achieve then we are 
again left without a motivation for making room for this concept 
in the first place.  
In this section I have argued that Dorsey’s attempt to solve the 
problem of supererogation by offering a new definition of 
supererogation faces a dilemma. I started by looking at the reasons 
why we might be tempted to make room for supererogation in our 
ethical scheme. I then argued that these considerations provide no 
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support for the existence of a deontic category fitting Dorsey’s 
definition. This creates a dilemma for Dorsey’s account. If the 
proponent of this account accepts that these considerations give us 
reason to make for supererogation then it should also be accepted 
that this account fails to solve the problem that the category of the 
supererogatory is supposed to solve. If the proponent rejects these 
considerations then there is no longer a need to make room for any 
category of the supererogatory and the proposed reinterpretation 
of the concept is redundant.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined my account of the definition of 
supererogatory. I started by arguing against qualified accounts of 
supererogation that seek to deny the claim that acts of 
supererogation are optional. I then sought to give an account of 
the comparative component of the definition. I have claimed that 
an act, , is supererogatory for an agent A, at time t, if and only if 
-ing is better than the minimum that morality demands of A at t 
and there is no other obligation that forbids A from -ing or for 
which -ing is the minimum that morality demands of A. I 
finished by defending this approach against a radical alternative 
proposed by Dale Dorsey. In the next two chapters I will 
investigate whether the definition I have given here is an adequate 
account of the sufficiency conditions for supererogation. I will 
consider two challenges to the sufficiency of my definition and 
argue that both challenges fail to provide any reason to 
supplement it with further sufficiency conditions. 
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Chapter Two: Are Acts of Supererogation 
Always Praiseworthy? 
Introduction 
In April 2012 Cory Booker, the Mayor of Newark New Jersey, 
returned home to find his neighbour’s house on fire. After fighting 
off a member of his security staff who attempted to restrain him, 
Booker entered the burning building and saved a woman trapped 
on the second floor of the house. Both Booker and the woman 
survived.1 Like many acts of supererogation it seems to be one 
that the agent is praiseworthy for performing. Many who have 
written on the subject of supererogation have claimed that all acts 
of supererogation are praiseworthy. The view that supererogation 
and praiseworthiness are necessarily connected is so widely 
accepted that it has been described as ‘The Standard Account’ of 
supererogation.2 In this chapter I will investigate whether there is 
any good reason to hold that such a connection exists. The issue is 
an important one. If true it will limit the range of acts that can 
rightfully be classed as supererogatory. However, I will argue that 
there is no necessary connection between the two.  
I will start, in §2.1, by laying out the different views in the 
literature on this topic. In §2.2 I will examine whether the claim 
that acts of supererogation are always praiseworthy follows from 
the analysis of supererogation I gave in Chapter One. I will show 
                                                        
1 BBC (2012). 
2 McNamara says that this is part of ‘The Standard Analysis’ 
(2011 p.203). Mellema says that this is part of ‘The Standard 
Account’ (1991 p17). The view is endorsed by Horgan and 
Timmons (2010 p. 32), Jacobs (1987 p.97), Mellema (1991 p.17, 
Montague (1989 p.102), Peterfreund (1978 p.54) and Raz (1975 
p.164). 
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that it does not. I will then, in §2.3, consider and dismiss what I 
will call ‘The Argument From Stipulation’ in favour of holding 
that acts of supererogation are always praiseworthy. As part of my 
response to this argument I will argue that there is a prima facie 
advantage for allowing acts of supererogation to be unworthy of 
praise. Given this advantage, the onus is on those who wish to 
defend the view that acts of supererogation are always 
praiseworthy to provide a justification for their view. In §2.4 I will 
consider one such justification in the form of Philip Montague’s 
argument from intuition that there exists a necessary connection 
between supererogation and praiseworthiness. However, I will 
argue first, in §2.5, that there is a debunking explanation that can 
be given for these intuitions. I will argue that this debunking 
explanation should be preferred to the claim that there is a 
necessary connection between supererogation and 
praiseworthiness for two reasons. First, as I will argue in §2.6, this 
explanation is favoured by the methodological principle known as 
‘Grice’s Razor’. Second, as I will argue in §2.7, the view that 
there is a necessary connection between supererogation and 
praiseworthiness gets implausible results in cases of practical 
deliberation, while the debunking explanation does not.  
2.1. The Options 
Following Gregory Mellema and Paul McNamara I will call the 
view that there is a necessary connection between supererogation 
and praiseworthiness ‘The Standard View’. I will define this claim 
as follows: 
 
The Standard View: Necessarily, if an act  is supererogatory then 
an agent who performs  will be worthy of praise for -ing.  
According to this view, in order for an act to be supererogatory 
the performance of the act must make the agent worthy of praise.   
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It is important to get clear on what those who defend some form 
of The Standard View are claiming. First, this is a view about 
moral praiseworthiness. There are many ways in which someone 
may be worthy of praise as the result of performing some act. It 
might, for example, have involved an impressive display of skill 
or willpower. The Standard View should be understood as making 
a claim about moral praiseworthiness or what is commonly called 
‘moral worth’. Second, we might understand this claim to mean 
that only agents who have all round praiseworthy characters are 
capable of performing acts of supererogation. This is not how this 
claim should be understood. The point is that the agent must be 
considered praiseworthy with regard to the performance of the act 
in question and what leads the agent to perform it (her motivation, 
dispositions etc). It is quite possible, on this account, for a 
villainous person to perform an act of supererogation (providing 
they are not acting in character).3 All that The Standard View 
requires from the agent in order for the act to be supererogatory is 
that she is worthy of praise for having performed it. 
Not all accounts of supererogation include an assessment of the 
agent as well as the act. Chisholm, for example, defines 
supererogatory acts as those that are, “good but not obligatory to 
do.”4 I will call the view that there is no necessary connection 
between judgements of supererogation and assessments of the 
agent The No Necessary Connection View. I will define this view 
as follows: 
The No Necessary Connection View: It is possible for an act  to 
be supererogatory and for an agent to be unworthy of praise for -
ing.  
                                                        
3 Montague makes this point (1989 p.102). 
4 Chisholm (1963 p.14). 
 86 
The purpose of this chapter will be to defend The No Necessary 
Connection View. I will start by looking at whether 
praiseworthiness is entailed by the basic components of the 
definition of supererogation.  
2.2. Does Supererogation Entail Praiseworthiness? 
In this section I will argue that it does not follow from the analysis 
of supererogation that I gave in Chapter One that acts of 
supererogation are always praiseworthy. 
Simplifying slightly, in Chapter One we saw that the basic 
features of supererogation are as follows:  
Morally Optional: If an act  is supererogatory then -ing is 
neither morally forbidden nor morally required. 
Morally Better: If an act  is supererogatory then -ing is morally 
better than the minimum morality demands.5 
The question I will be answering in this section is whether it 
follows from this that supererogatory acts are always 
praiseworthy. It is worth noting that this rules out one way in 
which we might seek to argue against The Standard View. As we 
saw in Chapter One, Joan Straumanis and Nancy Stanlick both 
argue that some acts of supererogation are morally wrong for 
members of certain groups to perform.6 I have already argued 
against these views and so for my purposes in this chapter I will 
be assuming that an acceptable analysis of supererogation must 
accommodate both Morally Optional and Morally Better.  
We might think that The Standard View follows straightforwardly 
from Morally Better. If the supererogatory acts are the morally 
                                                        
5 The more complex account defended in Chapter One includes a 
precise account of the minimum that morality demands.  
6 Straumanis (1984) and Stanlick (1999). 
 87 
best acts available to an agent then we might think that it follows 
that they will be praiseworthy to perform. Indeed this would 
follow if we assume that it is always praiseworthy to perform the 
morally best act available.  
However, while this claim may seem right at first look it should, 
nevertheless, be rejected. An act can be morally good, even the 
morally best act available, without being praiseworthy, as 
praiseworthiness is primarily a feature of agents. It is agents, after 
all, who are the subject of praise. That is not to say that we cannot 
describe an act as praiseworthy but when we do so what we really 
mean is that the agent is worthy of praise for performing the act. 
Of course, how someone acts plays an important role in 
establishing whether she is praiseworthy or not. However, in order 
to establish whether or not someone is praiseworthy we must look 
to more than simply the act she has performed. It is commonly 
thought that the motivation behind an action contributes to the 
praiseworthiness but not the deontic status of the act. As John 
Stuart Mill puts the point, “the motive has nothing to do with the 
morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent.”7  
Although it is only agents that can be worthy of praise we might 
think that agents will always be worthy of praise whenever they 
perform a morally good action. This is also mistaken. It is after all 
a familiar thought that someone can perform the right action for 
the wrong reasons.8 For example, suppose John is in a situation 
                                                        
7 Mill (2001 p.18). What motives we must look for is subject to 
debate. We might think that the agent must be acting from the 
motive of duty as Kant (1993) does. Alternatively, we might think 
that an act is praiseworthy if it stems from good will, as Arpaly 
(2003 Ch.3) does. Finally, we might think, as Markovits (2010) 
does, that an act is praiseworthy if the agent’s motivating reasons 
coincide with the reasons justifying the act’s performance.   
8 As pointed out by Arpaly (2003 p.69) and Scanlon (2008 pp.56-
57). Kant also distinguishes acts that are in line with duty from 
those that possess moral worth. In order to have moral worth, an 
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where the right thing for him to do is to save a child who is 
drowning in a pond. John saves the child from the pond but he is 
motivated by the thought that doing so will bring about positive 
media attention. Despite the fact that John performs a good action 
in this case we would not think that he is praiseworthy. This is 
because John’s action, while morally desirable, is performed for 
the wrong reasons.9  
Similarly, as Paul McNamara points out, it is possible to perform 
an act that goes beyond duty but fails to be praiseworthy.10 To see 
this consider the following example: 
Cunning Candidate: Jane is a power hungry misanthrope standing 
for election as mayor. She wants to become mayor so she can 
more effectively enact her evil plans. Jane passes a burning 
building and hears a child scream for help. Inspired by the positive 
media reaction to Booker’s act of heroism, Jane recognizes that by 
running into the burning building she could save the child and also 
that doing so is likely to win her some votes in the forthcoming 
election. Jane has no concern whatsoever for the safety of the 
                                                        
act must be performed by an agent who is motivated in the right 
way (1993 p.11). 
9 In response to this it might be suggested that there are two ways 
in which an agent can be deemed to be praiseworthy. One is in 
virtue of her character traits and the other is in virtue of an act that 
she has performed. Gregory Trianosky suggests a proposal along 
these lines for moral blameworthiness. According to Trianosky an 
agent can be worthy of deontic blame for performing a wrong 
action or failing to perform an obligatory action and worthy of 
aretaic blame for possessing character traits that are the fitting 
subject of criticism (1986 pp.29-30). Whatever the strengths of 
this proposal for moral blame I take it that it is not plausible to 
posit the equivalent claim for moral praiseworthiness. We would 
not in the case of someone who performs the right act for the 
wrong reasons think that he is the fitting subject of any form of 
praise. 
10 (2011 p.208).  
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child in itself and is motivated solely by a desire to gain votes in 
the election. 
It seems reasonable to think that this act is morally optional and 
morally better than the alternative acts Jane could perform, such 
as phoning the fire brigade. Nevertheless, because of Jane’s 
motives we would not think that she is praiseworthy for acting in 
this way.  
Another way in which an act can fail to be praiseworthy is if it is 
performed accidentally. Consider the following example: 
Accidental Donation: Louise makes a large donation that she can 
comfortably afford to a famine charity by bank transfer. However, 
Louise donated the money by accident. She had intended to 
transfer the money between two of her own accounts to enable her 
to buy an expensive car. Louise would like to retrieve the money 
but is unable to do so. 
The act of donating the money to charity is morally good. It 
certainly seems to be morally better than buying the expensive 
car. However, Louise is not praiseworthy for acting in this way, as 
she did so accidentally.  
We might worry that the basic components of the definition of 
supererogation we have considered in this section miss an 
important aspect of an acceptable definition. Perhaps saying that 
an act is beyond the call of duty suggests that the agent is able to 
hear this ‘call’ which we might think means that an agent must be 
aware of the moral reasons that support performing the act. We 
might think that by rejecting the existence of a necessary 
connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness, The No 
Necessary Connection View will be unable to make an awareness 
of the moral reasons part of the definition.  
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The first point to make in response is that it would be a mistake to 
read too much into what is suggested by this phrase. The fact that 
the ordinary language phrase suggests a subjectivist reading does 
not give us any conclusive reason to hold a subjectivist view of 
supererogation.  
More importantly, however, this objection rests on a confused 
understanding of exactly what a supporter of The No Necessary 
Connection View is committed to. First, this view is compatible 
with a subjectivist view of supererogation, which holds that 
whether or not an act is supererogatory is determined by the 
agent’s beliefs about her situation.11 We might worry that, while 
perhaps not incompatible, it would be strange for a subjectivist to 
hold The No Necessary Connection View. However, this worry 
disappears when we keep in mind the point that for an agent to be 
praiseworthy for performing an act she must be motivated in the 
right way. Subjectivism about rightness is a view about the 
relationship between an agent’s beliefs and the rightness of an 
action. A subjectivist about rightness can hold a similar view 
about supererogation whilst maintaining that an agent need not be 
motivated in the right way in order to be said to have performed 
an act of supererogation. 
Finally, it is compatible with The No Necessary Connection View 
that acts of supererogation must satisfy some form of intention 
requirement. A full discussion of the relationship between 
intentions and supererogation must wait until Chapter Three but 
for now it is worth pointing out that an act can be performed with 
morally worthwhile intentions without being motivated in the 
right way. In the case of Jane, for example, the act is intentional 
under the description, ‘saving a child’s life’ but is not motivated in 
                                                        
11 For a defence of the subjectivist view of moral rightness see 
Smith (2010).  
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a praiseworthy way. Jane certainly seems to intend to perform a 
morally good act, as this is why she thinks performing the act will 
be popular with voters. Louise, on the other hand, would not count 
as performing an act of supererogation on this account, as her 
donation would not meet this intention requirement.  
To sum up this section, performing an action that satisfies Morally 
Optional and Morally Better is not sufficient for an agent to be 
worthy of moral praise. In order to be deserving of such praise an 
agent must perform the act for the right reason. This means that 
we cannot conclude from the fact that an act is morally better than 
the available non-supererogatory alternatives that the agent is 
worthy of praise for performing it.  
2.3. The Argument from Stipulation 
In the last section we saw that it does not follow from the basic 
components of the definition of supererogation that all such acts 
are praiseworthy. One way in which a supporter of The Standard 
View might seek to respond to this point is to say that we should 
reserve the term ‘supererogation’ for acts that are praiseworthy. 
Rather than thinking that it follows from the basic definition of 
supererogation that these acts are always praiseworthy we might 
instead simply stipulate that praiseworthiness is part of the 
definition of supererogation.12 
Of course, it is not enough for those wishing to defend this view 
simply to make this stipulation; they need to provide us with some 
reason to think that we should accept it. McNamara claims that 
this stipulation is acceptable due to “the absence of any real use of 
‘supererogation’ except as a technical term”.13 McNamara’s claim 
is that because ‘supererogation’ is a technical term used only by 
                                                        
12  This is how McNamara (2011 p.204) explains this possibility.  
13 McNamara (2011 p.204). 
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philosophers we are free to stipulate that it should be reserved for 
acts for which the agent is praiseworthy for performing. By itself 
this does not give us reason to include it in the definition of 
‘supererogation’, just licence to do so if we find a good reason to. 
Jason Kawall argues that there is good reason to do so because it 
is, “useful to have a term for actions in which everything goes 
right.”14 The thought here is that reserving the term 
‘supererogation’ for cases where the agent is praiseworthy will 
prove a useful distinction that will allow us to quickly identify 
whether we are talking about acts that merely exceed duty or the 
subset of those acts for which the agent is praiseworthy. 
Combining these two thoughts provides us with an argument in 
favour of including a praiseworthiness condition in the definition 
of supererogation. If we accept both these claims then it follows 
that we should restrict the term in this way. 
Again the problem with this argument lies not in the reasoning but 
in the premises. The claim that technical terms should be defined 
in whatever way is most useful seems to be an acceptable point of 
philosophical methodology. If philosophers are going to invent a 
term then they should use it in whatever way will be most useful. 
However, the other premises are more problematic. There is good 
reason to reject both of these claims.  
The first claim we should reject is that ‘supererogation’ is a 
technical term used only by philosophers. The term 
‘supererogation’ was not invented by moral philosophers but by 
Christian theologians to refer to those acts that go beyond what is 
commanded by God.15 As the term is used in theology to refer to 
acts that go beyond what is required by duty we should use the 
term in the same way in moral philosophy. Moreover, 
                                                        
14 Kawall (2003 p.495).  
15 Heyd (2011). 
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‘supererogatory’ is used in ordinary language to mean 
‘superfluous’.16 This use of the term is easier to reconcile with the 
simple ‘beyond duty’ definition and harder to reconcile with 
‘beyond duty and praiseworthy’.  
The claim that this is the most useful way to define the term can 
also be rejected. The first reason to do so is that the term has a 
long history of being used by moral philosophers to refer to all 
acts that go beyond duty, not just the acts of this kind for which 
the agent is praiseworthy. We have already seen that this is how 
the term is used in Christian theology and it is the most common 
use of the term in contemporary moral philosophy as well. Dale 
Dorsey17, Michael Ferry18, David Heyd19, Douglas Portmore20 and 
Justin Weinberg21 all define supererogation as acts that are beyond 
duty without making reference to these acts being praiseworthy. 
As a result, those who see the value in having a term that refers to 
a subset of the acts that are beyond duty should coin a new term. 
Of course, supererogation also has a history of being defined in 
terms of praiseworthiness. However, many who endorse this view 
do so from the mistaken assumption that if an act is beyond the 
call of duty it follows that it is also praiseworthy. Both Mellema 
and Cohen, for example, identify supererogatory acts as those that 
are ‘beyond the call of duty’ and then claim that these acts are 
                                                        
16 This use of the term is pointed out by Heyd (2011, Section 2 
and Section 4). Further support for this claim comes from The 
Oxford English Dictionary (2013) which gives the following 
example of this use of the term, which appeared in Time Out in 
1996: ‘By the time he gets his head bashed in, you hate him so 
much you could supply a supererogatory kick in the face.’  Thanks 
to Richard Rowland for pointing out this usage. 
17 (2013 p.356). 
18 (2013). 
19 (1982).  
20 (2011 p.91). 
21 (2011 p.274).  
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necessarily praiseworthy.22 However, as we saw in §2.2 this is not 
the case.  
Second, the most philosophically interesting questions about 
supererogation concern the possibility of acts that are beyond 
duty, not just those for which the agent is worthy of praise for 
performing. For example, the issue of how to understand the 
relationship between moral reasons and moral obligations in a 
way that makes room for the supererogatory is concerned with all 
acts that go beyond duty. The same is true for the question of how 
best to reconcile normative ethical theories with the possibility of 
supererogation. In both cases the issues are concerned with all acts 
that are beyond duty and not just the subset of these acts for which 
the agent is praiseworthy. 
Finally, a definition of supererogation that does not include 
praiseworthiness in the definition has the advantage of offering a 
unified set of deontic concepts. As we saw in the previous section, 
it is a recognisable feature of our ordinary moral discourse that 
people can do the right thing for the wrong reasons and as a result 
deserve no praise for acting in this way. Likewise, many people 
think it is possible to perform the wrong act but be in no way 
blameworthy for doing so, if for example the agent has an excuse. 
This suggests that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are not 
part of the definition of rightness and wrongness. There is nothing 
to stop defenders of The Standard View from accepting this. 
However, if they do accept this then on their account 
                                                        
22 Mellema (1991 p.16) argues that being ‘beyond the call of duty’ 
is the core of any analysis of supererogation, before going on to 
argue that acts that are beyond the call of duty are necessarily 
praiseworthy. The root of this mistake seems to be that Mellema 
sees ‘praiseworthy’ as roughly equivalent to ‘morally good’ (1991 
p.24). Cohen (Forthcoming p.1) identifies supererogatory acts as 
those that are beyond the call of duty before endorsing Mellema’s 
analysis of such acts.  
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supererogation possesses a necessary connection to an assessment 
of the agent’s motives that moral obligation and wrongness do 
not. This presents a prima facie disadvantage for defining 
supererogation in terms of praiseworthiness, as it presents a less 
unified account of our deontic concepts. This view is committed 
to this additional connection is not in itself problematic but it does 
seem like a difference that calls for an explanation. If we are to 
accept the claim that supererogation is different from obligation 
and prohibition in this way then I think that we need to be given 
good reason to do so. In the absence of such a reason we should 
prefer an account that does not posit this divide.  
To sum up, it has been suggested that there is good reason to 
define ‘supererogation’ as the subset of acts that are beyond the 
call of duty for which the agent is praiseworthy for performing. I 
have argued that there are good reasons to reject this argument 
and maintain the equivalence of supererogatory acts with those 
that are beyond the call of duty. In responding to this argument we 
found that a prima facie advantage for The No Necessary 
Connection View is that, unlike The Standard View, it does not 
posit a divide between supererogation and other deontic concepts. 
This should not be considered a decisive blow but as a challenge 
that defenders of The Standard View should seek to respond to. In 
the following section I will consider a possible justification that 
might be given for this divide.  
2.4. The Necessary Connection Argument 
So far we have seen that the claim that acts of supererogation are 
always praiseworthy does not follow from Morally Optional and 
Morally Better. We have also seen that we should not accept the 
claim that we should simply stipulate that supererogatory acts 
must be praiseworthy. In this section I will evaluate an argument 
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given by Montague in favour of the claim that acts of 
supererogation are always praiseworthy.  
Montague accepts that it does not follow from Morally Optional 
and Morally Better that acts of supererogation are always 
praiseworthy. However, he argues that this gives us reason to 
reject this as a full analysis of supererogation rather than to reject 
the claim that acts of supererogation are always praiseworthy. 
Montague explains his view in the following: 
Something is surely missing from this account of 
supererogation. For suppose A is an action which is neither 
required nor prohibited, but which is nevertheless morally 
valuable in virtue of being particularly beneficent. Since 
this characterization of A implies nothing about the 
motives with which it is performed, we can also suppose 
that the person doing A acts at his own convenience and 
for his own enjoyment. Should we regard A as 
supererogatory? I think not – and this because the person 
who performs A deserves no special credit or praise for 
having acted. The point is that supererogatory acts are 
necessarily praiseworthy – a point which is reinforced by 
the examples cited by supererogationists as paradigms of 
supererogatory acts, and by the frequent (even if largely 
unexplained) references to praiseworthiness in discussion 
of supererogation.23   
Montague makes three points in this passage to support the 
existence of a necessary connection between supererogation and 
praiseworthiness. The first is an appeal to intuition. As Montague 
points out there is something quite odd about claiming that 
someone has performed an act of supererogation without being 
praiseworthy for doing so.24 If we were told that someone has 
performed an act of supererogation we would usually take this to 
be evidence that the agent is praiseworthy for having acted in this 
way. To return to the case of Cunning Candidate, suppose we 
know nothing about the case and we are told the following, ‘Jane 
                                                        
23 (1989 p.102) 
24 Peterfreund makes a similar point (1978 p.55). 
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performed an act of supererogation.’ It is quite appropriate to take 
from this utterance that the speaker views Jane as praiseworthy for 
acting as she did. We would certainly think it misleading for 
someone to tell us this if she were aware of what motivated Jane 
to perform her act. Montague’s next claim is that the best way of 
accounting for this intuitive oddness is by appealing to the 
existence of a necessary connection between supererogation and 
praiseworthiness. Finally, positing such a connection enables us to 
explain why the paradigm cases of supererogation involve 
praiseworthy agents and why it is so common for people to define 
supererogation in terms of praiseworthiness.  
Montague takes this intuition to provide conclusive evidence for 
the existence of a necessary connection between supererogation 
and praiseworthiness. However, as I will argue in the next section, 
this is not the only way in which these intuitions can be accounted 
for. 
2.5. A Debunking Explanation 
Until now, those seeking to provide an explanation for the 
intuition examined in the previous section have assumed that the 
only way to do so is to appeal to the existence of a necessary 
connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness. In this 
section I will argue that an alternative explanation for these 
intuitions is that asserting that an act is supererogatory tends to 
convey via conversational implicature that the agent is 
praiseworthy for performing it. I will defend the viability of this 
explanation by showing that the connection between 
supererogation and praiseworthiness passes all the tests that are 
commonly used to identify conversational implicatures. I will 
then, in the following sections, argue that there is good reason to 
prefer this explanation to that proposed by Montague.  
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At this point we should consider a point of philosophical 
methodology introduced by Paul Grice. Grice noted that a 
common philosophical manoeuvre is to draw conclusions about a 
word’s meaning from the fact that its use would be inappropriate 
in certain kinds of situation.25 Grice warned that we should be 
careful about the application of this method, as there may be other 
reasons, stemming from the general principles of discourse, that 
can explain why the use of the word would be inappropriate in a 
given context.  
Grice claims that conversations operate according to what he calls 
‘The Cooperative Principle’.26 This principle states, roughly, that 
speakers ought, all things being equal, to make their contribution 
to the conversation such that it fits with the purpose or direction of 
the conversation. Grice gives four maxims for this principle:27 
 
Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as 
required and not more informative than is required.  
 
Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false or lack 
adequate evidence for.  
 
Relation: Be relevant.  
 
Manner: Avoid obscurity of expression and ambiguity and 
be brief and orderly. 
 
Grice argued that the assumption that speakers are following these 
maxims gives rise to ‘conversational implicatures’. These he 
defines as follows: 
 
 By saying, p, utterer U conversationally implicates q iff: 
1. U is presumed to be following the maxims 
2. the supposition q is required to maintain (1) 
                                                        
25 (1989 p.20). 
26 Grice (1989 p.26). 
27 Grice (1989 p.26-27). 
 99 
3. U thinks the recipient will realize (2).28 
 
These implicatures then are not part of the conventional meaning 
of the word or phrase used by the speaker but are communicated 
by the use of the words in a certain conversational context. In 
addition to these implicatures Grice claimed that there are also 
‘conventional implicatures’.29 Like conversational implicatures, 
these do not form part of the literal meaning of the term. However, 
unlike conversational implicatures, the implicature is part of the 
conventional meaning of the term. I will be arguing that 
praiseworthiness is not part of the conventional meaning of the 
term ‘supererogation’ or the phrase ‘beyond the call of duty’. This 
will show, then, that praiseworthiness is neither part of the truth 
conditional content nor conventionally implicated by 
‘supererogation’.  
 
However, these positive arguments must wait for now, as in this 
section I merely wish to establish that explaining the intuitions 
considered in the previous section in terms of conversational 
implicature is a viable alternative to positing a necessary 
connection. I will do so by showing that the connection passes the 
tests that can be used to identify conversational implicatures. 
Grice provides six tests for identifying conversational 
implicatures: 
a) Conversational impliciata are capable of being “worked 
out” on the basis, inter alia, of the Cooperative Principle. 
That is, they are calculable.  
(b) Conversational implicata are cancellable. 
         
(c) Conversational implicata are nondetachable.        
         
                                                        
28 Grice (1989 pp.30-31) summarized in this way by Levinson 
(2000 p.15).  
29 Grice (1989 p.26). 
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 (d) Conversational implicata are not part of the meaning 
of the uttered forms. They are nonconventional.. 
                                 
(e) Conversational implicata are not carried by what is 
said, but by the saying of it.    
          
(f) Conversational implicata may be indeterminate.30 
 
According to Grice these tests, while not conclusive, are fairly 
reliable indicators of conversational implicata. 
However, the adequacy of these tests has been challenged.  Tests 
(a), (d), (e) and (f) have all been claimed to be of no help in 
identifying implicatures.31 Whereas, (b), (c) and the additional test 
of reinforcibility have all been claimed to be useful ones that 
should be used. This is not the place for a discussion what the best 
available tests for conversational implicature are and it is fair to 
say that the rejection of Grice’s first test is controversial. This test 
is commonly used to test whether a conversational implicature is 
present.32  To avoid this controversy I will be testing whether the 
connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness is: 1. 
Cancellable                2. Non-detachable 3. Reinforcible and 4. 
Calculable. We are now in a position to apply these tests to the 
topic at hand.  
Test 1 Cancellability 
The first test I will apply to the question is that of cancellability. 
According to Grice, conversational implicatures can be denied 
without contradiction or misuse of words. 33 While this test is a 
useful one in testing for conversational implicature things are not 
always as straightforward as they are in these examples. As 
                                                        
30 Grice (1989 pp. 39-40), compiled in this way by Saddock (1991 
p.367). 
31 Saddock (1991 p.367). 
32 For example, see Strandberg (2012).  
33 Grice (1989 p.39). 
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Saddock points out, the more generalized the conversational 
implicature the less clear it will be that cancelling the implicature 
does not involve some form of misuse of words.34 Nevertheless, 
even highly generalized conversational implicatures will be more 
cancellable than conventional implicatures.35 We are now in a 
position to apply the test to supererogation to see whether the 
implicature can be cancelled. Consider the following utterance: 
It was beyond the call of duty for the election candidate to 
save the child but she deserves no praise for doing so.  
As pointed out in §1 there does seem to be something odd about 
this. For this reason the connection between supererogation 
utterances and praiseworthiness cannot be one of particularized 
conversational implicature. However, the implicature is 
sufficiently cancellable to be counted as conversational rather than 
conventional. We can see this by comparing it to the following 
case where praiseworthiness is part of the conventional meaning 
of the word: 
The election candidate became a heroine by saving the 
child but she deserves no moral praise for doing so.  
In this case the speaker would be guilty of misusing the word 
‘heroine’. When compared to a case of clear conventional 
meaning such as this one we can see that, the implicature is 
cancellable, albeit less obviously cancellable than particularized 
conversational implicature. As a result, applying the cancellability 
test supports the claim that the connection between supererogation 
and praiseworthiness is one of generalized conversational 
implicature.  
                                                        
34 Saddock (1991 p.373). 
35 Saddock (1991 p.373). 
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Test 2 Non-Detachability  
The second test for conversational implicature is that of non-
detachability. If the connection between supererogation and 
praiseworthiness is one of conversational implicature then it will 
not be possible to say something that shares the core meaning of 
the first utterance but lacks the implicature.36 We can see this by 
considering the following utterance: 
 It was beyond the call of duty for the candidate to save the 
child 
If the claim I am defending is true then this will typically convey 
the following via generalized conversational implicature: 
The candidate is praiseworthy.  
Now the question we must ask is whether we can make a claim 
that shares the same core meaning as the utterance without 
conveying the implicature. The answer is that we cannot. Consider 
the following utterance:  
By saving the child, the candidate did more than was 
required of her.  
Even though a new phrase is used in this example the implicature, 
that the candidate is praiseworthy for having acted as she did, 
remains. The non-detachability test also supports the claim that 
the connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness is 
one of conversational implicature.  
Test 3 Reinforcibility 
The third test for conversational implicature is that of 
reinforcibility. If an implicature is conversational then it should be 
                                                        
36 Grice (1989 p.39). 
 103 
possible to make the implicature explicit without this explicit 
statement of the proposition being redundant.37 Let us now look at 
whether this test supports the claim that the connection between 
supererogation and praiseworthiness is one of generalized 
conversational implicature. This test clearly supports my position. 
We can see why by considering the following: 
It was beyond the call of duty for Julie to give money to 
charity and  she is worthy of praise for having done so.  
The second half of this utterance gives an explicit statement of the 
proposition conveyed by implicature without being redundant. 
This second half of the above utterance makes absolutely clear 
that the speaker thinks that Julie’s act makes her worthy of praise. 
Applying this test gives us even more reason to think that the 
connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness is one of 
generalized conversational implicature.  
Test 4 Calculability 
 
The final test is that of calculability. Grice argued that if an 
implicature is conversational then it should be possible to work 
out the implicature using The Cooperative Principle.38 
Conventional implicatures, on the other hand, are not calculable. 
Saying an implicature is calculable does not mean that this is the 
only process by which we come to understand that there is an 
implicature conveyed. The point is that, even if we grasp the 
implicature intuitively, if the implicature is conversational we 
should be able to rationally reconstruct it. We do this by working 
out what needs to be presupposed about what the speaker intends 
                                                        
37 Saddock (1991 p.374).  
38 Grice (1989 p.31). 
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to communicate in order for the speaker to be said to be following 
The Cooperative Principle.  
 
Let’s start with the uncontroversial claim that a central purpose of 
moral discourse is to influence how we behave in different 
situations.39 This partly consists in working out what act to 
perform. It also involves working out how to respond to people 
who have acted in certain ways. So when we ask whether killing 
is wrong we want to know both whether we should kill and how 
we should respond to those who kill.40 I will call these two 
features of moral discourse ‘Act Directives’ and ‘Response 
Directives’.41   
With this distinction in hand we are now in a position to point out 
the conversational context in which the intuition appealed to in §4 
occurs. We are told that it would be odd to describe an act as 
supererogatory when the agent is not praiseworthy for performing 
it. In this conversational context the primary goal of the 
conversation is to assess how to respond to this act. This puts us in 
a position to give a rational reconstruction of the implicature 
carried by supererogation assertions. Consider the following 
assertion: 
 Cory performed an act of supererogation. 
                                                        
39 For a defence of the claim that influencing behaviour is one of 
the central purposes of moral conversation see Strandberg (2012 
p.105–108). 
40 Scanlon makes a similar point about the two roles moral 
principles can play (2010 p.23). He claims that moral principles 
serve as both standards of criticism and guides for action. 
41 Of course, in so far as our responses are themselves acts, 
Response Directives are directing us to perform acts as well. The 
point, though, is that while Act Directives direct us to perform the 
acts being discussed, Response Directives direct us to respond in 
certain ways to the acts being discussed.  
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Given what has just be said, we should accept that the primary 
purpose of this assertion is likely to be response directing. This 
makes it clear why these assertions commonly carry the 
implicature that the act is praiseworthy. When we are assessing 
the deontic status of an act that has already been performed, we 
are primarily interested in how we should respond to this act. 
Given this goal, in order to take a speaker of the above assertion to 
be complying with the maxim of relation, we must suppose that 
the speaker views Cory as being worthy of praise for performing 
the act.  
The fact that this implicature does not require any special 
conversational context provides a response to one line of objection 
that might be raised against my attempt to explain these intuitions 
without appealing to a necessary connection. It might be objected 
that explaining the intuition in terms of implicature can only 
account for the oddness of utterances that class non-praiseworthy 
acts as supererogatory. However, the original point Montague 
made was that it would be odd to regard acts as both 
supererogatory and unworthy of praise. The point then is that we 
need to explain why this would seem odd even in cases where we 
are considering the oddness of thinking an act to be 
supererogatory rather than asserting that it is. By positing a 
generalized form of conversational implicature, however, we can 
say that the reason why it seems odd to regard an act as 
supererogatory but not praiseworthy is that the implicature is so 
widespread that we have internalized the pragmatic connection 
between the two.42 This explains why it remains odd to imagine 
someone regarding an act as supererogatory but not praiseworthy. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the case we are asked to 
                                                        
42 A similar point is made in a different context by Strandberg 
(2011 p.350). 
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consider is not entirely devoid of context. We are after all asked to 
consider the application of ‘supererogatory’ in the context of 
assessing another person’s act. I will return to this point in §2.7 
when I give an argument against The Standard View.  
Another challenge that might be raised at this point is that nothing 
has been said to explain how we can explain the other reasons that 
Montague gives for accepting The Standard View. As we saw in 
§2.4, in addition to explaining the intuitions we have about the 
case of Cunning Candidate, The Standard View also explains why 
paradigm cases of supererogation involve praiseworthy agents and 
why it is so common for people to define ‘supererogation’ in 
terms of praiseworthiness.  
However, the view that supererogation assertions convey claims 
about the praiseworthiness of the agent is able to provide adequate 
explanations for both of these issues. First, given the existence of 
a generalized conversational implicature between supererogation 
and praiseworthiness it would be odd if people used examples of 
agents who are not praiseworthy when attempting to give 
paradigm cases. The reason for this is that the aim in giving these 
cases is to clearly illustrate the kinds of act in question. It would 
be confusing to do so by using examples of the unusual cases 
where no implicature is present. Second, there are two reasons 
why people might commonly define supererogation in terms of 
praiseworthiness. One reason is that many people mistakenly 
think that a morally good act is necessarily praiseworthy. The 
second is that people commonly mistake the content conveyed by 
these implicatures for part of the truth conditional content of the 
term.43 Given the frequency with which this mistake is made it 
should come as no surprise that it has been made here. 
                                                        
43 As Grice points out (1989 Ch.1). 
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In this section I have suggested that rather than viewing the 
intuition considered in §2.5 as evidence of a necessary connection, 
we can instead explain this intuition by appealing to the presence 
of conversational implicature.  In the next two sections I will 
argue that this explanation is superior to that offered by The 
Standard View.  
2.6. Grice’s Razor 
The first reason to think we should prefer the debunking 
explanation over the appeal to a necessary connection is given by 
a methodological principle that Grice termed ‘Modified Occam’s 
Razor’ but which I will, following Wayne Davis, call ‘Grice’s 
Razor’.44 Grice defines this as the principle that, “Senses are not 
to be multiplied beyond necessity.”45 What this means is that if 
there is a plausible pragmatic explanation that can be given for 
some linguistic phenomena then we should prefer this to an 
explanation that increases a term’s semantic complexity. This can 
be applied in several ways. First, if to account for some linguistic 
phenomena we must choose between positing a more restrictive 
use of a term or a pragmatic explanation then we should choose 
the latter. The same holds for a choice between positing a brute 
ambiguity and a pragmatic explanation. The justification for this 
principle is that it is a principle of parsimony. Applying it helps to 
provide simpler theories by opposing the unwarranted postulation 
of entities and by ensuring that no theories are postulated to 
explain something that can already be explained by a theory we 
are already committed to.46  
                                                        
44 Grice (1989 p.47). The label ‘Grice’s Razor’ is given by Davis 
(1998 p.19) 
45 (1989 p.47). 
46 These points are made by Hazlett (2007 p.674). 
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When we apply Grice’s Razor to the two explanations we have for 
the intuition raised in §2.4 we can see that this principle supports 
the debunking explanation. Accounting for this intuition by 
positing a necessary connection to praiseworthiness increases the 
semantic complexity of the term, as instead of one term to cover 
all kinds of act that go beyond duty we now have two; one that 
applies to all acts that go beyond what is morally required and one 
that covers the subset of these acts that the agent is worthy of 
praise for performing. The debunking explanation, on the other 
hand gives a pragmatic explanation for this intuition. If we accept 
that the pragmatic explanation is a viable one then it would be 
theoretically redundant to accept a more restrictive use of the term 
‘supererogation’ to explain a datum that can already be explained 
by existing theoretical commitments.  
2.7. An Argument Against The Standard View 
So far we have seen that there is an alternative explanation that 
can be given for the intuition that supporters of The Standard 
View take to be evidence for their view and that given this, 
Grice’s Razor suggests that we should reject the existence of a 
necessary connection between the two. In this section I will 
provide an additional argument against The Standard View. 
Until now we have considered uses of the phrase in situations 
where we are being asked to appraise another agent’s action. As 
we have already seen, in these contexts it would be strange to 
assert that an act is beyond the call of duty but that the agent is not 
praiseworthy for performing it. However, when we change the 
conversational context to one where someone is asking for advice 
about how to act then the connection between supererogation and 
praiseworthiness appears far weaker. Suppose Cory Booker had 
asked one of his aides whether he ought to run into the burning 
building. In response she says, ‘That would be beyond the call of 
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duty.’ This is not an unusual use of the phrase. However, if we 
accept The Standard View then the aide would be saying 
something quite extraordinary, as rather than simply informing 
Booker of the moral status of the action she has also made a 
speculative predication about what will motivate Booker’s action.  
After all, this is part of what will determine the truth or falsity of 
her assertion according to The Standard View. Given that this is 
an acceptable use of the phrase it seems as if The Standard View 
is committed either to accepting that the aide is making a 
prediction in this case or to attributing error to those who use the 
phrase in this way. Neither is an attractive option. 
On the other hand, if we accept The No Necessary Connection 
View then the aide’s assertion is perfectly understandable. 
According to this view the aide is simply making a comment 
about the deontic status of the action and not making any 
prediction about what would motivate Booker to perform it. If we 
want a view of supererogation that is able to make sense of a 
common usage of the term and its ordinary language equivalent 
then we seem forced to accept that whether or not an agent is 
praiseworthy for performing an act does not determine the term’s 
truth conditions.  
What this tells us is that The Standard View brings with it 
implausible results in cases of practical deliberation. While 
positing a necessary connection between supererogation and 
praiseworthiness gets the right result in cases where we are 
assessing another’s conduct, albeit in a theoretically extravagant 
way, it is implausible to think that such a connection exists in 
cases where we are asking for advice about our own conduct. 
Given that the debunking explanation allows us to explain the 
intuition without bringing about this strange result in cases of 
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practical deliberation, it should be preferred to The Standard 
View.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have investigated whether supererogation and 
praiseworthiness are connected in some way. I argued first that 
acts that satisfy Morally Optional and Morally Better may be 
performed by an agent who is motivated in such a way that he is 
not praiseworthy for acting. It does not follow then from the 
common understanding of supererogation as going beyond duty 
that such acts will always be praiseworthy. Moreover, the fact that 
other deontic concepts are not tied to praise or blameworthiness 
gives us reason to favour The No Necessary Connection View. I 
then considered The Stipulation Argument, which I rejected on the 
grounds that ‘supererogation’ is not a technical term that is used 
only by philosophers and more importantly is not most usefully 
defined in terms of praiseworthiness. I then moved on to consider 
what I took to be the most plausible argument in favour of The 
Standard View, The Necessary Connection Argument. I 
responded to this argument by offering a debunking explanation 
for the intuition used to motivate it. I then gave two reasons to 
favour this debunking explanation. First, the methodological 
principle of parsimony known as ‘Grice’s Razor’ speaks against 
positing a semantic explanation when a pragmatic one is available. 
Second, positing a necessary connection between supererogation 
and praiseworthiness gets implausible results in cases of practical 
deliberation. The conclusion of this discussion then is that there is 
no good reason to think that an agent who performs an act of 
supererogation will always be praiseworthy for doing so. 
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Chapter Three: Supererogation and 
Intentions1 
In the previous chapter I investigated the relationship between 
supererogation and praiseworthiness, arguing that it is possible for 
an act to be supererogatory without being praiseworthy. In this 
chapter I will investigate the relationship between supererogation 
and intentions. In particular, I will be investigating David Heyd’s 
claim that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent 
performing the act must possess altruistic intentions.2 According 
to Heyd, acts of supererogation must be performed with the 
intention of benefitting people other than the agent.3 I will name 
this feature of Heyd’s definition The Altruistic Requirement. This 
claim is important for the same reason that the discussion of 
praiseworthiness was important.  Accepting this claim will limit 
the range of acts that can rightfully be classed as supererogatory, 
which in turn will have implications for the issues I will consider 
in the second half of the thesis.  
I will start this chapter by looking at why we might think that 
supererogatory acts are performed with altruistic intent. According 
to Heyd, this requirement allows us to make sense of the 
meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. I will argue that, 
even if we accept the need to make room for the meritorious 
nature of supererogation, there is also good reason to think that 
Heyd’s requirement is overly restrictive. We can accommodate 
everything that Heyd wants to say in a way that avoids the 
problematic restrictions of Heyd’s view by replacing Heyd’s 
                                                        
1 This chapter is largely based on Archer (2013).  
2 (1982 p.115). 
3 (Heyd 1982 p.136). 
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requirement with a moral intention requirement. I will finish by 
pointing out that the reasons that Heyd gives in support of the 
view that classing an act as supererogatory involves an assessment 
of the agent’s intentions does not, as Heyd suggests, give us 
reason to include this as a separate condition in my definition of 




3.1. Why include The Altruism Requirement in the 
definition? 
I will start by investigating the reasons for making The Altruism 
Requirement a necessary requirement for acts of supererogation. 
Heyd argues that this requirement is needed to make sense of the 
claim that acts of supererogation are meritorious.4 Heyd argues 
that without this requirement, an act could count as supererogatory 
even if it is completely lacking in moral merit. In this section I 
will investigate how we should understand merit and explain the 
importance of merit for understanding supererogation.   
Heyd argues that moral merit is an essential feature of acts of 
supererogation.5 By ‘merit’ Heyd, means something distinct from 
‘praiseworthiness’. It is unclear exactly how we should understand 
this distinction. One way that Heyd distinguishes the two is 
unconvincing. Heyd argues that praiseworthiness can be 
influenced by a variety of reasons, such as the agent performing 
the act, the person doing the praising and the consequences that 
the praise might have, while merit is related more strictly to what 
                                                        
4 (1982 p.136). 
5 (1982 p.132). 
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is deserved.6 This, though, seems to be a strange way to think of 
praiseworthiness. Those who agree with Peter Strawson’s claim 
that the desirability of praising or blaming someone is the wrong 
kind of reason to praise or blame them would be unlikely to accept 
this claim.7 Nevertheless I think Heyd is right to think that there is 
a distinction that can be made here between acts that are 
praiseworthy and acts that are worthy of some other form of 
positive appraisal.  
A more promising way of making the distinction is suggested by 
Heyd’s claim that the principles of merit, “take into consideration 
primarily the act itself and not the agent’s motives, virtues, 
strength of will.”8 This way of distinguishing between the two 
makes the merit an agent receives from performing an act distinct 
from her praiseworthiness. While merit is focused only on the act, 
praiseworthiness is also concerned with the character of the agent. 
Merit then is concerned with everything praiseworthiness is 
concerned with apart from that relating to the character of the 
agent. Given this we might think that an act is meritorious if and 
only if it would be praiseworthy if performed for the right reasons. 
In other words, the act would be praiseworthy if it is the 
appropriate features of the situation that motivate the agent to 
perform the act. However, this would not explain why merit is 
supposed to be a form of positive appraisal. Someone who 
accidentally performs an act that would have been praiseworthy if 
performed for the right reasons is not worthy of any form of 
positive appraisal. There must, then, be an intentional component 
to merit. Given this, I propose the following definition: 
                                                        
6 (1982 p.139). 
7 (1968) 
8 (1982 p.139). 
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Moral Merit: An act is morally meritorious if and only if it is an 
act that is intentional under a description such that it would be 
praiseworthy if performed for the right reasons.9   
According to this definition, an agent can be said to have earned 
moral merit if under a legitimate description of the agent’s 
intentions, the agent would be morally praiseworthy for 
performing the act if motivated by the appropriate features of the 
situation. This definition allows us to clearly see the relationship 
between praiseworthiness and merit. Merit is separate from 
praiseworthiness, as it is possible for an act to be meritorious 
without being praiseworthy (when the agent is motivated by the 
wrong reasons). Of course, it seems reasonable to think that the 
two are closely related, as it is plausible to think that whenever an 
agent performs a meritorious act for the right reasons she will be 
praiseworthy. Nevertheless, for my purposes in this chapter it is 
sufficient to point out that the two can come apart.  
Introducing the idea of merit allows us to associate the 
performance of a supererogatory act with a special kind of 
positive appraisal that is distinct from praiseworthiness. It is 
important to do so, as agents who perform acts of supererogation 
do seem to be worthy of positive appraisal. When someone 
performs an act like Autrey’s we think it right that he should 
receive special recognition for his actions.  
We are now in a position to see the importance of the Altruistic 
Intention Requirement. This requirement can, in Heyd’s words, 
                                                        
9 The terminology ‘intentional under a description’ was introduced 
by Elizabeth Anscombe, who noted that a single action can have 
several different descriptions and only be intentional under some 
of these descriptions (2000 p.11). For example, an act may meet 
the descriptions ‘sawing a plank’ and ‘making a squeaky noise 
with a saw,’ but is only intentional under the first (Anscombe 
2000 p.11). 
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“rule out accidental, unconscious, involuntary or self-regarding 
acts as cases of supererogation.”10 The Altruism Requirement 
prevents acts that are lacking in moral merit from counting as 
supererogatory. We can see why this is important by considering 
again an example from the previous chapter:  
Accidental Donation: Louise makes a large donation that she can 
comfortably afford to a famine charity by bank transfer. However, 
Louise donated the money by accident. She had intended to 
transfer the money between two of her own accounts to enable her 
to buy an expensive car. Louise would like to retrieve the money 
but is unable to do so. Julie, on the other hand, also makes a large 
donation to a famine charity but she does so intentionally.  
Although these acts are similar and are just as likely to have 
morally valuable consequences only one of these acts can be 
classed as supererogatory. Only Julie’s act can be counted as 
morally meritorious as only her act is intentional under a 
description (helping the hungry) that would make it praiseworthy 
if performed for the right reasons. Louise had no intention of 
benefitting anyone else and only did so accidentally. This example 
makes clear the benefits of including The Altruism Requirement 
in the definition of supererogation. By making it a necessary 
condition of acts of supererogation that the agent performing the 
act must intend to bring about somebody else’s good, The 
Altruism Requirement prevents acts like Louise’s that are lacking 
in moral merit from being classed as supererogatory.11   
                                                        
10 (1982 p.116). 
11 A related issue is the debate between objectivists and 
subjectivists about moral obligation. For a defence of the 
subjectivist view see Smith (2010). For a defence of objectivism 
see Graham (2010). Objectivists hold that the rightness of 
performing an act in any given situation is determined by the 
objective facts of the situation, not the agent’s beliefs about those 
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3.2 Why Intentions? 
We can see, then, the important role that The Altruism 
Requirement plays in Heyd’s definition of supererogation. 
However, we might wonder whether Heyd’s requirement goes far 
enough. We might think that it is an agent’s motivations that are 
important rather than her intentions. The difference between 
requiring altruistic intention rather than altruistic motivation is 
that for an agent to have an altruistic intention, she must aim to 
bring about some benefit for others. To have an altruistic motive 
the agent must be motivated by this appreciation of the benefits 
the act will have for others. In this section I will consider this 
challenge to a requirement that looks to the agent’s intentions 
rather than motivations. I will argue, in support of Heyd’s 
position, that it is the intentions not the motivations of the agent 
that are important for an act to be considered supererogatory.  
The claim that it is motivation rather than intention that is 
important for supererogation is made by Sheldon Peterfreund. He 
argues that altruistic motivation is a necessary condition of 
                                                        
facts. On this understanding of obligation, it does not matter 
whether or not the agent is aware, or even could be aware, of what 
the best act would be. Subjectivists, on the other hand, hold that 
the act that it is right for an agent to perform is determined by her 
beliefs about the situation. Note that on the objectivist account we 
can perform a moral obligation without having any awareness that 
doing so will be the right thing to do. Heyd’s point is that 
whatever we think about moral obligation, the view of the agent 
plays an important part in assessing whether or not an act can be 
classed as supererogatory. Heyd’s requirement, then, has a 
subjective component to it. In order for an act to count as 
supererogatory the agent must believe that it will have good 
consequences for others or at least be performing the act as an 
attempt to benefit others. Of course, The Altruism Requirement 
requires more from agents than subjectivists about moral 
obligation do. As well as performing the act that is right from a 
subjective point of view the act must also be performed with the 
intention of benefitting other people. 
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supererogatory action.12 To support this claim Peterfreund gives 
the example of two doctors who decide to go to a plague-ridden 
city to help the sick residents. One doctor is motivated by a desire 
to help those affected by the disease while the other is motivated 
by a sense of adventure. Peterfreund argues that we should only 
count the first doctor’s act as supererogatory.  
The underlying point in Peterfreund’s argument is that altruistic 
motivation is necessary for acts of supererogation because 
supererogatory acts are necessarily praiseworthy. However, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, there is no good reason to think that 
supererogatory acts must be praiseworthy. Peterfreund’s 
argument, then, gives us no reason to allow only altruistically 
motivated acts to count as supererogatory.  
Why then does Heyd think that only acts performed with altruistic 
intentions can count as supererogatory? The reason is that Heyd, 
following John Stuart Mill, thinks that intentions form part of the 
description of the act while motives do not.13 In other words, an 
act can be performed with different motivations and be the same 
act but the same cannot be said for intentions. An agent in the 
same situation but acting with different intentions would have 
performed a different act. As a result, the motivation that led to 
the act does not alter the moral evaluation of the act; it only alters 
our evaluation of the agent. As supererogation is an act evaluation 
this gives us good reason to think that it is merit and intentions 
that are necessary for supererogation rather than praiseworthiness 
and motives. 
Heyd’s approach allows for an attractive symmetry between 
supererogation judgements and other act evaluations. It seems 
                                                        
12 (1978 p.55). 
13 (Heyd 1982 p.137; Mill 2001 p.18 Fn.2). For an explanation of 
Mill’s position here see Ridge (2002).  
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plausible to think that there is no motivation requirement for right 
and wrong actions. When we want to know whether someone has 
performed an act that is right we do not need to know what 
motivated her to act as she did. Someone with an obligation to pay 
her taxes performs her duty when she pays her taxes intentionally. 
It does not alter our evaluation of the act if she is motivated to do 
so by an appreciation of her duty or by a fear of punishment. 
Knowledge of the agent’s motivations may alter our judgement of 
the agent performing a right action but it will not alter our 
judgement of the act itself. Given that both supererogation 
judgements and rightness judgements are evaluations of acts and 
not agents, it should be considered a benefit of Heyd’s account 
that it fits with this plausible way of thinking about rightness 
judgements. 
If we accept the way that Heyd and Mill choose to individuate acts 
then we are in a position to respond to the examples. In the doctor 
example, assuming that both doctors act with altruistic intentions, 
we can say that the doctors perform the same act. The different 
moral evaluations that we might think the two doctors are due is 
not down to the performance of different acts but down to the 
features of their character that led to the performance of the act. 
We can accept that the adventuring doctor is less praiseworthy 
than the other doctor but maintain that his act is supererogatory. 
Likewise, we can accept that the election candidate is morally 
blameworthy but maintain that her act is supererogatory.  
Of course, the above response to Peterfreund only works if we are 
happy to individuate acts in the way that Heyd and Mill choose to. 
While a complete defence of this way of individuating acts is 
beyond the scope of this thesis I will briefly explain two reasons 
why I think this is the right way to do so. 
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One reason to individuate acts in this way is given by Heyd. 14 He 
claims that it is often very difficult to determine the underlying 
motives that lead people to act.15 Suppose we see someone give 
money to a homeless person who has asked her to spare some 
change. It seems hard to pinpoint exactly what would motivate the 
person to give the money. Of course the recognition that this 
money will help the person is likely to play some role but there 
may well be other factors that influence this decision. Perhaps the 
agent has a desire to appear generous. Discovering what it was 
that motivated the agent to act in this way will prove difficult. 
Discovering intentions, on the other hand, is more straightforward. 
We can be fairly confident that an agent who gives money to 
charity is aware that some good shall arise from this. If we need to 
know that the motivations of the agent are altruistic before we can 
class an act as supererogatory then it will prove incredibly 
difficult to class any act as supererogatory. 
The second reason why this seems to be the right way to 
individuate acts is that it allows us to explain a familiar feature of 
moral duties. By not including a motivation requirement, Heyd’s 
definition allows acts of supererogation to fit easily with how we 
think about moral obligations and prohibitions. It is a common 
thought that it is possible to perform the right act for the wrong 
reasons.16 We can also perform a morally wrong act and be in no 
way blameworthy for doing so. If we individuate acts according to 
intentions then we can explain how this is possible. Someone can 
be motivated to perform acts by the wrong kind of considerations. 
                                                        
14 A very similar point is made by Mike Ridge (2002 p.66).  
15 (1982 p.187) 
16 For example, Kant distinguishes acts that are in line with duty 
from those that possess moral worth. In order to have moral 
worth, an act must be performed by an agent who is motivated in 
the right way (1993 p.11). Similarly, Ross claims that an act can 
be morally right but not morally good (2003 p.156). 
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If we individuate acts in terms of motivations, though, then we 
can no longer make sense of this, as the agent acting with a 
different motivation will be performing a different act.  
In this section, I have given two reasons to think that Heyd is right 
to focus on intentions rather than motivations. First, it is much 
harder to determine motives than it is to determine intentions. 
Second, it is consistent with the possibility of performing the right 
act for the wrong reasons.  
3.3 Why Altruism is Not Necessary 
So far I have argued that The Altruism Requirement plays an 
important role in ruling out acts that intuitively do not seem to be 
supererogatory from counting as such. However, in this section I 
will argue that The Altruism Requirement should be rejected for 
two reasons. First there seems little theoretical support for 
restricting the claim to altruistic intentions rather than moral 
intentions. Second, doing so excludes acts that intuitively should 
count as supererogatory.  
The first reason to replace The Altruism Requirement is that, 
given the role this requirement plays in the definition, there seems 
little reason to restrict the claim to altruistic intentions rather 
moral intentions in general. We have seen that the reason to accept 
The Altruism Requirement is that it explains why acts of 
supererogation are morally meritorious. However, a moral 
intention requirement would also do this. There is nothing in what 
Heyd says about merit, nor in my attempt to give a more precise 
formulation of the idea, that restricts merit to those with altruistic 
intentions. There seems to be no theoretical reason to restrict the 
claim to altruistic intentions rather than moral intentions in 
general.  
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Nevertheless, we might think that the reason why we should 
restrict the claim to altruistic intentions is that this is a better fit 
with our intuitions. Certainly, it does seem to be true that most 
cases that we think of as supererogatory do involve an agent 
acting with altruistic intent. Many of the examples of 
supererogation we have looked at so far are cases where the agent 
is acting with altruistic intent. Perhaps, then, there is some prima 
facie support for The Altruism Requirement. Nevertheless, this 
support will be undermined if we can find examples of acts that 
are intuitively supererogatory but performed by agents with moral 
but not altruistic intent.  
I will give two examples that I think meet this description, one 
from Mellema and one of my own. To be clear, what we are 
looking for are cases where we would happily describe the act as 
supererogatory even if the agent lacks any altruistic intention. If 
we find a case of this sort then we will have found a counter 
example to The Altruism Requirement.  
Mellema gives the first counterexample.17 His example is of a 
political prisoner being held by terrorists.  The prisoner is told by 
the terrorists to renounce his government and pledge allegiance to 
their cause. No one will find out about his refusal to cooperate 
with the terrorists and therefore doing so will not benefit those he 
cares about in any way.18 The consequences for him, though, of 
not cooperating will be terrible, as he will face torture from the 
terrorists. However, the prisoner is a principled and patriotic man 
who believes that he should not renounce his government. Out of 
                                                        
17 (1991 pp.19-20). 
18 In Mellema’s description of this example he says that the act 
will bring about only ‘bad consequences’ (1991 p.20). I have 
changed this to  ‘indifferent consequences’ because I believe it 
makes the example more plausible. This in no way changes the 
point that Mellema is making.  
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respect for these principles, and with knowledge of the lack of 
good consequences for other people that will result from his 
actions, the prisoner refuses to renounce his government.  
Mellema argues that in this example the man performs a 
supererogatory act in refusing to comply with the demands of the 
terrorists. The prisoner heroically stands up for what he believes 
in and does so in a way that exceeds the requirements of duty. 
However, the act is not performed with altruistic intent. If we 
accept that the act that Mellema describes is supererogatory then 
we will have to accept that The Altruism Requirement is not a 
necessary condition of supererogation. 
For the sake of those unconvinced by this example I will give one 
of my own. Simon Wiesenthal was a Holocaust survivor. After 
The Second World War, he dedicated his life to tracking down 
fugitive Nazis so they could be brought to justice. Most famously, 
Wiesenthal helped to track down Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi 
bureaucrat who orchestrated the killing of millions of people, 
leading to his capture in 1960. The reason that Wiesenthal 
dedicated his life to this cause was not vengeance but justice.19 By 
choosing to spend his life in this way Wiesenthal put himself in a 
position where he would have to suffer both physical attacks from 
neo-Nazis and the emotional pain of constantly reliving his 
traumatic experiences.20 Wiesenthal’s actions appear to be clear 
examples of supererogation.  
                                                        
19 This is why the title of one of Wiesenthal’s books is Justice Not 
Vengeance (1989). In this book Wiesenthal’s friend, Peter 
Michael Lingens, tells of the important role that the idea of justice 
had in shaping Wiesenthal’s view of the world from an early age 
(1989 p.3).  
20 Wiesenthal talks of the emotional pain he put himself through 
here (1989 p.27) and the physical attacks here (1989 p.401).  
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It is unclear whether Wiesenthal can be said to have intended to 
benefit others with his act. Perhaps he viewed his acts as 
safeguarding people against these criminals. Perhaps he viewed 
his acts as in some way intending to benefit the dead by keeping 
their memory alive.21 Importantly for my purposes, we might 
think that his intention was not to bring about some benefit to 
anyone; it was just to bring about justice. I do not claim that this is 
how we should understand Wiesenthal’s intentions, only that it is 
conceivable to think of his intentions, or those of someone in a 
similar position, in this way. For the purposes of this discussion I 
will be assuming that these were Wiesenthal’s intentions. The 
important question we must ask ourselves is whether thinking of 
Wiesenthal’s intentions in this way changes our view about 
whether or not his acts were supererogatory. Clearly it does not. 
We would still think of Wiesenthal’s acts as supererogatory even 
if we found out that his intentions were not altruistic.  
These two examples give us good reason to reject The Altruism 
Requirement. Before doing so though, it is worth considering a 
response that might be made to my argument. Someone seeking to 
defend The Altruism Requirement might argue that an act cannot 
be valuable, and so can’t be better than the minimum that morality 
demands, unless it benefits people in some way.22 If we reject the 
moral value of this act then there is no reason to think that this is 
an act of supererogation and so no reason to see this as a counter-
example to Heyd’s definition. For example, a consequentialist 
may contend that if no positive consequences are expected to arise 
as a result of the act then according to this view no moral value 
has been produced. We might think then that we can retain Heyd’s 
requirement by denying the moral value of the prisoner’s act. Of 
                                                        
21 Wiesenthal suggests that this was the intention behind many of 
his acts (1989 p.411). 
22 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.  
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course this response depends upon a certain way of understanding 
moral value, such that it is the consequences of acts that are 
important for moral value. 
If we accept this then in order to be counted as supererogatory an 
act must benefit people in some way. This leaves us with a 
dilemma. Either the acts in the previous examples do not benefit 
people and so have no moral value or they do benefit other people 
and so are altruistic after all.  
However, I think even if we accept this claim about moral value 
this response does not present my argument with a real problem. 
Remember, we are interested in whether the intentions of the 
agent are altruistic. If we accept the consequentialist 
understanding of moral value then we can view the agent’s act as 
having good consequences for other people, and being morally 
valuable as a result, without the agent intending to bring these 
consequences about.23 The act can, then, be morally valuable 
without the intentions of the agent being altruistic.  
In addition, many consequentialists claim that their account of 
what makes an action right or wrong is not intended as an account 
of what agents should be consciously aiming at when they act. As 
Henry Sidgwick puts the point: “It is not necessary that the end 
which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at 
which we consciously aim.”24 R. M. Hare, for example, claims 
that there are two levels of moral thinking.25 At the ‘intuitive 
level’ we have a range of moral principles that guide our conduct 
in our everyday moral behaviour. The ‘critical level’ is where we 
evaluate these principles and adjudicate conflicts between them. 
For example, we might at the intuitive level follow the principle 
                                                        
23 A similar point is made by Mellema (1991 p. 20).  
24 (1907 p.413). 
25 (1981).  
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‘keep one’s promises’ and this is justified, at the critical level, by 
the plausible thought that a system of promise keeping is generally 
beneficial. It seems plausible to think that on such an account an 
act could count as good if the agent’s intentions reflect only the 
intuitive level of thought. For example, if someone intends only to 
fulfil her promise rather than to support the institution of promise 
giving. Even if Wieshanthal was not acting with altruistic 
intentions, then, his act may still count as morally better than the 
minimum that morality demands on a consequentialist view if he 
was acting from principles at the intuitive level of moral thought.  
In this section I have argued that we should reject The Altruism 
Requirement. However, we must not lose sight of the reason why 
The Altruism Requirement was seen to be an important part of the 
definition of supererogation. Without this requirement we would 
be unable to rule out cases such as that of Louise, the unwitting 
donator to charity, from counting as supererogatory. This may be 
viewed as a greater cost than having to rule that the prisoner’s act 
was not supererogatory.  
3.4 Moral Intention Requirement 
However, abandoning The Altruism Requirement does not mean 
we are forced to accept that Louise performs a supererogatory act. 
Instead we can replace The Altruism Requirement with a similar 
requirement that allows us to label the prisoner’s act as 
supererogatory but withhold the term from Louise’s act. If the 
requirement looked for moral intentions rather than altruistic 
intentions then it would be possible to describe the prisoner’s act 
as supererogatory but not Louise’s. We should then, replace The 
Altruism Requirement with a moral intention requirement. Below 
is a first attempt to formulate this requirement: 
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Moral Intention Requirement One (MIR1): For an act to be 
supererogatory the agent must be acting with moral intentions.  
Like The Altruism Requirement, MIR1 would allow us to 
withhold the term ‘supererogatory’ from Louise’s act. As Louise 
does not intend her act to bring about any moral value it cannot be 
classed as supererogatory. Julie, on the other hand, does intend for 
her act to bring about moral value and so can be said to have 
performed an act of supererogation. 
Unlike The Altruism Requirement though, MIR1 would allow the 
tortured prisoner’s act and Wiesenthal’s acts (on my interpretation 
of his intentions) to count as supererogatory. Not only would 
MIR1 give us the right result in these two examples it would do so 
in a way that explains our intuitions. The reason why it seemed 
implausible to say that Louise was performing an act of 
supererogation was that any moral value that arose from her action 
was accidental. Likewise, with both the prisoner and Wiesenthal’s 
acts we want to say that their intentions do not need to be altruistic 
in order for their acts to count as supererogatory, so long as they 
are moral. MIR1 allows us to do this. 
However, there is a problem with this way of formulating the 
moral intention requirement. MIR1 could be read as requiring acts 
of supererogation to be performed by agents whose intention is an 
explicitly moral one. There are two problems that might arise 
from this. The first problem is in cases where an agent intends her 
act to bring about a state of affairs that seems to be morally 
valuable but which would not be recognized as such by the agent. 
For example, suppose Hugo is a nihilist. This does not stop Hugo 
from performing many morally valuable acts. One day Hugo 
walks past a burning building and hears shouts for help coming 
from inside. At great personal risk, Hugo runs into the building to 
save those trapped inside. If Hugo were asked whether he was 
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aware of a moral reason favouring his act he would deny it. We 
might imagine him saying the following: ‘I don’t believe in 
morality. I am just doing this because I feel sympathy for those 
trapped inside.’ This seems like an act of supererogation even if 
Hugo would deny it. This is a problem for any moral intention 
requirement, as it seems as if Hugo may be said to lack awareness 
of any moral reason in favour of his action. As a result Hugo’s 
action would fail to meet MIR1 and so could not be classed as 
supererogatory.  
Another example of an agent who intends his act to bring about a 
state of affairs that seems to be morally valuable but which would 
not be recognized as such by the agent is the case of Huckleberry 
Finn.26 In Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, Huck fails to turn in 
his friend Jim, a runaway slave, despite judging that this is what 
he ought to do.27 We might think that Huck performs a 
supererogatory act in this case. Certainly his act seems to be 
morally valuable and we might think that the risks he is taking 
would prevent it from being obligatory. Nevertheless, if we 
require supererogatory acts to be performed by agents with 
explicitly moral intentions then this act cannot be counted as 
supererogatory.   
The second problem with requiring supererogatory acts to be 
performed by agents with explicitly moral intentions is that we 
might think that someone whose intentions are explicitly moral 
would be a slightly strange moral agent. We might think that such 
an agent has, in the words of Bernard Williams’ famous objection 
to utilitarianism, “one thought too many,” (1981 p.18). It would, 
                                                        
26 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that one 
example might not be enough here.  
27 Twain (1966). For discussions of whether or not Huck Finn can 
be said to be morally praiseworthy see Jonathan Bennett (1974) 
and Nomy Arpaly (2003).  
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perhaps, be more appropriate for an agent to be intending to help 
others rather than intending to perform morally meritorious acts. 
The problem that could be raised against MIR1 is that it requires 
agents to be acting with the wrong kind of intentions.  
However, these problems can be avoided if we formulate the 
moral intention requirement differently. These criticisms only 
arise if we take a moral intention requirement to require agents to 
have explicitly moral intentions. There is though, no need to 
formulate the requirement in this way. Instead, we can say that in 
order to be supererogatory the agent’s act needs to be intentional 
under a description in virtue of which it is morally meritorious. 
The agent need not be aware that her act meets this requirement. 
We should then give a new version of the moral intention 
requirement that avoids these problems.  
Moral Intention Requirement Two (MIR 2): For an act to be 
supererogatory the act must be intentional under a description D 
such that D picks out features in virtue of which the act is morally 
meritorious. 
This formulation shares the advantages that The Altruism 
Requirement and MIR1 have over having no intention 
requirement. Like MIR1 and The Altruism Requirement, MIR2 
allows us to prevent Jane’s act from counting as supererogatory.  
MIR2 also shares the advantages that MIR1 has over The 
Altruism Requirement. Like MIR1, MIR2 allows us to say that 
both Mellema’s prisoner and Simon Wiesenthal’s acts (on our 
interpretation) are supererogatory in a way that explains our 
intuitions. The reason why it seemed implausible to say that 
Louise was performing an act of supererogation was that any 
moral value that arose from her action was accidental. Likewise, 
in the case of the prisoner, the reason why it may be judged that 
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his act is supererogatory is that he has performed an act that is 
morally meritorious under the description ‘refusing to denounce 
one’s ideals’.  
Unlike MIR1 though, MIR2 avoids the objection that arose from 
requiring agents to have explicitly moral intentions. The problem 
with both Hugo and Huck was that they were unaware that their 
acts were morally meritorious. Nevertheless, they both pass 
MIR2. Hugo’s act is intentional under the description ‘Saving 
those in the building’ and to perform an act under this description 
certainly would be morally praiseworthy when performed for the 
right reasons. Huck’s act is intentional under the description 
‘Allowing my friend Jim to remain free’ and again is praiseworthy 
under this description, providing of course Huck is performing the 
act for the right reasons. Similarly, the claim that this would 
require agents to be acting with the wrong kind of intentions also 
disappears once we put the point in this way, as the agent does not 
need to possess an explicitly moral intention.  
To sum up, including MIR1 or MIR2 in the definition of 
supererogation is preferable to The Altruism Requirement as these 
requirements allow acts such as those of Mellema’s prisoner and 
Simon Wiesenthal to count as supererogatory. These requirements 
are also preferable to a definition lacking in any requirement on 
the intentions of the agent as it can rule out cases where the 
agent’s act is accidentally morally valuable act. MIR2 is 
preferable to MIR1, as it does not require agents to possess 
explicitly moral intentions. As a result, we should replace The 
Altruism Requirement with MIR2. 
One problem that might be raised against MIR2 is that it could 
allow self-regarding acts to count as supererogatory. If we think 
that self-regarding acts can be morally valuable then we might 
think that, unlike The Altruism Requirement, MIR2 would allow 
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such acts to count as supererogatory. The Altruism Requirement 
rules out such acts, as it requires agents to be aiming to bring 
about some good for other people. If we find it implausible that 
there can be self-regarding acts of supererogation then this might 
seem to be an unacceptable consequence of replacing The 
Altruism Requirement with MIR2. If we think that acts of 
supererogation cannot be self-regarding, and that The Altruism 
Requirement would explain this while MIR2 would not, then this 
puts pressure on the claim that we should replace The Altruism 
Requirement with MIR2.  
There are two ways to respond to this criticism. The first is to 
accept that acts of supererogation can be self-regarding. Jason 
Kawall puts forward an argument in defence of this position 
(2003). He claims that self-regarding acts of supererogation are 
possible. He supports this claim by giving an example of a waiter 
who wants to go to university. In order to do so the waiter takes 
on a second job to save up the money to fund his studies. Kawall 
argues that this act is supererogatory despite the fact that it only 
provides benefits to the person performing the act.28 If we accept 
Kawall’s argument then compatibility with self-regarding acts of 
supererogation becomes an advantage rather than a problem. 
Rather than viewing MIR2 as too permissive we might now view 
The Altruism Requirement as too restrictive in what acts can 
count as supererogatory.29  
While this does seem like a genuine advantage for my view I do 
not want my argument to be dependent on Kawall’s. In order to 
convince those who are not persuaded by Kawall’s argument I 
must find some way of showing that those who reject the 
existence of self-serving acts of supererogation can nevertheless 
                                                        
28 (2003 p.490). 
29 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.  
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accept the claim that The Altruism Requirement should be 
replaced by MIR2. My strategy for doing so will be to show that 
whatever reason we give for wanting to reject Kawall’s argument 
will prevent self-regarding acts from counting as supererogatory 
regardless of the intention requirement we include in our 
definition. To be clear, I am not attempting to show that these 
responses give us good reasons to reject Kawall’s argument. All I 
am trying to show is that the reasons that might be given to reject 
it will show commitments that prevent self-regarding acts from 
counting as supererogatory regardless of our intention 
requirement.  
Before looking at these responses though, it is worth pointing out 
one way of responding to Kawall’s argument that cannot be 
brought in at this stage of the discussion. One reason that might be 
given to reject Kawall’s argument would be because it is 
incompatible with The Altruism Requirement. Those convinced of 
the truth of The Altruism Requirement might see this as providing 
sufficient reason to reject Kawall’s view. Note though, that while 
rejecting Kawall’s claim for this reason is incompatible with my 
view it does not create a new objection to it. Remember that we 
are considering whether the fact that my view is compatible with 
the existence of self-regarding supererogatory acts is an 
independent problem for my view. If the only reason this is 
problematic is that it is incompatible with The Altruism 
Requirement then this is not a new problem for my view, it is 
simply recognition of the fact that my view is different from The 
Altruism Requirement.  
The other way in which someone might try to respond to Kawall’s 
argument would be to claim that the acts described in Kawall’s 
example are not morally better than the minimum that morality 
demands, as only the agent gains the benefits. Those who think 
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that morality is concerned with our interactions with other people 
will not view the waiter’s act as morally better than any of the 
alternatives that would enhance his well-being to a lesser degree. 
Given this, those who deny the moral value of self-regarding acts 
will not count such acts as supererogatory regardless of whether or 
not The Altruism Requirement is part of our definition of 
supererogation.   
There are then two ways of responding to the criticism that MIR2 
would make      self-regarding acts of supererogation possible. 
First, we can embrace this consequence of this requirement. Note 
that if we are persuaded by Kawall’s argument then the fact that 
my view would allow self-regarding acts to count as 
supererogatory is an advantage for the view rather than a 
disadvantage. Alternatively, we can say that whatever reasons are 
given for rejecting Kawall’s argument will be ones that ought to 
prevent such acts from counting as supererogatory regardless of 
the intention requirement.  
3.5 Do we Need Any Intention Requirement? 
So far I have argued that if we are going to include an intention 
requirement in our definition of supererogation then Heyd’s 
Altruistic Intention Requirement is too restrictive. We should 
instead include a Moral Intention Requirement according to which 
an act is supererogatory only if it is intentional under a description 
D such that D picks out features in virtue of which the act is 
morally meritorious. In the remainder of this chapter I will argue 
that there is no need to include this requirement in our definition 
of supererogation.   
Let’s begin with a reminder of why Heyd claimed there was a 
need to include an altruistic intention requirement in the definition 
of supererogation. The point of this requirement was to, “rule out 
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accidental, unconscious, involuntary or self-regarding acts as 
cases of supererogation.”30 We have already seen reason to 
abandon the ‘self-regarding’ part of this definition. The reason 
Heyd gave to rule out accidental, unconscious or involuntary acts 
was that he, following John Stuart Mill, views intentions as 
forming part of the description of the act.31 However, if we do 
individuate actions according to intentions then we have no need 
to include this requirement as a separate component of our 
definition of supererogation. This is because part of what the 
minimum that morality demands on such a view is to act with the 
appropriate intentions. If the intentions are not appropriate then 
the act is not right. If the agent performs the act accidentally or 
unconsciously then this will not count as performing a right act. In 
order to perform an act that is morally better than the minimum on 
such a view the agent would need to have the appropriate 
intentions. Otherwise, as we have seen, the action is wrong. Such 
a view then presupposes that the agent is acting with the 
appropriate intentions. There is no need then for those who hold a 
Millean view of act individuation to include an intention 
requirement as a separate condition in their definition of 
supererogation.  
Might there be something to be said for including such a 
requirement as part of the definition in the interest of full 
disclosure of what is required for an act to be supererogatory? 
Perhaps if everyone accepted a Millean view of act individuation 
this would be reasonable. However, not everyone does. Given that 
my goal is to seek to give a definition of supererogation that is 
                                                        
30 (1982 p.116). 
31 (Heyd 1982 p.137; Mill 2001 p. 18 Fn.2). For an explanation of 
Mill’s position here see Ridge (2002).  
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acceptable to as wide a range of differing views as possible, it 
would be a mistake to include this condition in my definition.  
3.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, in this chapter I have investigated the claim that 
altruistic intentions are a requirement for acts of supererogation. I 
have argued that the requirement has some appeal, as it is able to 
make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. 
Nevertheless, I have argued this requirement should be abandoned 
as it prevents cases like Mellema’s patriotic prisoner and Simon 
Wiesenthal from being classified as supererogatory. I have argued 
that by replacing Heyd’s Altruistic Intention Requirement with a 
Moral Intention Requirement we can achieve everything that 
Heyd sought to achieve in a way that avoids the problematic 
counter examples. However, accepting that all acts of 
supererogation will meet this requirement for the reasons Heyd 
gives does not give us any reason to include this requirement in 
our definition. For those who accept the Millean view of act 
individuation, this is presupposed by the existing definition. 
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Part II Supererogation and Moral 
Philosophy 
In the first half of this thesis, I investigated how supererogation 
should be defined. Having provided and defended my definition, I 
will now examine three issues in moral philosophy that up to now 
have been examined without paying adequate attention either to 
the existence of acts of supererogation or to the nature of the 
supererogatory.  
I will start, in Chapter 4, by looking at the issue of the relationship 
between moral reasons, non-moral reasons and moral obligation. 
The debates around this issue have involved an appreciation of the 
relevance of supererogation to the discussion but, as I will argue, 
one of the most prominent positions in this debate rests upon an 
implausible view about the nature of the supererogatory.  
I will then, in Chapter 5, investigate the debate about motivational 
judgement internalism, the view that there is an internal 
connection between moral judgements and motivation. This 
debate is one that has taken place without sufficient appreciation 
of the need to understand the difference between moral 
requirements and moral goodness. I will argue that appreciating 
the difference between the two, as we must if we accept the 
existence of the supererogatory, gives motivational judgement 
internalists good reason to restrict their claim to moral 
requirements. This move might seem arbitrary but can be justified 
if it is accepted that internalism is explained by the truth of moral 
rationalism, the view that moral requirements are always in line 
with what there is most reason to do.  
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However, as I will explain in Chapter 6 this raises a problem, as 
moral rationalism is often thought to depend upon the view that 
moral reasons are overriding. This would be problematic because, 
as I will argue in §6.1, once we accept the existence of 
supererogation, moral overridingness ceases to be plausible. 
However, as I will then go on to explain, it is possible to accept 
moral rationalism without accepting overridingness. Indeed the 
explanation for moral rationalism that is compatible with 
supererogation appears to be better supported by the intuitions 
commonly appealed to by those seeking to argue for moral 
rationalism than the explanation offered by overridingness.  
Having examined the impact that accepting the existence of acts 
of supererogation has for these three debates, I will examine the 
question of whether we need to make room for more deontic 
categories. Since Urmson’s argument in support of the need to 
make room for the category of the supererogatory a number of 
philosophers have argued that there is a need to make room for 
even more deontic categories such as suberogation, quasi-
supererogation and forced supererogation. As I will argue in 
Chapter 7, many of the arguments put forward in support of these 






Chapter Four: Supererogation, Sacrifice 
and The Limits of Duty 
Introduction 
A noticeable feature of many acts of supererogation is that they 
seem to involve the agent sacrificing her own interests in order to 
promote the interests of others. Urmson’s soldier, for example, 
gives up his life in order to protect his comrades. It is often 
claimed that all supererogatory acts involve sacrifice.1 Patricia 
McGoldrick goes further, describing sacrifice or the risk of 
sacrifice as, “The distinguishing feature of a supererogatory act.”2 
Like many who associate supererogation with sacrifice, the 
reasoning behind McGoldrick’s claim is that what prevents acts of 
supererogation from being obligatory is the level of sacrifice 
required from the agent. However, this claim is rarely defended 
and it is often unclear exactly what is meant by sacrifice in this 
context. This is unfortunate, as this claim has important 
consequences.  
First, how we respond to this issue will have consequences for 
what can count as an acceptable solution to The Puzzle of The 
Good-Ought Tie-Up. 3 The puzzle arises when attempting to 
reconcile the claim that acts of supererogation are morally 
                                                        
1 Those who make this claim include Dancy (1993 p.138), 
Feinberg (1961 p.281), Fishkin (1982), Harwood (2003 p.182), 
Jackson (1986 p.289,1988), Jacobs (1987 p.101), McGoldrick 
(1984), Mellema (1991 p.179), Sikora (1979), Straumanis (1984 
p.8). Dorsey (2013 p.358) and Raz (1975 p.167) claim that there 
might be good reason to support this view, without explicitly 
endorsing it.  Rawls (1971 p.117) claims that most, if not all, acts 
of supererogation involve sacrifice.  
2 (1984 p.525). 
3 As named by Heyd (1982 p. 4). 
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optional with the claim that they are morally better than the non-
supererogatory alternatives. If we think that morally obligatory 
acts will be the acts that are best supported by moral reason then it 
is hard to make sense of the existence of acts that are better from 
the moral point of view. Second, this issue will have consequences 
for attempts to reconcile the possibility of supererogatory acts 
with normative ethical theories. While my goal here is not to 
provide an answer to these two questions, I will finish by 
examining the implications of my discussion for attempts to 
resolve it. Third, how we settle this issue will have implications 
for whether certain acts are classed as obligatory or 
supererogatory, which in turn may influence how we should 
respond to these actions.  
The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to investigate whether 
acts of supererogation always involve sacrifice. I will start, in §4.1 
by examining different ways of understanding this claim. In §4.2 I 
will examine some purported counter-examples that have been 
proposed to this view and explain their limitations. I will then, in 
§4.3, develop an argument in favour of the view based on brief 
remarks by Dale Dorsey. In §4.4, I will argue that the view, and 
the argument in favour of it, should be rejected. Finally, in §4.5, I 
will respond to objections that might be raised against my 
argument.  
4.1 Two Kinds of Sacrifice Connection 
There has been little attempt by those who claim that 
supererogation always involves sacrifice to explain exactly what 
they mean by sacrifice in this context. This is a pity, as there are 
two plausible ways in which we might understand this claim.  
We should start by noting that those who claim that 
supererogation always involves sacrifice are appealing to a notion 
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of sacrifice that is less rich than the everyday use of the term. The 
use of sacrifice in this context is restricted to a cost to the agent 
performing the act. Jonathan Dancy, for example, claims that 
supererogation always involves sacrifice, which he defines as 
“cost to the agent”.4 We might think that the everyday meaning of 
the term ‘sacrifice’ involves some further conditions, such as 
being performed intentionally or voluntarily.5 I take it, though, 
that whatever else we mean by ‘sacrifice’, in order for an act to 
count as a sacrifice it must involve some cost to the agent’s 
interests. Given that my aim is to deny that acts of supererogation 
always involve sacrifice it will be enough for my purposes to 
show that acts of supererogation do not always satisfy this 
necessary condition of sacrifice. 
The first point to make is that sacrifice is a comparative concept.6 
When an act involves a sacrifice it makes the agent worse off in 
some way. The question we must now ask is what the relevant 
comparison is here.  There are two options. One option is that the 
relevant cost to an agent’s interests is in comparison to her 
position before performing the act. The alternative is that we take 
the relevant comparison to be the position the agent would be in if 
she performed one of the other acts available to her. Clearly it is 
the second, counter-factual, option that picks out the relevant form 
of cost. Cases of ‘cutting one’s losses’, where an agent chooses 
the least costly option from a range of costly alternatives, should 
not count as cases of sacrifice.7 Suppose the victim of a mugging 
is faced with the choice of handing over his money or being 
beaten and having his money taken from him. While choosing the 
                                                        
4 (1993 p.118). 
5 See, for example, Overvold (1980 pp.113-114) and Rosati (2009 
p.320). 
6 Thanks to Elinor Mason, Neil McDonnell, Lee Whittington and 
Alan Wilson for helpful discussion here. 
7 Overvold (1980 p.108) makes this point. 
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first option will result in the victim being worse off than he was 
before, this is an example of minimizing one’s losses rather than 
making a sacrifice. On the other hand, someone can make a 
sacrifice while making herself better off than she was before. 
Someone who chooses not to receive the full value of a cash prize 
but to take part of it and leave the rest to charity, counts as making 
a sacrifice despite the fact that she is better off than she was 
before. What makes this a sacrifice is the availability of an 
alternative option that would have made her better off. The 
relevant comparison then is to the position the agent would have 
been in had she chosen to perform one of the other available acts. 8 
                                                        
8 By holding a comparative account of ‘sacrifice’ I do not mean to 
commit myself to a comparative account of ‘harm’, which face 
problems involving preemption and omission that do not arise for 
comparative accounts of sacrifice. See Hanser (2008) and Bradley 
(2012). The preemption problem is that comparative accounts 
seem unable to class an event as a harm if the agent would have 
experienced the same cost in the absence of that event. Suppose I 
am shot seconds before I would otherwise have had a fatal heart 
attack. It seems counter-intuitive, though, to say that the shooting 
did not harm me, or so Bradley claims (2012 p.397). This problem 
does not arise for a comparative notion of sacrifice. In the 
mugging case it would be counter-intuitive to say that the victim 
made a sacrifice by giving away his money, as he would have lost 
it anyway. The omission problem for comparative accounts of 
harm is that it seems counter-intuitive for some cases where 
someone fails to receive a benefit to describe it as a harm. For 
example, if I plan to buy you a birthday present and then change 
my mind it would seem strange to describe this as a harm. It is not 
strange, however, to say that someone who fails to provide 
themselves with some benefit makes a sacrifice. For example, 
suppose I plan to buy myself a holiday but change my mind and 
donate the money to charity instead. It seems reasonable to say 
that I have made a sacrifice. For a defence of the comparative 
account of harm against these worries see Klocksiem (2012). We 
might also think that, unlike with sacrifice, not all costs count as 
harms. For example, many have attributed a restricted view to 
John Stuart Mill (1859). Gray (1996 p.57) argues that on Mill’s 
view it is only costs to vital interests that count as harms while 
Riley (1998 p.99) argues that the costly effects our actions have 
on  the feelings of others do not count as harms. For a defence of 
 141 
The next question is whether or not the cost should be understood 
as an overall cost to the agent’s interests. The most obvious way 
of understanding the sacrifice connection is as a claim about the 
overall cost to the agent. This view of sacrifice has the following 
necessary condition: 
Self-Sacrifice: An act involves self-sacrifice only if it has an 
overall negative impact on the agent’s welfare compared to some 
available alternative act. 
However, as Vanessa Carbonell argues, often we use the term 
‘sacrifice’ to mean something weaker.9 Carbonell argues that we 
make a sacrifice when we endure a loss that is not compensated 
for, where a ‘compensated loss’ is understood as one that is 
directly replaced without loss. For example, a committed child 
gymnast who gives up play-dates and ice cream in order to perfect 
her technique makes a sacrifice even if this has an overall positive 
impact on her well-being. 10  This notion fits well with a theory of 
well-being that holds different sources of well-being to be 
incommensurable. For example, an objective list theory of well-
being holds that there are different sources of well-being.11 On 
such a view it is clear how an act that involves a net gain may 
involve a loss that is not directly compensated for. It may increase 
overall welfare but involve a loss to one source of well-being that 
is not directly made up for or replaced without loss. Carbonell’s 
gymnast, for example, sacrifices one source of well-being, 
                                                        
the claim that Mill did not intend a restrictive view of harm see 
Turner (2014). Thanks to Elinor Mason, for helpful discussion 
here. 
9 Carbonell (2012 p.237).  
10 (2012 p.237). 
11 This theory is named and defended by Parfit (1984 p.499). As 
Fletcher (2013) notes, however, this theory is better described as a 
pluralist enumerative theory of well-being. That is one that 
specifies which things enhance well-being and identifies more 
than one member of this set.  
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friendship, for another, achievement. However, while this is a 
legitimate use of the term ‘sacrifice’, I take it that it would be 
inappropriate to describe this as a case of ‘self-sacrifice’. We 
would not say that people who make sacrifices in this sense 
perform acts of self-sacrifice. The gymnast has not sacrificed her 
own interests for those of other people. Rather, she sacrifices 
some goods in order to obtain others.  
The relevant necessary condition for this weaker version of 
sacrifice is the following: 
Sacrifice: An act involves sacrifice only if it makes the agent 
worse off in some respect than she would be if she performed 
some available alternative act. 
Although, this notion of sacrifice fits well with an objective list 
theory of well-being we might think that it fits less comfortably 
with alternative theories of well-being. A desire-fulfilment 
theorist, however, could hold that the fulfilment of one desire 
cannot directly make up or replace another being unfulfilled. 
Admittedly, it will be harder for hedonists, those think that 
pleasure is the only source of well-being, to make sense of this 
kind of sacrifice. Given that I will be arguing against the claim 
that supererogation always involves sacrifice, I will set this issue 
to one side. After all, it would be far from satisfactory to reject 
this notion of sacrifice on the basis of a seeming incompatibility 
with hedonism.  
 
We can use these two kinds of sacrifice to define two ways of 
making the claim that supererogation always involves sacrifice.  
The Self-Sacrifice View: If an act  is supererogatory then -ing 
has an overall negative impact on the agent’s welfare compared to 
some other available act. 
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The Weak Sacrifice View: If an act  is supererogatory then -ing 
makes the agent worse off in some respect than she would be if 
she performed some other available act. 
We might wonder whether these views are intended as conceptual 
truths or as claims about the extension of the concept. For the 
most part, it is not stated explicitly which view is being 
defended.12 For my purposes, though, this issue is unimportant, as 
my argument against the view will be effective against both 
interpretations.  
The Self-Sacrifice View is one that is endorsed by a number of 
authors writing on supererogation. For instance, James S. Fishkin 
explicitly endorses this in the following:  
There are limits to the sacrifice which can be demanded of 
any individual as a matter of duty or obligation. Beyond 
these limits, an action is heroic [...] And the presumption is 
that such heroic behavior must be classified as 
supererogatory, not obligatory. By ‘sacrifice’ in this 
definition I mean a reversal or harm to an agent’s 
interests.13 
Jason Kawall endorses the weaker view. He argues that cases 
where an agent suffers some sacrifice to improve her own position 
can count as supererogatory.14 Clearly this only makes sense if we 
take Kawall to be using the weaker notion of sacrifice. 
It is worth noting at this point that these two views do not exhaust 
the ways in which supererogation has been linked to sacrifice. As 
we have already seen, McGoldrick’s view is that it is sacrifice or 
the risk of sacrifice that are distinctive of supererogation.15 A 
reasonable assumption to make is that we need to make room for 
                                                        
12 Dorsey (2013 p.358) notes this lack of clarity. One exception to 
this is Feinberg (1961 p.281) who states explicitly that this is a 
necessary truth.  
13 (1982 pp.14-15).  
14 (2003).  
15 (1984 p.525). 
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additional views that are concerned with the risk of sacrifice rather 
than or in addition to sacrifice itself.16  
However, there is little reason to view these as giving independent 
accounts of the connection between supererogation and sacrifice. 
Instead, what these views point out is that it is not clear whether 
the loss mentioned in these definitions refer to an actual loss, the 
agent’s beliefs about loss or what it would be rational for the agent 
to believe about loss. For this reason, I intend to remain silent 
about the issue of whether we should have an objective, subjective 
or prospective view of moral obligations. objectivism, at least 
consequentialist objectivism, is the view that it is the actual 
consequences of an act that determine whether or not an act is 
morally obligatory.17 prospectivists, on the other hand, hold that it 
is not the actual consequences but what it would be rational for an 
agent to believe the consequences will be given her epistemic 
limitations that are important.18 Finally, subjectivism is the view 
that it is the agent’s beliefs that determine her obligations.19 
Plausibly, if we think that it is sacrifice that separates 
supererogation from moral obligation then our view of the 
relevant kind of loss will be determined by which view of moral 
obligation we hold. This means that when we are assessing the 
two sacrifice views given above we must ensure that the 
arguments given are effective against all three of these views of 
the relevant form of loss.  
4.2 The Sacrifice Views: Initial Assessments 
                                                        
16 Thanks to Lee Whittington and Alan Wilson for pressing me on 
this point.  
17 For a defence of this view see Graham (2010). 
18 For a defence of this view about ‘moral rightness’ see Mason 
(2013). 
19 For a defence of this view see Smith (2010).  
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In this section I will examine some purported counter examples to 
The Sacrifice Views and explain their limitations. As we have 
already seen, Kawall’s defence of self-regarding acts of 
supererogation involves the rejection of The Self-Sacrifice 
View.20 Of course, we might take Kawall’s claims about the 
possibility of self-regarding supererogation to be sufficient 
evidence that we should reject The Self-Sacrifice View. I take it, 
though, that those sympathetic to The Self-Sacrifice View are 
unlikely to find this persuasive. Even those who find Kawall’s 
claims persuasive might concede that self-regarding 
supererogatory acts are not paradigmatic examples of 
supererogation that any acceptable account ought to be able to 
accommodate.  
Similarly, Michael Ferry also seems to reject The Self-Sacrifice 
View.21 Ferry claims that it is not the case that acts of 
supererogation always involve significant sacrifice to the agent. 
He supports this claim by giving the following example:  
Gift for Friend: You see a book on sale and decide to buy 
it for a friend. If you buy the book it will bring joy to your 
friend and the pleasure of giving an unexpected gift will 
also bring joy to you.22 
Ferry takes this case to show that not all acts of supererogation 
involve significant sacrifice. Unfortunately, Ferry says nothing to 
defend this claim beyond this appeal to intuition. We should also 
note that as the example stands we do not have enough 
information to enable us to say whether this case involves 
                                                        
20 (2003).   
21 (2013 p.579). Horgan and Timmons also reject The Self-
Sacrifice View, in passing, by appealing to a similar example 
(2010 p.54). 
22 This is a paraphrased version of the example given by Ferry 
(2013 p.580). 
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sacrifice or not.23 Remember that making a sacrifice involves 
performing an act that has an overall negative impact, at least in 
some respect, on the agent’s welfare compared to some other 
available act. All we are told about this act, though, is that it does 
not make you worse off than you were before performing the act. 
To make this a case of supererogation that does not involve 
sacrifice we must stipulate that there is no alternative act that you 
could perform that would make you better off either overall or in 
some respect.   
Why might this case give us reason to abandon The Self-Sacrifice 
View? One reason is that it would seem inappropriate to blame the 
person who chose not to buy the book for the friend in this 
example. This is important because it is often claimed that people 
are always blameworthy if they fail to fulfil their obligations, at 
least in the absence of an excuse.24 If we hold this view of moral 
obligations and think that it would be inappropriate to blame the 
person who failed to buy the book, even if they lacked an excuse, 
then we should accept that this act is not obligatory. Presumably, 
though, this act is morally better than whatever we are required to 
do in this situation. Therefore, the act is supererogatory without 
involving self-sacrifice.  
This argument only undermines The Self-Sacrifice View. Buying 
the book still involves a financial cost that is not directly 
compensated for by the pleasure of giving the book. However, we 
might think that a modified example can raise problems for The 
Weak Sacrifice View. Consider the following case: 
                                                        
23 Thanks to Mike Ridge for helpful discussion here.  
24 For a defence of this claim see Darwall (2006 Ch.5), Gibbard 
(1990 p. 40), Portmore (2011 pp.48-49) and Skorupski (1999 pp. 
29, 142). 
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Free Gift For Friend: You see a book on sale and decide to buy it. 
At the counter you notice a promotional offer where buying one 
copy of the book allows you to receive a free second copy. You 
decide to pick up a second copy to give to your friend.25  
In this example we might think that there is no cost whatsoever 
involved in performing the act. Nevertheless, it does not seem like 
someone who failed to perform this act would be a legitimate 
target of blame. Perhaps, then, this gives us sufficient reason to 
reject The Weak Sacrifice View as well.  
Of course, a supporter of The Weak Sacrifice View may claim 
that there are         non-monetary costs involved in this case. The 
burden of having to carry an extra book around is a cost that 
presumably will not be replaced without loss. Some may wish to 
insist that once we remove these costs, perhaps by saying that the 
offer is for a free     e-book and so involves no extra carrying, then 
we should view this act as obligatory. At the very least we might 
worry that it is hard to generate clear intuitions in cases where the 
benefits are fairly trivial.26  
Alternatively, others might accept that these examples are acts of 
supererogation but retain some version of The Sacrifice View by 
claiming that the view is true for a subset of supererogatory acts. 
Of course, if any acts of supererogation involve sacrifice then it is 
trivially true that some subset of supererogatory acts do involve 
sacrifice. However, in order for this view to be interesting the 
subset has to be one with independently significant features. In 
both of these examples the acts of supererogation secure fairly 
trivial moral goods. These are the kind of acts we might be 
unwilling to describe as ‘beyond the call of duty’ though we 
                                                        
25 Thanks to Elinor Mason for suggesting an example of this sort. 
26 Thanks to Mike Ridge for helpful discussion here. 
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would say that there is no requirement to buy the book in these 
cases. This might lead some to think that there are two sorts of 
supererogatory act, those that are fairly trivial and those that are of 
great moral significance. The former may not involve sacrifice but 
the latter must involve sacrifice, as this is what is preventing these 
acts from being obligatory. This division seems to be endorsed by 
both Portmore, and Horgan and Timmons.27 This would give us 
the following view: 
 
The Restricted Sacrifice View: If an act  is a morally significant 
act of supererogation then  -ing involves an overall (or not 
directly compensated for) loss to the agent. 
Of course, the phrase ‘morally significant’ is somewhat vague but 
the thought it is trying to capture is that there are some acts that 
involve costs and benefits that are fairly trivial from the moral 
point of view and others that are non-trivial. The question, then, is 
whether there is some reason to reject The Sacrifice View that 
does not rely on cases such as Gift For Friend where the benefits 
are of little moral significance. If there are then this will serve as a 
response both to the worry that these cases may be obligatory after 
all and the retreat to The Restricted Sacrifice View.  
In this section we have looked at some counter examples that have 
been raised against The Self-Sacrifice View. We then looked at 
how we might modify one of these examples to be effective 
against The Weak Sacrifice View. We might take this to signal the 
end of the discussion; The Sacrifice Views get the wrong results 
in these cases, therefore we ought to reject them. However, we 
saw that there is reason to worry about the force of these 
                                                        
27 See Portmore (2011 p.135 fn.22) and Horgan and Timmons 
(2010 p.62). This seems to be the case if we take morally 
significant acts to be ones supported by moral reasons that possess 
requiring force. 
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examples, as there appear to be resources for defenders of The 
Sacrifice View to respond to these counter examples. Moreover, 
as we shall see in the next section, there is an intuitively 
compelling argument that can be given in defence of either 
version of The Sacrifice View. It is safe to say, then, that a 
convincing argument against The Sacrifice View should do more 
than simply appeal to these examples.  
4.3 How to Argue For The Sacrifice Views 
In this section I will look at how a supporter of either version of 
The Sacrifice View might argue for this view. Unfortunately, 
despite the frequency with which this view is endorsed, it is 
seldom seen as a claim that needs to be supported by argument. 
The closest attempt to give an argument in support of this 
connection is given by Dale Dorsey. In this section I will develop 
Dorsey’s brief remarks into an argument in support of the view 
that acts of supererogation always involve sacrifice.  
Though Dorsey does not commit himself to the claim that all acts 
of supererogation must meet this connection, he suggests a reason 
why we might in the following: 
If I am in a position to donate half my yearly salary to 
Oxfam International, but only at significant cost to my 
own well-being, doing so is supererogatory. If my 
donations fail to affect my well-being, or affect it only 
trivially, making these donations is morally required.28 
The point that Dorsey is making here is that it seems reasonable to 
think that the reason that an act is supererogatory is because it 
involves an overall cost to the welfare of the person performing it. 
Without this cost the act would be obligatory. The basic thought 
that Dorsey is appealing to here is that if we can help others 
without negatively impacting on our own well-being then it is 
                                                        
28 Dorsey (2013 p.357). 
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morally required to do so. Likewise, Henry Sidgwick claims that it 
is part of commonsense morality that people have, “a positive 
duty to render, when occasion offers, such services as require 
either no sacrifice one our part, or at least one very much less in 
importance than the service rendered.”29 We can formalize this 
thought in the following way: 
The No Cost Principle: If an available act, , is morally better than 
what would otherwise be the minimum that morality demands and 
involves no cost to the agent then -ing is obligatory. 
This is an intuitively appealing principle. After all, if we can 
perform a morally better act at no cost to ourselves then it seems 
reasonable to think that this is what we ought to do. This also 
seems like a principle that demands very little of the agent 
performing the act, as this principle will only apply in situations 
where doing the morally better act does not involve a cost to the 
agent. 
If we accept this principle then all permissible acts that are 
morally better than the minimum morality requires will involve a 
cost to the agent’s well-being that the minimum morality requires 
does not. Given that acts of supererogation are those that are better 
than the minimum required by morality it follows that all acts of 
supererogation will involve sacrifice.30 It is worth noting that this 
argument remains quiet on whether the sacrifice is the stronger, 
overall version of sacrifice or the weaker version. This argument, 
                                                        
29 (1907 p.253). 
30 This argument has the following form: P((Q R)S). 
STQ PT. Where P: Act  is supererogatory. Q: Act  is 
morally obligatory. R: A Act  is morally forbidden. S: Act  is 
better than the minimum morality demands. T: Act  involves an 
extra cost to the agent in comparison to the minimum that 
morality demands. Premise One is the definition of 
supererogation, Premise Two The No Cost Principle and the 
conclusion is The Sacrifice View.  
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then, can be used to support either version of The Sacrifice View, 
so long as we understand The No Cost Principle to involve the 
relevant form of cost. 
4.4 Against The No Cost Principle And The Sacrifice 
Views 
In §4.2 we looked at some problematic counter examples for The 
Sacrifice Views. We saw, though, that one way to respond to these 
counter examples is to retreat to The Restricted Sacrifice View. In 
the previous section, we looked at another way in which The 
Sacrifice Views can be defended; by appealing to The No Cost 
Principle. In this section I will give an argument against The No 
Cost Principle and all versions of The Sacrifice View. 
I will begin my argument with the observation that many people 
who perform acts that seem like paradigmatic examples of 
supererogation report that it was in their  self-interest to act as 
they did. Consider the following case: 
Free Help Guy: An anonymous London man known as The Free 
Help Guy (henceforth ‘Guy’) uses the Internet to offer free help to 
those who get in touch. His acts of kindness include helping a man 
find his estranged father, helping a man to do DIY and helping 
several people find jobs. He says that he does it because he enjoys 
helping people saying, “I wouldn't call this altruism because I 
think I've got more out of this than anyone else.”31 
In this case the agent performs what appear to be paradigmatic 
examples of acts of supererogation. However, if we take Guy’s 
comments at face value then it seems that he believed that his acts 
would have an overall positive impact on his own well-being 
compared with the alternatives. Is this claim plausible? We might 
                                                        
31 Usborne (2013).  
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think that this claim is plausible if we hold a subjective view of 
well-being but less so if we accept a more objective understanding 
of welfare. A subjectivist about well-being holds that  is 
intrinsically good for an agent if and only if  is valued under the 
proper conditions by the agent. An objectivist, on the other hand, 
holds that there are facts about any person’s well-being that are 
independent of her evaluative perspective.32 If we accept a 
subjectivist view and we think that the conditions under which 
moral exemplars possess their desires to perform morally valuable 
acts are ‘proper’, then we seem pushed to accept that Guy’s 
helpful acts really do increase his well-being.  
The point is perhaps less clear for objectivism.33 Nevertheless, 
those who hold this view of well-being typically do not want to 
claim that features of the agent have no role to play in determining 
the agent’s level of well-being. For example, in T.M. Scanlon’s 
defence of objectivism about well-being he is careful to point out 
the following:  
In speaking of ‘objective criteria’ I do not […] mean to 
exclude the possibility that, according to such a criterion, 
the same allotment of goods and opportunities may be 
judged to represent different levels of well-being for two 
different people because of differences in their condition.34  
Of course, on an objective view the differences between these two 
agents could not be fully reducible to the agents’ preferences. 
However, other features of the agents have an important role to 
play. Suppose Stuart derives great pleasure from cycling and none 
from watching football. Laura, on the other hand, derives great 
pleasure from watching her favourite football team and none from 
                                                        
32 These definitions are borrowed from Dorsey (2012 p.1). For a 
defence of objectivism see Parfit (2011 Ch.2,3). 
33 Thanks to Elinor Mason and Chris Mills for useful discussion 
here.  
34 (1975 p.658). 
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cycling. Even if we have an objectivist view it seems reasonable 
to think that if both had to choose between cycling or watching 
football, Laura’s level of well-being would be enhanced to a 
greater extent if she watched football while Stuart would be better 
off cycling. This is consistent with their being some preferences 
the fulfilment of which will not improve an agent’s level of well-
being. Someone could have preferences that do not fit with what 
would actually improve her well-being. Someone might, for 
example, prefer to count blades of grass rather than read poetry.35 
We might think that in this case, the agent’s well-being would 
actually be better promoted by reading poetry. 
In fact in order to be at all plausible an objectivist view of the type 
of costs relevant to determining the limits of moral duty must 
allow that an act that involves a cost for one agent may involve no 
cost at all for some other agent. To see why suppose, that Laura 
and Stuart have both offered to help Polly move house. We might 
think that, as a result, both are morally obliged to help. 
Unfortunately, it turns out that the day Polly needs help is the 
same day that Laura’s favourite football team is playing in a cup 
final. In this case it seems reasonable to think that this would 
make it permissible for Laura not to help but the same would not 
be true for Stuart. Even those who do not think that this makes it 
permissible for Laura not to help would presumably accept that 
missing the cup final would count as a cost for Laura and not for 
Stuart. Of course, this view can remain fully objective, as we 
could, for example, claim that the reason that missing the match 
counts as a cost for Laura and not for Stuart is not a result of 
either’s evaluative perspective but rather the actual level of 
pleasure they will each derive from this activity. Note that this 
                                                        
35 The example of someone who strongly desires to count blades 
of grass comes from Rawls (1971 p.432). 
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particular example works even if we do not accept a purely 
hedonist form of objectivism, one that views well-being as 
determined by pleasure. After all, objective list theories typically 
include pleasure on the list of things that contribute to an agent’s 
welfare.36 The point I wish to make, though, is the more general 
one that any acceptable objectivist view of the type of costs that 
are relevant in determining the limits of moral duty will allow 
features of the agent’s condition to play a role.37  
Of course, we could accept this and yet think that Guy’s 
preferences do not fit with what would actually be in his best 
interests. This may or may not be true. What is important for our 
purposes, though, is not to consider whether in the actual case 
Guy’s welfare was best promoted by acting as he did but whether 
it is conceivable that it could have been. Unfortunately for 
supporters of The Sacrifice View, it seems hard to deny that this is 
conceivable. After all, many people who perform acts we think of 
as supererogatory claim that they would have been unable to 
forgive themselves if they had not acted as they did. In Samuel 
and Pearl Oliner’s study of ‘righteous gentiles’, those who helped 
Jews escape the Nazis in the Second World War, they found that 
many made this claim.38 In addition, many reported feeling a 
rewarding sense of inner satisfaction as a result of their actions.39 
This suggests that often people who perform highly morally 
valuable acts are acting in line with their own               self-
interest. This claim is backed up by psychological research on 
                                                        
36 See Fletcher (2013 p.214), Parfit (1984 p.502).  
37 This point is accepted by Hooker (2000 p.43) and Scanlon 
(1998 p.120).  
38 (1988 p.168). A similar observation is made by Munroe (1991 
p.404).  
39 Oliner and Oliner (1988 pp. 169,177, and 220), Monroe et al. 
(1990 p.110). Badhwar (1993 p.107) argues that this gives us 
good reason to think that the rescuers were actually motivated by 
self-interest.   
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moral exemplars. In a recently published study, Frimer et al. 
found that exemplars were significantly more likely than the 
comparison group to have integrated their personal ambitions with 
their moral convictions. After ruling out various alternative 
explanations, the researchers concluded that, “These results are 
consistent with the claim that moral exemplars have achieved 
enlightened self-interest, whereby they best advance their own 
interests by advancing the interests of others.”40 
Accepting this allows us to say that whether we accept 
subjectivism or any plausible objectivist account we must accept 
that when someone with more developed moral sensibilities 
performs helpful acts it will, all else being equal, promote her own 
welfare to a greater extent than it would promote the welfare of 
someone who derives less pleasure from acting in this way. This is 
bad news for The No Cost Principle. When this principle is 
applied, those with more developed moral sensibilities will be 
subject to higher moral standards than the rest of the moral 
community. This is unacceptable. There would be something 
deeply unfair about holding those who experience higher levels of 
psychological discomfort in response to acting in less than 
morally optimal ways to higher moral standards than other people. 
To see why, imagine two people in a position to help rescue Jews 
from the Nazis. One has more developed moral sensibilities than 
the other. If we accept The No Cost Principle then we are 
committed to saying that the person with the more developed 
moral sensibilities is subject to more demanding obligations. 
Moreover, the reason she has these more demanding obligations is 
because she has more developed moral sensibilities. Effectively, 
then, the other’s less developed moral sensibilities get her off the 
                                                        
40 (2011 p.160). For further psychological evidence for this claim 
see Frimer et al. (2009) and Frimer et al. (2012). See also Colby 
and Damon (1992). 
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hook from these more demanding obligations. This, though, is 
simply not the kind of consideration that should prevent someone 
from facing a moral obligation.41  
Similarly, imagine Guy* is like Guy in every way, apart from the 
fact that, unlike Guy, Guy* finds helping people boring rather 
than pleasurable. Both Guy and Guy* are in a position where they 
could spend the afternoon helping someone. It seems implausible 
to think that Guy will be subject to more demanding moral 
obligations than Guy* simply because he has more developed 
moral sensibilities. Again, though, this is what we are committed 
to saying if we accept The No Cost Principle.  
We might think that this argument only works if we are dealing 
with an overall sense of cost, rather than the weaker sense 
explored in §4.1. However, we can avoid this problem if we 
stipulate that the alternative act available to both Guy and Guy* is 
a boring afternoon spent watching daytime television. For Guy, 
then, performing the helpful act will not involve any loss that is 
uncompensated for. Guy*, on the other hand, finds helping people 
to be even more boring than watching TV. As a result, The No 
Cost Principle would generate a duty for Guy but not for Guy*.  
So far I have argued that The No Cost Principle is implausible 
because it would generate less demanding obligations for those 
with less developed moral sensibilities. We might wonder whether 
we could accept this argument but hold on to some version of The 
Sacrifice View. We could, of course, accept that Guy’s act 
satisfies Morally Optional and Morally Better but insist that it 
                                                        
41 This argument has the following logical form: PQ. QR. 
RP. Where P: The No Cost Principle is accepted. Q: Those 
with more developed moral sensibilities will be held to higher 
moral standards than the rest of the moral community. R: Lacking 
a more developed moral conscience gets people off the hook from 
more demanding obligations. 
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cannot be supererogatory precisely because it does not involve 
sacrifice. In other words, while Guy’s act is not morally required 
it is not supererogatory either, as sacrifice is a necessary condition 
of supererogation. However, there is no benefit to be had in 
stipulating that we should define supererogation in this way. After 
all, Guy’s act seems like a paradigm example of an act that we 
would describe as being supererogatory. In addition, this 
stipulation creates the need for a new deontic category to 
accommodate acts that satisfy Morally Optional and Morally 
Better but do not involve self-sacrifice. Making this stipulation 
would, then, bring about a less parsimonious division of the 
deontic field without bringing about any obvious theoretical 
benefits. If we accept this argument against The No Cost Principle 
then we should also reject The Sacrifice View. Note that retreating 
to The Restricted Sacrifice View will not help here, since at least 
the case of helping a man find his estranged father seems like an 
act that brings about a          non-trivial moral good. As a result it 
must count as a morally significant act of supererogation. 
4.5. Objections and Responses 
In the previous section I argued against The No Cost Principle and 
The Sacrifice Views. In this section I will consider a number of 
objections that might be raised against this argument and respond 
to each in turn.  
The first objection that might be raised is that this account 
depends on a subjective view of the evidence about whether or not 
an act involves sacrifice. In other words, it is dependent on the 
agent’s own beliefs about which act will involve a cost to his 
welfare. We might think that on an objectivist view, where the 
facts of the matter determine which acts count as involving 
sacrifice, or a prospectivist view, where what it would be rational 
for the agent to believe determines which acts count as involving 
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sacrifice, the argument will not go through. However, as we have 
already seen, there is good reason to think that these acts actually 
do improve the well-being of the agents. If this is the case then an 
objectivist view of the evidence about whether or not an act 
involves sacrifice would say that these acts do not involve 
sacrifice. Similarly, if an agent believes that an act involves 
sacrifice and that act actually does involve sacrifice then it seems 
reasonable to think that there will be cases where it is rational for 
her to believe that the act involves sacrifice. If this is right then a 
prospectivist view about the evidence would also say that these 
acts involve sacrifice.  
Next, it might be objected that the fact that acting in line with the 
extra moral obligations that exemplars would face is in line with 
their self-interest means that they are not subject to more 
demanding obligations. It might be thought that if performing an 
act is in line with an agent’s self-interest then there is nothing 
demanding about making it obligatory. However, this objection is 
misguided for two reasons. First, the fact that an act is in 
someone’s self-interest is no guarantee that she will perform it. On 
this account, when someone with a more developed moral 
conscience fails to perform an act that is both in line with her self-
interest and morally good then she has violated a moral obligation, 
even though she would not have done so had she had a less 
developed moral conscience. This is demanding as it makes slip-
ups such as these morally blameworthy for the morally developed 
agent. Similarly, this objection ignores the fact that there may be 
two or more acts that are equally in line with an agent’s self-
interest. To make the morally better act morally required in cases 
like this is to limit the range of permissible acts that are in line 
with an agent’s self-interest.  
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We might also worry that this argument commits us to the 
implausible view that possessing greater capabilities never results 
in being subject to additional moral obligations.42 We can see why 
this would be problematic when we imagine the following case: 
suppose someone is drowning in the sea near the shore where two 
people are standing. One is a poor swimmer and the other a 
holidaying lifeguard. In this case it seems reasonable to think that 
the lifeguard may have an obligation to save the drowning man 
but the poor swimmer does not. We might think that this case is 
analogous to a more conscientious person and someone with less 
developed moral sensibilities, as both the lifeguard and the 
conscientious man find it easier to perform the morally good act. 
We might worry then that if we claim that the more conscientious 
man should not face additional duties as a result of his more 
developed sensibilities then nor should the stronger swimmer face 
more demanding duties as a result of his swimming ability.  
While it is plausible to think that the lifeguard does have an 
additional duty in this case, this causes no problem for my 
argument. This is because these cases are not analogous. Both the 
lifeguard and the conscientious man find it easier than those 
around them to perform the morally good act in these cases. 
However, there are two different uses of ‘easier’ at work here. The 
lifeguard finds it easier to save the drowning man because the 
challenge facing him is a minor one given his abilities. However, 
there is no reason to think that the conscientious man will find 
performing morally good acts easier in this sense. The sense of 
‘easier’ at work when we say that the conscientious man finds 
morally good acts easier to perform is simply that, given his more 
developed moral sensibilities, they involve a lesser sacrifice for 
                                                        
42 Thanks to Sebastian Köhler, Geoff Sayre-McCord and Brian 
McElwee for pressing me on this point. 
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him. I have argued we that we should not hold people to higher 
standards as a result of finding morally good acts easier to 
perform in this latter sense. My claim is that The Sacrifice View 
ought to be rejected because it has implausible implications for the 
relationship between conscience and duty. This in no way 
commits me to any view about the relationship between capability 
and duty.  
Finally, we might worry that this argument commits us to a 
strange position when we consider a mirror image of the person 
with a highly developed moral conscience.43 Suppose a child is 
falling from a third-floor window and Selfish Steve is standing 
below. Suppose Steve could catch the child and save her life if he 
drops the cup of coffee that he is holding (he does not have time to 
place it on the ground). As an unusually selfish man, Steve would 
get little pleasure from saving the child and has little desire to do 
so. In fact he would get much more pleasure from drinking the 
coffee and desires this much more strongly. Given that I have 
claimed that any acceptable objectivist view of welfare would 
allow subjective conditions to play a role in determining what is 
best for the agent, we might think that I am committed to saying 
that in this case Steve endures a far higher cost than an ordinary 
person would. 
However, even if we accept that Steve faces a greater cost than an 
ordinary person would in this case there is no need for me to 
accept that this will alter the obligations that he faces. My aim 
here has simply been to argue against The Sacrifice Views. I have 
not defended a positive account of what it is that makes an act 
supererogatory as opposed to obligatory. I am not then committed 
to making any assessments about whether Steve’s selfish 
personality should make him less liable to face certain obligations. 
                                                        
43 Thanks to Elinor Mason for raising this objection.  
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In fact, we could use the argument I have provided against The No 
Cost Principle against this assessment as well.  
Concluding Remarks 
I have argued that we should reject The Sacrifice View, as it is 
committed to the implausible view that those with more developed 
moral sensibilities are subject to more demanding moral duties 
than other people.  
This discussion has important implications for how we should 
evaluate competing solutions to The Paradox of Supererogation.  
If we accept that not all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice 
then this is going to be problematic for solutions to the paradox 
that rely on the balance of the agent’s self-interested reasons 
counting against performing the act.44 Given that we also rejected 
The Restricted Sacrifice View, this discussion will also be 
problematic for solutions that appeal to this sort of explanation for 
a subset of supererogatory acts.45  
This discussion also has implications for how we might 
accommodate these acts within existing normative ethical 
theories. Strategies that seek to accommodate the possibility of 
supererogation by appealing to a clash between what is best for 
the agent and what is best overall will be unable to explain this 
kind of supererogatory act. For example, utilitarians who attempt 
to accommodate the supererogatory by appealing to a permission 
to increase one’s own utility over overall utility in certain 
situations,46 will be unable to allow for acts of supererogation that 
it is in the agent’s interest to perform.
                                                        
44 Eg. Dorsey (2013).  
45 As both Portmore (2011 p.135 fn.22) and Horgan and Timmons 
(2010 p.62) do. 





Chapter Five Supererogation and 
Motivational Judgement Internalism 
5.1. Introduction 
Motivational judgement internalism (henceforth, ‘internalism’) is 
the view that there is an internal connection between moral 
judgements and motivation. According to this theory, there is a 
necessary link between making a moral judgement and being 
motivated to act in line with this judgement. Motivational 
judgement externalism (henceforth, ‘externalism’), on the other 
hand, is the view that there is no internal connection between the 
two. In this chapter I will investigate a neglected question for 
internalists, namely which moral evaluations the internal 
connection holds for.  
The debate between internalists and externalists is important in its 
own right because it has implications for who can be said to be 
making genuine moral judgements. If we accept internalism then 
we may have to conclude that someone who claims to have made 
a moral judgement that does not motivate her cannot be said to 
have made a genuine moral judgement.   
The debate is also important for the role it plays in other 
metaethical debates. When internalism is combined with a 
Humean theory of motivation it lends natural support to non-
cognitivism about moral judgements.1 The Humean theory of 
motivation states that beliefs by themselves are incapable of 
motivating. If we accept internalism about moral judgements then 
we accept that motivation is internal to moral judgements and so 
according to the Humean view of motivation, they cannot be 
                                                        
1 This point is made by Michael Smith (1994, p.12).  
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purely cognitive states.2 Of course, things are not this simple and 
it is possible to combine internalism with a cognitivist view of 
moral judgements.3 An interesting development in recent years 
has been the attempt to reconcile the two by showing that the 
assertion of a cognitive state of mind can express non-cognitive 
attitudes via some form of implicature.4 Nevertheless, it is fair to 
say that anyone attempting to combine internalism with a Humean 
theory of motivation and a cognitivist view of moral judgements 
will have some explaining to do.  
Many have found internalism attractive because it is able to 
explain the strong connection that appears to exist between moral 
language and motivation.5 As a number of authors have pointed 
out, there seems to be something puzzling about someone who 
claims that an act is obligatory but fails to be motivated to perform 
it.6 Suppose Jenny tells us that eating meat is wrong. It would be 
puzzling to then find her enjoying a hamburger. Internalists claim 
that the reason why this seems puzzling is that motivation is 
internal to moral judgements, so that it is impossible to make a 
genuine moral judgement without being motivated to act in line 
with it.   
In response to arguments like this one, externalists have argued 
that amoralists, people who makes genuine moral judgements but 
                                                        
2 Although, for all this argument shows, moral judgements could 
include both cognitive and noncognitive states. Such hybrid views 
are increasingly popular, see, for example, Ridge (2006) and 
Tresan (2006).  
3 As, for example, Smith attempts to do (1994). 
4 See Copp (2001), Finlay (2004), Strandberg (2012).   
5 This way of characterizing the appeal of internalism comes from 
Strandberg (2012 p.89).  
6 See Stevenson (1944 pp.16-17), Dreier (1990 pp.13-14), Dancy 
(1993 p.4), Smith (1994 p.60), Blackburn (1998 pp.48, 52-53) and 
Lenman (1999 pp. 443-446). 
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remain unmotivated by them, are conceptually possible.7 This 
would mean that there is no necessary connection between moral 
judgements and motivation and that externalism is true.  
The most common internalist response to the challenge posed by 
the possibility of amoralists is to restrict the internalist claim to a 
subset of moral agents. Different kinds of agent restrictions have 
been proposed. Some restrict the claim to rational agents, others to 
normal agents and the claim might also be made about virtuous 
agents. While these agent restrictions help the internalist respond 
to the challenge of the amoralist, they do so at a price. The price 
that must be paid for using this strategy is that the further we 
restrict the internalist claim, the less influence the claim will have 
for the debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists. Certainly 
for some ways of restricting internalism it seems reasonable to 
worry that what started as an interesting claim about moral 
judgements, has become a less interesting (for metaethicists at 
least) claim about certain kinds of moral agent.8 Another response 
that can be given is that the motivation generated by moral 
judgements is only pro tanto and is capable of being overridden 
by motivation deriving from other sources.9  
There is, though, an important question that internalists have 
largely ignored. While there has been a great deal of discussion 
                                                        
7 See Brink (1989), Svavarsdóttir (1999), Shafer Landau (2003), 
Zangwill (2008). 
8 Miller makes this point convincingly about versions of 
internalism that are restricted to virtuous agents. This, Miller 
points out,“Might be the case simply because of what it is to be a 
‘virtuous agent’ in the first place,” (2008 p.252). Similar points 
are made by Enoch (2011 p.251) and Svavarsdóttir (1999 p.183). 
9 David Brink first made the distinction between Strong 
Internalism, which holds that moral judgements provide sufficient 
motivation to act and Weak Internalism, which holds that moral 
judgements necessarily provide some motivation to act (1989 
p.41). 
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about the kinds of agents internalism applies to and the kind of 
motivation under discussion there has been almost no discussion 
about the kinds of moral evaluations this connection holds for. 
One recent development in the literature has been the explicit 
recognition of a point that had previously been left implicit; that 
internalism is a theory about first-person judgements.10 However, 
this leaves open the question of which first-person moral 
judgements internalism applies to. While different definitions of 
internalism focus on different moral evaluations there has been 
little discussion about which evaluations the theory should cover. 
Indeed most contributions in the literature seem oblivious to the 
fact that different evaluations have been given and the importance 
that this has for the debate. 11  The primary aim of this chapter is 
to investigate whether internalism is a plausible view to hold 
about moral judgements in general or whether it should be 
understood only to be a claim about moral requirements. 
I will limit myself in this discussion to focussing on the 
connection to motivation that internalists have focussed on up to 
now, that is a motivation to perform the action in question: in 
other words, being motivated to perform the act I have made a 
moral judgement about. Other forms of internalism have been 
defended, such as Allan Gibbard’s view that moral judgements are 
connected to various kinds of emotions.12 For instance, we might 
think that judging an act to be morally wrong is internally 
connected to motivation to blame the person performing the act. 
While this possibility is an interesting one, for the purposes of this 
                                                        
10 This point is made by Wedgwood (2007 p.25) and Ridge 
(2014). 
11 One notable exception is Miller (2008 p.235) who 
acknowledges this gap in the literature.   
12 (1990). 
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chapter I will focus on the standard approach, which is to link 
moral judgements to motivation to perform the act being judged. 13 
I will start in §5.1 with an investigation of the different 
evaluations that internalism has been claimed to cover. I will 
argue that these various evaluations can be grouped into two 
categories. One way to understand the internalist claim is that it 
covers all moral judgements. Another way in which we might 
understand the internalist claim is as a claim regarding only 
judgements about the morally required and forbidden. In §5.2 I 
will explain why it is important to find out which form of 
internalism can be defended. Unfortunately for the internalist 
there appear to be problems associated with both options. In §5.3 I 
will argue that internalists about all moral judgements face the 
problem of the supererogation amoralist and that this is a problem 
that traditional amoralist accommodating strategies will be 
ineffective against. In §5.4 I will examine the problem facing the 
form of internalism restricted to moral requirement judgements. 
Those who accept this form of internalism owe an explanation as 
to why it is only a subset of moral judgements that are internally 
connected to motivation. However, I will argue that there is an 
explanation that internalists can give in response to this problem. 
As a result, internalists should accept that in order to be plausible, 
the view must be restricted to requiring moral judgements.  
5.1 A Neglected Question for Internalists 
Internalists have largely ignored the question of what kinds of 
moral evaluation their theory applies to. Different definitions of 
internalism make the claim about different forms of moral 
evaluation. There are, at least, five different forms of moral 
evaluation that the internalist claim has been made about. Some 
                                                        
13 Thanks to Mike Ridge for pressing me on this point. 
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authors have claimed that the connection holds for judgements of 
moral obligation.14 Others have defined internalism as applying to 
‘moral ought’ judgements.15 The claim has also been made about 
judgements of ‘moral rightness’16, ‘moral goodness’17 and about 
all moral judgements.18 In this section I will argue that these 
accounts can be grouped into two categories: those that hold that 
the internalist claim applies to all moral judgements and those 
who restrict the claim to requiring moral judgements.  
The first way of making the internalist claim refers to moral 
obligation judgements. For example, Michael Cholbi describes 
internalism in the following way: “If an agent judges that she is 
morally obligated to , then, that agent is, to at least some minimal 
extent, motivated to .”19 This definition could be interpreted as 
making a claim about all moral judgements and focussing on the 
case of moral obligation for simplicity. Nevertheless, I think an 
equally acceptable interpretation would be that it is making a 
claim specifically about moral requirement judgements. Indeed 
some authors discuss internalism in such a way that this is the 
only way to interpret their claims.20 We might think that this view 
of internalism restricts the claim only to moral obligation 
judgements. Equally, though, we might think that this claim 
should be understood to cover negative moral judgements as well. 
                                                        
14 See Frankena (1958), Korsgaard (1996 p. 81), Cholbi (2011 
p.28). 
15 See Kauppinen (2008). 
16 Smith (1994 p.61). 
17 Dreier (1990 p.11) and Blackburn (1984 p.187-8). 
18 See, for example, McNaughton (1988 p.23) and Dancy (1993 
p.7). 
19 Cholbi (2011 p.28). 
20 For example, Frankena describes the debate between internalists 
and externalists as: “A problem with the analysis of judgements of 
moral obligation,” (1958 p.40).  
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This is how I will understand the claim in this chapter.21 Someone 
who judges that an act is morally forbidden should be motivated 
not to perform that act in the same way that an agent who judges 
an act to be morally obliged will be motivated to perform it. I will 
define this view as follows: 
Restricted Judgement Internalism (Restricted Internalism): If an 
agent judges that she is morally required to  then she will 
necessarily be motivated to . If an agent judges that she is 
morally required not to  then she will necessarily be motivated 
not to .22 
Other ways of defining internalism seem to be saying something 
quite different. These definitions claim that all moral judgements 
are necessarily connected to motivation. I will define this form of 
internalism as follows: 
Unrestricted Judgement Internalism (Unrestricted Internalism): If 
an agent judges that it would be morally good for her to  then she 
will necessarily be motivated to . If an agent judges that it would 
be morally bad for her to  then she will necessarily be motivated 
not to . 
The claim that moral judgements are connected to motivation 
should be understood in the same way that Restricted Internalism 
has been. Positive moral judgements will motivate people to 
                                                        
21 My reason for doing so is that my goal in this chapter is to show 
that we must restrict internalism to requiring moral judgements. 
Whether or not the internalist claim needs to be restricted even 
further to cover only obligation judgements or only prohibition 
judgements is not a question I will deal with here. Thanks to Alan 
Wilson for pushing me to consider this issue.  
22 It should be noted that I am using ‘restricted’ here to refer to 
restrictions on the kinds of judgement the theory covers. There are 
of course other ways of restricting internalism, such as to certain 
kinds of agent. I considered these forms of restriction in §5.3. 
 170 
perform the acts whilst negative moral judgements will motivate 
people not to perform them. The difference between the two forms 
of internalism I have outlined is that Unrestricted Internalism 
holds the internalist claim to cover all moral judgements while for 
Restricted Internalism the theory only applies to judgements about 
the morally required and forbidden. Restricted Internalism makes 
no claims about acts that are given other kinds of moral 
evaluation.  
The remaining claims about the evaluations internalism covers 
(those concerning moral ought judgements, moral rightness 
judgements and moral goodness judgements) can be divided into 
these two classes. Internalism about moral goodness should be 
placed with Unrestricted Internalism. In the same way that 
Restricted Internalism was taken to include judgements about the 
morally wrong as well as the morally required I will take this form 
of internalism to apply to ‘moral badness’ judgements as well as 
judgements relating to goodness. This form of internalism claims 
that there is a necessary connection between judging that an act is 
morally good and being motivated to do it. Likewise, there is a 
necessary connection between judging that an act is morally bad 
and being motivated not to do it. This form of internalism is 
making a claim about all forms of moral evaluation.  
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to think that those who 
advocate internalism about ‘moral ought’ are referring to 
Restricted Internalism. When confined to moral contexts about 
how, morally, someone should act I take it that ‘ought’ means ‘is 
morally required to’.23 More controversially perhaps, definitions 
                                                        
23 Zimmerman uses the term ‘ought’ to refer to moral obligation 
(1996 p.1). Chrisman (2012), on the other hand, points to some 
problems with understanding the moral ‘ought’ in terms of 
obligation. More general worries about the identification of 
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of internalism that propose a necessary connection between ‘moral 
rightness’ judgements and motivation should also be included 
under Restricted Internalism. To say that a particular act is 
morally right implies that the agent is under obligation to do it.24 
For my purposes it does not matter whether I have grouped these 
forms of internalism into the appropriate categories or not. All I 
have sought to show is that these five forms of internalism can be 
reduced to two.  
 
5.2 Why The Distinction Matters 
This distinction is important because Unrestricted Internalism 
covers a wider range of judgements than Restricted Internalism. 
According to Unrestricted Internalism all moral judgements, with 
the exception of judgements of moral neutrality, will be 
necessarily connected to some form of motivation either to 
perform or not perform the act. According to Restricted 
Internalism, it is only requiring moral judgements that will 
motivate. Accepting Unrestricted Internalism, then, will commit 
us to the view that there is a necessary connection between 
judgements of supererogation and motivation. Accepting 
Restricted Internalism brings with it no such commitment. In this 
section I will explain what it is to judge that an act is 
supererogatory and why Unrestricted Internalism is committed to 
internalism about supererogation judgements. 
As I have already discussed, a supererogatory act is one that is 
morally better than the minimum morality demands. When we 
judge an act to be supererogatory then we judge that it is morally 
                                                        
‘ought’ with ‘is required to’ are raised by McNamara (1996), von 
Fintel and Iatridou (2008), Finlay (2010 p.76) and Ridge (2014). 
24 This claim is made by Ross (1930 p.6). We might equally think, 
as Scanlon does (1998), that ‘morally right’ means ‘morally 
permissible’.  
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optional and morally better than the available non-supererogatory 
alternatives. As a result, if we accept Restricted Internalism then 
we should think that the internalist claim does not apply to these 
judgements. Unrestricted Internalism, on the other hand, is 
committed to a view of Internalism that holds that there is a 
necessary connection between supererogation judgements and 
motivation.  
This, then, shows an important difference between Unrestricted 
Internalism and Restricted Internalism and it is one that presents 
problems for the defender of either view.25 The problem for 
defenders of Unrestricted Internalism is that they are committed to 
the view that supererogation judgements are necessarily connected 
to motivation. This is problematic, as positing an internal 
connection to motivation for these judgements seems far less 
plausible than for other moral judgements. Moreover, as I will 
argue in the next section, the traditional internalist strategies for 
accommodating cases of amoralism seem incapable of saving 
internalism here.  
However, defenders of Restricted Internalism also face a problem. 
Given that they wish to restrict the internalist claim to a narrow 
subset of our moral judgements, they owe an explanation for this. 
This problem is made even worse when we consider that it is 
commonly thought that judging an act to be supererogatory 
involves judging the act to be morally better than the merely 
required alternative. Nevertheless, as I will argue in §5.4, there is 
an explanation that supporters of Restricted Internalism can give 
                                                        
25 It is possible that judgements about the offensive or 
suberogatory might cause similar problems for the internalist. 
These are judgements that an act is morally bad but not morally 
forbidden. Both Chisholm (1963) and Driver (1992) argue that 
such acts exist. For the purposes of this chapter I will look only at 
positive moral judgements and the problems caused by 
judgements of supererogation.  
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here. As a result, I will argue that those wishing to defend 
internalism should defend Restricted Internalism and not 
Unrestricted Internalism. 
5.3 Unrestricted Internalism and The Supererogation 
Amoralist 
The problem that Unrestricted Internalism faces is that of the 
supererogation amoralist, someone who makes genuine 
supererogation judgements but remains unmotivated by them. 
This is problematic, as it seems possible to judge that an act is 
supererogatory and remain completely unmotivated to perform it. 
Suppose Judy says the following: ‘It would be beyond the call of 
duty for me to give away all of my disposable income to charity.’ 
Now imagine we find out that she is not motivated to do so. This 
does not seem odd in the way that Jenny’s eating meat seemed 
odd. The reason for this is that we do not expect people to be 
motivated by a judgement that an act is supererogatory. Suppose 
we asked Judy why she isn’t acting in line with her judgement. A 
perfectly reasonable response for Judy to make is that she judges 
it to be supererogatory not obligatory.  
Let me say a little about why I take this to be a particular problem 
for Unrestricted Internalism and not simply another battle in what 
David Enoch has called ‘The Amoralist Wars’.26 The first reason 
is that, unlike traditional amoralist objections, being unmotivated 
by a supererogation judgement is likely to be a recognisable 
feature of many people’s moral experience. Certainly, when 
reflecting on my own experience of judging an act to be beyond 
the call of duty I would go so far as to say that the occasions 
where these judgements are accompanied by motivation are the 
exception rather than the norm. As I write this I judge that it 
                                                        
26 (2011 p.250). 
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would be morally better for me to stop writing and go and help out 
at a soup kitchen but I am not motivated to do so and do not find 
this particularly odd. Of course, we do not need to go as far as 
asking whether or not someone who is never motivated by 
supererogation judgements exists. All we need to know is whether 
it is possible for someone to sometimes be unmotivated by 
supererogation judgements. 27 Nevertheless, the fact that this 
seems like a recognisable feature of moral experience means that 
internalists are going to have a difficult job persuading us that 
supererogation amoralists are necessarily impossible. One 
difference, then, between this challenge and traditional amoralist 
challenges is that the supererogation amoralist is more than a 
fantastical creature posited for the purposes of a thought 
experiment. It is a condition that many ordinary agents will have 
experienced in their own lives.  
The second reason why this is a particularly important problem for 
internalists is that the connection between moral language and 
motivation that is used to provide support for internalism does not 
apply for talk of supererogation judgements. When Judy from the 
previous example utters the sentence: ‘Donating my disposable 
income to charity would be beyond the call of duty.’ This sentence 
does not seem to bring with it the presumption that Judy will be 
motivated to donate her money. If anything it seems that our 
expectation would be that she would not donate the money. Note, 
as we have already seen, the same is not true about obligations. If 
                                                        
27 Zangwill says that we should not describe people who are 
indifferent on a particular occasion as amoralists, since amoralists 
are people who are never motivated by moral judgements (2008 
p.101). To be clear, when I use the term supererogation amoralist I 
mean someone who on that particular occasion is left unmotivated 
by a supererogation judgement. Those who think that this is a 
misuse of the term can replace ‘supererogation amoralist’ with 
‘someone indifferent to their supererogation judgement’. 
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Judy were to say instead that she viewed donating the money as 
morally obligatory then it would be somewhat puzzling if she 
lacked motivation to do so. So, while internalists can support their 
claim about moral obligations by an appeal to the connection that 
it seems odd to claim that an act is obligatory without being 
motivated by it they are unable to make an equivalent argument 
for supererogation judgements.    
The challenge, then, for those seeking to defend Unrestricted 
Internalism is to explain the possibility of supererogation 
amoralists in a way that is compatible with the theory. In the 
remainder of this section I will consider two ways in which 
internalists have responded to previous amoralist challenges. I will 
argue that neither provides an effective defence for Unrestricted 
Internalism against the problem of supererogation amoralism. 
The first response to consider is whether some form of agent-
restriction can deal with this problem. To test this possibility we 
must ask whether for any of the available agent restrictions, it is 
true that everyone who meets the requirements of the restriction 
and makes a supererogation judgement will be motivated to act in 
line with it. There are three forms of agent-restriction that have 
been proposed in the literature and I will look at each of these 
restrictions in turn. I will argue that none of these restrictions can 
provide a plausible response to the problem of the supererogation 
amoralist.  
The first agent-restricted form of Unrestricted Internalism I will 
consider is one restricted to practically rational agents.28 For this 
to be an effective response to the problem we will need to be 
persuaded that practically rational agents will necessarily be 
                                                        
28 This form of restriction is advocated by Smith (1994 p.61), 
Wallace (2006) and van Roojen (2010). 
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motivated to perform acts that they judge to be supererogatory. I 
take it that many will share the thought that this is an implausible 
claim to make about supererogation judgements. Suppose 
someone judges that donating all of her money to charity would 
be supererogatory. It seems absurd to think that she is irrational if 
she is not then motivated to act in line with this judgement. This I 
take to be the case whether we opt for a procedural or a 
substantive account of practical reasoning. Proceduralists think 
that we can only be rationally blameworthy for failing to have a 
desire we could have rationally reached from our existing set of 
beliefs and desires. According to substantivists we might be 
rationally blameworthy for failing to have some desire even if it 
would not have been possible for us to rationally reach it through 
our existing beliefs and desires. 29  
I take it to be uncontroversial that proceduralists about practical 
reason should accept that supererogation amoralists might not be 
irrational. There seems no reason to think that everyone who 
judges an act to supererogatory could rationally reach the 
motivation to perform the act from his or her existing beliefs and 
desires.  As a result, internalists are going to have to look to a 
substantive view of rationality to declare supererogation 
amoralists as irrational.  
The problem with this, though, is that it is plausible to think that 
many cases where an act of supererogation is available are cases 
where there are rational options. 30 These are cases where two 
rationally permissible options are available. In fact this seems like 
a feature of supererogation that any plausible account must be 
                                                        
29 For a discussion of the literature on proceduralism and 
substantivism about practical reason see Hooker and Streumer 
(2004). Thanks to Elinor Mason for helpful discussion here. 
30 This claim is made by Gert (2004 p.106), Horgan and Timmons 
(2010) and Portmore (2011 p.153). 
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capable of incorporating. If it is rationally permissible not to 
perform the supererogatory act then surely it will also be 
rationally permissible not to be motivated to perform the act. So 
declaring supererogation amoralists as irrational using a 
substantive account of irrational is not going to be an option for 
accounts that allow for rational options in cases where one or 
more available acts are supererogatory.  
Another problem with attempting to declare supererogation 
amoralists as substantively irrational is that it seems to rule out as 
incoherent philosophical positions that appear to be intelligible.31 
Take, for instance, the view that Susan Wolf defends in her 
influential article ‘Moral Saints’.32 One of the claims that Wolf 
defends here is that the life of a moral saint, someone who always 
acts in the morally best possible way, is an undesirable one. 
Presumably, those who accept this line of thought would also 
accept that it is not irrational to be unmotivated by a 
supererogation judgement. After all, those who are always 
motivated to perform acts they judge to be supererogatory will, 
according to Wolf, lead a worse life than those who are not. Of 
course, not everyone endorses the view Wolf defends here and we 
might think that the force of this point is contingent upon its 
acceptance.33 However, even if we are not persuaded by Wolf’s 
claims, if we find her view intelligible then it is hard to see how it 
could be a conceptual truth that rational people will be motivated 
by their supererogation judgements. If this were the case then it 
would surely appear incoherent. For these two reasons it seems 
reasonable to conclude that restricting the internalist claim to 
rational agents will not provide supporters of Unrestricted 
                                                        
31 Thanks to Mike Ridge for suggesting this point.  
32 (1982).  
33 One way to put pressure on this view is to reject this account of 
‘moral sainthood’ as Carbonnell (2009) does.  
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Internalism with an acceptable response to the possibility of 
supererogation amoralists.  
The next agent-restricted form of Unrestricted Internalism I will 
consider is one restricted to virtuous agents.34 In order for this to 
be an effective response to the problem it must be the case that 
virtuous people will always be motivated by their supererogation 
judgements. This claim strikes me as implausible. It seems 
perfectly possible for a virtuous agent to be unmotivated by a 
judgement that an act is supererogatory.  
For those who don’t immediately share this thought it is important 
to bear in mind that we are concerned with judgements of 
supererogation rather than acts. I am not claiming that it is 
possible for a virtuous agent never to be motivated to perform a 
supererogatory act. All I am saying is that a virtuous agent need 
not be motivated to perform any acts that she judges to be 
supererogatory. This is a much more plausible claim, as there may 
be some people we consider virtuous because they have a very 
demanding view of what is morally required. In fact, many people 
who do perform acts of supererogation claim to have only 
performed their duty.35 Take the example of John Weidner, who 
during the Second World War put himself at great risk while 
working for the Resistance helping Jews escape the Gestapo. 
When asked whether he had performed a particularly worthy act 
his response was, “Absolutely not. I did my duty. That is all.”36 
Many might think that Weidner is wrong about this and that his 
                                                        
34 This form of agent restriction is considered, though not 
defended, by Miller (2008 pp.250-252). Though I know of no one 
who defends this form of internalism it seems worth considering 
here, as it might be thought to be particularly relevant to the case 
of supererogation. 
35 This phenomenon is identified by Colby and Damon (1992), 
Badhwar (1993), and Carbonell (2012). 
36 This quote comes from Monroe (2004 p.117). 
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acts should be seen as supererogatory. Now let’s imagine that 
Weidner does judge some acts to be supererogatory, perhaps he 
spent six days a week working for the resistance and judged that 
to spend a seventh would be supererogatory. If Weidner was 
occasionally left unmotivated by a supererogation judgement 
would that mean that he could not be classed as a virtuous person? 
Clearly not, after all he is motivated to perform acts that many 
people would consider to be supererogatory, he just happens to 
think that they are obligatory. It is possible, then, for a virtuous 
agent to be unmotivated by a supererogation judgement. 
Those sympathetic to this form of agent-restricted internalism 
might respond by saying that in this context we must understand 
‘virtuous’ to mean ‘fully virtuous’.37 This form of internalism 
avoids the problem considered above, as it is compatible with 
those typically regarded as saintly failing to be motivated by their 
supererogation judgements. However, it does so at a price. The 
price is that this form of internalism, insofar as it is true, no longer 
seems to be telling us anything interesting about our moral 
judgements in general. After all, if this form of internalism does 
not apply even to exemplars such as Weidner then it does not 
seem to be telling us anything about moral judgements made by 
human agents. Rather, it is making a trivial claim about what we 
mean by ‘fully virtuous agent’. For these reasons, this form of 
agent restriction will not be able to handle the case of the 
supererogation amoralist.  
The next form of restriction I will look at is restricting the claim to 
normal agents. According to this version of internalism, moral 
judgements are necessarily connected to motivation for normal 
agents. If this form of restricted internalism is plausible then we 
will be able to explain why it is possible for supererogation 
                                                        
37 Thanks to Mike Ridge for pressing me on this point. 
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amoralists to exist. The existence of such people is compatible 
with this form of internalism as they are not normal agents. On 
this account all normal agents will be necessarily motivated by 
their supererogation judgements. 
This account is supported by focusing not on the individual 
making the judgement but on the community that she is a part of. 
According to this form of internalism, there must be some internal 
connection between moral judgements and motivation even if it is 
just one that is generally present in the community rather than in 
every individual member of that community.38 Even if individual 
amoralists are conceivable, it is argued, a community of 
amoralists is not. Perhaps, then, internalists can make a similar 
response to the conceptual possibility of supererogation 
amoralists. In response to such a problem it might be argued that, 
while it may be possible for an individual to remain unmotivated 
by a judgement of supererogation it would not be possible for a 
community of such people to do so. The important issue to 
consider about such a world is whether or not we could say that 
the inhabitants are making genuine supererogation judgements 
given that people tend not to be motivated to act in line with them.  
The first point to make against the ability of this form of 
Unrestricted Internalism to accommodate the existence of 
supererogation amoralists is that it doesn’t seem at all clear that 
normal people are motivated by their supererogation judgements. 
Of course, it isn’t clear how we should understand ‘normal’ in this 
context.39 However, I cannot see any way of understanding 
                                                        
38 See Dreier (1990 p.14), Blackburn (1998 pp.61-68), Lenman 
(1999) and Gibbard (2003). 
39 We might understand it in a purely statistical way or in a more 
normative way. Of course, if understood in a statistical way then 
this seems to provide no support for the internalist claim, as 
internalism is supposed to be an a priori thesis. This point is made 
by Miller (2008 p.245). 
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normal that is related to its ordinary use for which it would be 
plausible to think that normal people are generally motivated by 
supererogation judgements. A major part of what makes it so 
admirable to perform supererogatory acts is that most people 
would not have acted in the same way if they had been in that 
situation.40 This by itself seems to be good reason to reject this 
approach to dealing with the problem of the supererogation 
amoralist. It is worth noting, though, that rejecting this claim will 
not be enough to save this response to the supererogation 
amoralist. The internalist must endorse the stronger claim that it is 
necessarily the case that normal people are motivated by their 
supererogation judgements. In other words, they must show that it 
is inconceivable that normal people would be unmotivated by 
supererogation judgements. This surely gives us good reason to 
reject this response.  
Perhaps, though, the real challenge of Communal Internalism 
should not be put in terms of normality. After all we might be 
quite happy to describe judgements as moral judgements so long 
as some people are motivated by these judgements. A more 
worrying challenge is that moral judgements are necessarily 
connected to motivations at a community level. In order for a 
judgement to be considered a moral judgement perhaps it must 
exist against a background of moral judgements motivating people 
to act.41 To relate this to the supererogation amoralist, perhaps 
such a person is only possible against a background of at least 
some people being motivated by supererogation judgements.  
However, unlike with moral judgements in general, there seems to 
be no reason to think that a judgement of supererogation can only 
                                                        
40 To be clear, I do not mean that most people never perform 
supererogatory acts, only that they do not perform all of the 
supererogatory acts available. 
41 This is the point that Lenman makes (1999 p.445). 
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count as genuine against a background of people being motivated 
to act in line with these judgements. We can see why if we 
imagine a world, Planet Duty, where no one is ever motivated by 
supererogation judgements. Now imagine that on Planet Duty 
there are differing conceptions of what morality requires. Some 
people, The Maximizers, have a very demanding conception, 
while for others, The Satisficers, morality is thought to demand 
very little. Imagine that those with the less demanding conception 
of duty are full of praise and admiration for the acts performed by 
those with the more demanding view. They give them medals and 
write poems celebrating their acts. They just are never motivated 
to perform acts that they judge to be supererogatory. I can see no 
reason to think that these people are not making genuine 
supererogation judgements.  
When it comes to considering judgements of supererogation, there 
seems no reason to think that the challenge of Communal 
Internalism shows that the idea of someone making a genuine 
judgement of supererogation is dependent on people in their 
community being motivated by such judgements. Appealing to 
Communal Internalism will not save Unrestricted Internalism 
from the supererogation amoralist. 
The second response that might be made in defence of 
Unrestricted Internalism is that the motivations that moral 
judgements are necessarily connected to, need only be pro tanto. 
This form of internalism is often called Weak Internalism and can 
be formulated as follows: 
Weak Unrestricted Internalism: If an agent judges that it would be 
morally good for her to  then she will necessarily have some 
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motivation to . If an agent judges that it would be morally bad for 
her to  then she will necessarily have some motivation not to .42  
On this account moral judgements will always provide some 
motivation but this motivation may be overridden by contrary 
motivation.43 This response allows the supporter of Unrestricted 
Internalism to claim that judging an act to be supererogatory is 
necessarily connected to motivation but that this motivation may 
be outweighed. It is possible on this view to judge an act to be 
supererogatory and not be sufficiently motivated to perform it. 
This response is attractive as it allows us to retain an internal 
connection between all moral judgements and motivation without 
making the implausible claim that those who judge an act to be 
supererogatory will necessarily be motivated all the way to action.  
Furthermore, we might think that two commonly identified 
features of supererogation judgements might provide further 
support for this claim. First, it is often claimed that acts of 
supererogation necessarily involve some degree of self-sacrifice 
from the agent. Of course, as I argued in the previous chapter, 
there is good reason to reject the claim that all acts of 
supererogation involve sacrifice. Nevertheless, if we accept that 
acts of supererogation typically involve self-sacrifice then we 
might think that judging an act to be supererogatory will typically 
involve a judgement that there are self-interested reasons against 
performing supererogatory acts.44 Similarly, supererogatory acts 
                                                        
42 That is, unrestricted in terms of what evaluations are covered. 
These forms of internalism may be restricted in terms of what 
agents they apply to. 
43 Mason describes a version of this form of internalism restricted 
to those that are practically rational as Weakest Internalism (2008 
p.144).  
44 This, presumably, will not be the case if we think that self-
regarding supererogatory acts are possible, as Kawall (2003) does. 
This possibility is ruled out if we accept Heyd’s claim (1982 
p.115) that altruistic intentions are necessary for acts of 
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are often thought to be ones for which formal sanctions such as 
punishment and informal sanctions such as blame are 
inappropriate responses to non-performance.45 This means that 
typically there are strong self-interested reasons to perform moral 
requirements that do not support performing acts of 
supererogation. It seems reasonable to think that this judgement 
will often provide motivation against performing the 
supererogatory act either because judgements of self-interest are 
also necessarily motivating or because they typically are. Either 
way, recognizing that there are often strong self-interested reasons 
against performing acts of supererogation and against omitting 
obligatory acts allows supporters to explain why the connection to 
motivation seems weaker for supererogation judgements than for 
obligation judgements.  
However, this response can be dismissed for two reasons. First, 
even this weaker claim is implausibly strong. It seems quite 
possible to judge that an act is supererogatory and be completely 
unmotivated to perform the act. This form of internalism would be 
committed to saying that in order for Judy from the previous 
example to be said to be making a genuine moral judgement she 
must be motivated to some extent to donate all of her money to 
charity. It seems perfectly possible to judge that an act is 
supererogatory and to be completely unmotivated to perform the 
act.  
Of course the supporter of Weak Unrestricted Internalism might 
respond by insisting that this cannot be considered a genuine 
moral judgement. Note, though, that this point is not supported by 
the usual arguments from the practicality of moral language. As 
                                                        
supererogation. However, as I argued in Chapter Three, there is 
good reason to reject this requirement.  
45 Eg. Heyd (1982 p.115). 
 185 
noted in §5.1 the arguments usually used to support internalism 
involve an appeal to the claim that there is something odd or 
incoherent about someone who utters a sentence like, ‘Eating meat 
is wrong’, and has no motivation to stop eating meat. This 
argument provides no support for the claim that supererogation 
judgements must be accompanied by pro tanto motivations. In 
order to support this form of internalism we would need to be 
given reason to think that uttering a sentence like, ‘Vegetarianism 
is beyond the call of duty’, necessarily indicates some pro tanto 
motivation the agent has to become vegetarian. Unfortunately for 
the supporter of Unrestricted Internalism there does not seem to be 
any reason to think that it does. In fact it seems plausible to think 
that making an utterance of this kind often suggests that the 
speaker lacks motivation to perform the action. It seems natural in 
this exchange to think that the speaker of this sentence will not be 
overall motivated to become vegetarian. Moreover there does not 
seem to be any reason to think she would be in some way 
incoherent if she does not have some pro tanto motivation to do 
so. Such a situation would not make us question the sincerity of 
the speaker’s judgement or her competence in her use of moral 
terms.  
This first point connects to the second more general worry that 
others have voiced about pro tanto forms of internalism. As a 
number of authors have pointed out it seems implausible to think 
that people will necessarily be motivated to some extent by a 
judgement that there is some reason to do something when this 
reason is overridden by other concerns.46 To see why consider the 
following case, adapted from an example given by Caj 
Strandberg:  
                                                        
46 Those who make this point include Dancy (2004 p.17), Wallace 
(2006 pp.187-188), Strandberg (2013 p.32). 
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Life vs. Coffee: Clara has a serious illness and knows that 
she must undergo a medical procedure in order to save her 
life but that if she gets the treatment she will be unable to 
drink coffee for one minute.47  
Assuming that Clara likes drinking coffee, it seems that in this 
case Clara has some reason not to undergo the procedure albeit 
one that is vastly outweighed by considerations that count in 
favour of doing so. According to a pro tanto form of internalism 
about normative judgements, if Clara’s judgement is a genuine 
one then she will necessarily be motivated to some extent to avoid 
the procedure. Now of course it might be the case that Clara does 
have this motivation but there does not seem to be any reason to 
think that she necessarily will. There certainly seems nothing odd 
or incoherent about someone who made this judgement of the 
balance of reasons and had no motivation whatsoever to avoid the 
procedure. Note that this point remains even if we combine Pro 
Tanto Unrestricted Internalism with some form of agent 
restriction. There is no reason to think that Clara could not be 
classed as a normal, rational or virtuous agent if she lacked this 
motivation.  
Of course, the above case concerns normative reasons in general. 
Perhaps a supporter of Pro Tanto Unrestricted Internalism could 
claim that the theory holds only for moral reasons. Again, though, 
this theory looks implausible. To see why consider the following 
case: 
Children vs. Donkeys: John has five pounds he has set aside to 
donate to a charity. He judges that he has some moral reason to 
donate it to a charity that cares for donkeys but much stronger 
reason to donate it to a charity that feeds starving children. 
                                                        
47 (2013 p.32). 
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In this case John judges he has some moral reason to perform one 
act but much greater reason to perform another. Again there does 
not seem to be any reason to think that he will necessarily be 
motivated to some extent to give the money to the donkey charity 
if his judgement is sincere. Nor does it prevent him from being 
classed as a rational, virtuous or normal agent. 
To sum up this section, I have argued that the possibility of the 
supererogation amoralist creates an important problem for the 
supporter of Unrestricted Internalism. I have considered two ways 
in which internalists typically respond to amoralist challenges and 
found that they do not succeed in providing an adequate response 
to this objection. In the next section I will investigate the 
plausibility of adopting a more restricted form of internalism. 
5.4 Requirement Internalism and Moral Rationalism 
If we accept the implausibility of Unrestricted Internalism then 
those wishing to defend internalism must pin their hopes on an 
evaluation-restricted version of the view. However, as we saw in 
§5.3, in order to be considered plausible, this form of internalism 
must be able to explain why it is that the internal connection to 
motivation holds only for moral requirements. In this section I 
will argue that there is a plausible explanation that internalists can 
give here.  
The solution can be found by looking at one strategy that has been 
used to defend internalism. Both Michael Smith and Mark van 
Roojen argue that a form of internalism follows from the 
following view: 
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Moral Rationalism: If an act, , is morally wrong then, from an all 
things considered normative perspective, -ing is against the 
balance of reasons.48 
 
This view is one that many have found plausible, as it appears to 
follow from our practice of blaming those who fail to act in line 
with their moral requirements. 49  
Both Smith and Van Roojen argue that moral rationalism provides 
an explanation for internalism. The essence of the argument is that 
if we necessarily have most reason to act in line with our moral 
requirements then when we judge an act to be morally required we 
will necessarily be motivated to perform the act in so far as we are 
rational.50  
As Strandberg notes, in order to move from moral rationalism to a 
form of internalism about moral judgements we need to accept the 
following form of internalism about normative judgements in 
general: 
                                                        
48 See Smith (1994 pp.61-62) and van Roojen (2010).  
49 This is a simplified version of the argument given by Portmore 
(2011 pp.43-44) and Darwall (2006 pp.95-99).  
50 This is roughly the argument Smith gives (1994 pp.61-62). 
However, as van Roojen notes this is too simplistic, even if we 
take moral rationalism to be true, it is possible for rational agents 
to be unaware of its truth. Such an agent cannot be said to be 
irrational if she fails to motivated by her obligation judgement. 
Nevertheless, van Roojen’s argues that it is the normal cases, 
those where the judgement that an action is right motivates the 
agent, that fix the meaning of the term ‘right’ and that this allows 
us to conclude that rational agents acting normally will be 
motivated by a judgement that an act is morally required (2010 
pp.518-521).  
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Normative Judgement Internalism: If a rational agent judges that 
-ing is what there is most reason to do then she will necessarily 
be motivated to .51 
For my purposes, it is important to note two implications about the 
form of internalism that this argument vindicates. First, if we 
accept this argument then internalism is not a special feature of 
moral judgements. Rather it is a feature shared by all conclusive 
normative judgements. Second, and more importantly for our 
purposes, this argument can only vindicate a form of internalism 
that is restricted both to certain kinds of agent and to certain kinds 
of moral judgements. As moral rationalism is a view about moral 
requirements rather than moral judgements in general, this 
argument can only vindicate a form of internalism that is restricted 
to judgements about what is morally required. This provides the 
supporter of Restricted Internalism with an explanation for 
restricting the claim to certain kinds of moral evaluation. The 
reason is that it is only all things considered normative judgements 
about what there is most reason to do that are necessarily 
connected to motivation and only moral requirements that are 
necessarily in line with what there is most reason to do all things 
considered. It is worth noting that this form of internalism allows 
for rational agents to be motivated to perform a morally required 
act or a supererogatory alternative. All that it rules out is the 
possibility of a rational agent being motivated to perform a 
morally wrong act.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at what a supporter of motivational 
judgement internalism can say about judgements of 
                                                        
51 Standberg (2013). A version of this form of internalism is 
endorsed by Wedgwood (2007 p.25).  
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supererogation. I have argued that the problem of the 
supererogation amoralist gives us good reason to think that 
internalism cannot plausibly be held to cover all moral 
judgements. As a result, we should restrict the internalist claim to 
requiring moral judgements. However, we need to give some 
explanation for this restriction in order for this form of internalism 
to be plausible. I have argued moral rationalism provides us with a 
perfect explanation for this restriction as it allows us to say that 
internalism about moral requiring judgements follows from 
internalism about all things considered normative judgements. 
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Chapter Six: Supererogation, Moral 
Rationalism and Overridingness 
Introduction 
 
Suppose that on my way to an important job interview I find a lost 
child. I realize that I could help the child find her parents but that 
this might make me late for my interview. In this case it seems 
reasonable to think that, morally, I ought to help the child, despite 
the fact that I have a strong self-interested reason not to do so. 
While not everyone has faced such a dilemma, we all may find 
ourselves in situations where what we morally ought to do clashes 
with acts favoured by other kinds of reasons. When faced with 
such a situation we must ask ourselves what we have most reason 
to do, all things considered. It is commonly claimed that in cases 
of conflict such as this, moral reasons override other types of 
reason, meaning that we always have most reason to perform the 
act favoured by morality. This view is called the overridingness 
thesis (hereafter, ‘overridingness’). A closely related view is that 
we always have most reason, from the all things considered 
normative perspective, to act in line with our moral requirements. 
This view is called moral rationalism (hereafter, ‘rationalism’). 
These views may seem to be almost identical but, as I will show, 
there are important differences between them.  
 
These two views are important in their own right because 
accepting either view will have consequences for our everyday 
decision-making. If we accept overridingness then we should 
accept that when faced with a dilemma like the one above we 
ought to perform the act favoured by morality. If we accept 
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rationalism then we accept that if we are morally required to help 
the child in the above case then this is what we have most reason 
to do. These views also have important implications for other 
debates in Moral Philosophy. Accepting overridingness or 
rationalism could provide resources for showing why we ought to 
act morally. If either is true, then we can say that acting in line 
with our moral requirements is what we have most reason, all 
things considered, to do. These views also have implications for 
‘The Demandingness Objection’ that is commonly raised against 
standard forms of consequentialism.1 It is argued that 
consequentialist views generate moral requirements that make 
unreasonable demands of moral agents. However, as a number of 
authors have pointed out, this objection has little force unless we 
accept some form of overridingness or rationalism.2 Finally, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, rationalism is also thought to have 
implications for the debate about whether there is an internal 
connection between moral judgements and motivation. It is 
claimed that if rationalism is true, rational agents will be 
motivated by their moral judgements.3 Moreover, we can justify 
restricting motivational judgement internalism to obligation 
judgements if we accept moral rationalism, the view that if an act 
is morally required it is what there is most reason all things 
considered to do.  
 
Despite the importance of both views there has been surprisingly 
little discussion of the relationship between the two theses. In fact, 
confusion about the differences between the two is common. 
Sometimes a view is described as one and labeled as the other. 
Sarah Stroud, for example, defines overridingness in the following 
                                                        
1 See, for example Sidgwick, (1981 pp.87, 434, 492).  
2 See Portmore (2011 pp.26-27), Dorsey (2012 pp.1-23), and 
Attila Tanyi (2012). 
3 See Smith (1994 pp.61-62) and van Roojen (2010). 
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way: “If S is morally required to , then S has most reason to .”4 
Similarly, Samuel Schleffer defines ‘the claim of overridingness’ 
in the following way: “It can never be rational knowingly to do 
what morality forbids.”5 These views are versions of rationalism 
not overridingness, as they say nothing about whether the moral 
reasons have overridden other reasons. My aim in this chapter will 
be to clarify the difference between the two views and then to 
show that a form of moral rationalism is compatible with the 
existence of acts of supererogation. Moreover, I will also show 
that this form of rationalism is the version that follows from the 
considerations that are typically appealed to by those seeking to 
motivate support for the view.  
 
This is important for our purposes because, as I will show in §6.1, 
if we accept the possibility of acts of supererogation then 
overridingness appears to be an implausible view to hold. Having 
explained the problems that supererogation raises for 
overridingness I will then explain, in §6.2, how rationalism and 
overridingness can come apart in a way that allows those who 
accept that acts of supererogation exist to endorse overridingness. 
However, the fact that these two views can come apart does not 
give us any reason to think that it is plausible to accept rationalism 
without overridingness. After all, the considerations that count in 
favour of rationalism may also count in favour of overridingness. I 
will investigate whether or not this is the case, starting, in §6.3, by 
looking at the three important intuitions that are often appealed to 
by those seeking to defend rationalism. In §6.4 I will show that 
there are two possible readings of rationalism, a de dicto reading 
and a de re reading and that only the former is supported by the 
intuitions considered in §6.2. In §6.5 I will argue that the de dicto 
                                                        
4 (1998 pp.170-189).  
5 (1992 p.53). 
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version does not provide any support for accepting overridingness 
over the alternative way of understanding rationalism.  
 
Before I begin, it is worth making clear four assumptions that I 
will be making in this chapter. First, in order for either rationalism 
or overridingness to be an interesting claim it needs to be assumed 
that there is a genuine distinction to be made between moral and 
non-moral reasons. In other words, I will be assuming that it is 
possible for some consideration to count in favour of performing 
some action without its counting in favour from the point of view 
of morality. Without this assumption, the claims are trivial.6 This 
rules out two kinds of justification for rationalism or 
overridingness. The first justification holds that all normative 
reasons are properly understood as moral reasons. The second 
holds that what we ought morally to do is fully determined by 
what we ought to do from a self-interested point of view. Of 
course, this does not mean that these views are not interesting or 
defensible.  
 
In addition, I will be assuming that moral and non-moral reasons 
can conflict with one another; that the balance of moral reasons 
can support performing an act while the balance of non-moral 
reasons can oppose the act’s performance. This assumption needs 
to be made in order for overridingness to be an open possibility. 7 
If moral reasons never conflict with non-moral reasons then 
neither will ever override the other. We do not, though, need to 
make this assumption in order to accept rationalism. If these two 
kinds of reasons never conflict then rationalism’s truth is 
guaranteed, as what there is most moral reason to do will not 
                                                        
6 This point is made by Schleffer (1992 p.54). 
7 Thanks to Mike Ridge for useful discussion here.   
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conflict with any opposing reasons.8 However, for the purposes of 
this chapter I will assume that these two kinds of reason can 
conflict in order to show that accepting rationalism does not give 
us reason to accept overridingness even if we make this 
assumption.  
 
The third assumption that needs to be made is that moral and non-
moral reasons are commensurable. In order to ask whether moral 
requirements always determine what there is most reason to do we 
must assume that there is some way of comparing moral 
requirements with other kinds of normative reasons or 
requirements. Otherwise it will not make sense to say that one 
always overrides the other. This view is not universally accepted 
but any version of either view that assumes that the two kinds of 
reason can conflict will have to make this assumption, so this is an 
acceptable assumption to make here.9  
 
Finally, I will be assuming that rationalism is a necessity claim. In 
other words, the rationalist is not claiming that it is a contingent 
feature of moral requirements that they are always in line with 
what there is most reason to do. That is not to say that there are 
any problems with such a view. Rather, I take it that this is not 
what those who subscribe to rationalism for the reasons I will 
examine in §6.3 have in mind.  
 
6.1 Overridingness and Supererogation 
 
                                                        
8 This point is made by Portmore (2011 p.39 Fn.32). 
9 For arguments against the possibility of an all things considered 
point of view see Sidgwick (1981 p.508) and Copp (1997 pp.86-
106). Parfit, responds to Sidgwick’s argument in his (2011 Ch. 6). 
For a reply to Copp see McLeod (2001 pp.269-291). 
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In this section I will argue that if we accept the possibility of 
supererogation we have good reason to reject overridingness. First 
we must explain what is meant by ‘overridingness’. To say that 
one kind of reason always overrides another is to say that when 
the two conflict the first kind of reason will always defeat the 
other relative to some normative standpoint. As the standpoint we 
are interested in is the all things considered standpoint, we can 
define the relevant kind of overridingness as follows: 
 
Rational Overridingness: One kind of reason, m, rationally 
overrides another, n, if and only if from an all things considered 
normative perspective, m reasons always defeat all n reasons in 
terms of importance or normative strength.10  
 
We are interested in whether moral reasons override other 
normative reasons. We can define one version of this view as 
follows: 
 
Strong Overridingness: From an all things considered normative 
perspective, moral reasons always override all non-moral 
reasons.11  
 
I will start by arguing that if we accept the possibility of 
supererogation then we have good reason to reject Strong 
Overridingness. This view has the implication that we always 
have decisive reason all things considered to do what we have 
most moral reason to do.12  Accepting this view is problematic if 
                                                        
10 Similar definitions of ‘overridingness’ are given by Copp (1997 
p.90), Portmore (2011 p.39), and Shiffrin (1999 p.773). 
11 Baier defends this view (using the term ‘superior’ rather than 
‘overriding’), (1958 p.99). Others who define overridingness in 
terms of reasons include, Portmore (2011 p.40) and Tanyi (2012 
p.167). 
12 As pointed out by Portmore (2011 p.40).  
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we also accept the existence of supererogation. As we have seen a 
supererogatory act is one that is morally better that the merely 
permissible alternatives. Presumably, then, these acts are better 
supported by moral reasons than the alternatives. This means that 
we always have decisive reason all things considered to perform 
the best available supererogatory act.  
 
The problem with this is that it conflicts with the thought that 
supererogation is not only morally optional but also rationally 
optional. There are two ways of making this point. The first is by 
appealing to specific cases of supererogation. Suppose, for 
example, that Anna passes by a burning building and hears a 
child’s cry for help coming from inside. At great personal risk she 
runs into the building to save the person trapped inside. This act 
seems like a clear case of supererogation. After all, it would seem 
inappropriate to blame Anna for not running into the burning 
building. Note though, that if we accept Strong Overridingness, 
then, if Anna fails to perform this act then she will fail to perform 
the act that she had decisive reason to perform. It appears, then, 
that some form of criticism is available. While we may not be able 
to morally criticize the agent for failing to save the child we can 
rationally criticize her. This is a strange result. It seems no more 
appropriate to criticize this agent for acting irrationally than to 
criticize her for acting immorally. In fact, if anything we might 
think that it would be more appropriate to criticize this agent for 
being immoral rather than criticizing her for being irrational.  
 
We might not wish to put too much weight on our intuitive 
reaction to this case. However, the problem that supererogation 
raises for Strong Overridingness goes beyond bringing about 
counter-intuitive results in particular cases. Strong Overridingness 
also commits us to a very strange theoretical position. If we accept 
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that, in the previous example, Anna has most moral reason to save 
the child but that it is morally permissible not to then we are 
committed to accepting that what we have most moral reason to 
do does not fully determine what we are morally required to do. It 
would be strange to accept this view together with the view that 
moral reasons are rationally overriding. However, if we accept 
Strong Overridingness then from the all things considered 
normative point of view moral reasons are decisive. This is a very 
odd position to hold, if moral reasons fail to be decisive with 
regards to the moral point of view how could they be decisive 
from the all things considered point of view? Surely, if moral 
reasons are decisive in any domain then it would be in the moral 
domain not in the domain of all normative reasons.  
 
A supporter of overridingness might respond by claiming that not 
all moral reasons are rationally overriding. Perhaps when we have 
a choice between a supererogatory act and a morally permissible, 
non-obligatory alternative then the moral reasons that support 
performing the supererogatory act are not rationally overriding.13 
We can, though, accept this but still hold the following weaker 
version of overridingness: 
 
Weak Overridingness: From an all things considered normative 
perspective, the reasons that support or are provided by moral 
requirements always override all non-moral reasons. 
 
Weak Overridingness covers two possible views. We might think 
that it is the reasons that support moral obligations that override 
all non-moral reasons.14 Alternatively, we might think that moral 
                                                        
13 This point is made by Terrell (1969 pp.52-53) and also by 
Darwall (2006 p.286). 
14 This possibility is considered by Darwall (2006b p.286) and 
also by Schlothfeldt and Schweitzer (2012 pp. 65-88). 
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requirements provide conclusive reasons to act while other moral 
reasons do not.15 
 
This view, though, is at best a minimal improvement on the 
previous one. Accepting this view fails to provide a complete 
solution to the problem facing Strong Overridingness. This view 
was unable to plausibly accommodate cases of supererogation 
where the cost to the agent’s self-interest prevented an act from 
being obligatory that would otherwise have been so. It looks 
initially as if Weak Overridingness is well placed to avoid this 
problem as, unlike Strong Overridingness, Weak Overridingness 
is not committed to saying that from the all things considered 
normative point of view there is always decisive reason to act in 
line with what there is most moral reason to do.  
 
However, on closer inspection accepting Weak Overridingness 
fails to solve the problem. To see why, imagine that Anna could 
save the child at no risk to herself. Presumably, in this case it 
would be morally obligatory for her to do so. However, if Weak 
Rationalism were true then the reasons that would make saving 
the child morally obligatory in the case where there is no risk 
involved should also do so in the case where there is a risk to the 
agent. After all, the reasons that support the moral requirement in 
the first case presumably continue to do so in the second. If these 
reasons override all non-moral reasons then so long as the it 
remains morally better to attempt to save the child than not to do 
so this will be what there is decisive reason to do all things 
considered. At least, this is the case if we accept the first form of 
Weak Overridingness. What about the view that moral 
                                                        
15 This version of Weak Overridingness is endorsed by Brink who 
claims that moral requirements provide overriding reasons for 
action (1997 p.256) and Darwall (2006a p.26). 
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requirements provide reasons that always override non-moral 
reasons? This view is also problematic. To see why imagine that 
when the agent from the previous case first hears the cries for help 
the fire is not particularly serious. She could then save the child 
without much risk to herself. At this stage many would think that 
this act is morally required. If we accept this version of Weak 
Rationalism then this would provide reason to save the child that 
override all non-moral reasons. If this were the case then this act 
would remain what there is most reason to do even if the risks 
were to increase, at least for as long as saving the child remains 
the act that is best supported by moral reasons. Presumably, 
though, once the risks are raised sufficiently the act ceases to be 
morally required. Again, then, we are left with a view that holds 
that these moral reasons are decisive from the all things 
considered normative point of view but not from the moral point 
of view.  
 
To sum up, if we accept the existence of supererogatory acts then 
overridingness appears to be implausible. First because it does not 
appear to be the case that we always have decisive reason from the 
all things considered point of view to perform the best 
supererogatory act available. Second because it seems 
theoretically odd to think that we always have decisive reason 
from the all things considered point of view to perform the act that 
is best supported by moral reasons but we do not always have 
decisive reason from the moral point of view to do so. Retreating 
to Weak Overridingness does not help avoid the problem as it 
cannot handle cases where an act would have been required if it 
were not for the presence of costs to the agent’s  self-interest.  
 
This puts pressure on the claim that motivational judgement 
internalists can avoid the problem of supererogation by appealing 
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to rationalism to justify restricting their claim to obligation 
judgements. As we have seen many who accept rationalism do so 
because they accept that moral reasons override other normative 
reasons. Indeed, the views are often assumed to be 
indistinguishable. If this is the case then the internalist solution 
will involve endorsing a view that seems hard to reconcile with 
the existence of acts of supererogation. In the next section I will 
show that we can in fact accept that moral requirements are 
always in line with what there is most reason to do without 
accepting that moral reasons always override other forms of 
normative reason.  
 
6.2 Moral Rationalism Without Overridingness 
 
In this section I will explain the difference between rationalism 
and overridingness and show that it is possible to accept 
rationalism without accepting overridingness.  
 
Weak Overridingness seems superficially similar to the following 
view: 
 
Moral Rationalism: If an act, , is morally wrong then, from an all 
things considered normative perspective, -ing is against the 
balance of reasons.16 
                                                        
16 In an earlier version of this discussion (2014 p.106) I 
formulated moral rationalism in the following, slightly different 
way: “If an act, , is morally required then, from an all things 
considered normative perspective, -ing is what there is most 
reason to do.” However, this earlier formulation of moral 
rationalism is incompatible with there ever being most reason to 
perform an act that is supererogatory. By formulating moral 
rationalism in the way I do here I avoid this problem while 
retaining the basic idea that there is always most reason to act in 
line with our moral requirements.  
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However, there is an important difference between the two. Weak 
Overridingness says that the reasons that support or are provided 
by moral requirements always override all non-moral reasons. 
Rationalism, on the other hand, makes no mention of what 
explains why we have decisive reason to act in line with our moral 
requirements nor does it state that morality is of greater normative 
importance than other normative considerations. 
 
In addition to these views being similar, the acceptance of 
overridingness provides an explanation for rationalism. If we 
accept that either version of overridingness is a necessary truth 
and we think that moral requirements are fully determined by 
what we have most moral reason to do then we should also accept 
rationalism. According to such a view, moral requirements will 
always be what agents have most reason to do. 
 
The question I will be considering is whether the reverse applies. 
Does accepting rationalism give us any reason to accept some 
version of overridingness? One way in which it would is if 
overridingness provided the only possible explanation for 
rationalism. Stephen Darwall seems to suggest that this is the case 
in the following:  
 
Reasons provided by moral oughts might be invariably 
supreme because they are guaranteed to override other 
normative reasons, because they invariably defeat (that is 
reduce or undermine the force of) other reasons, or through 
some combination of the two.17 
 
It is not important, for my purposes, whether moral reasons defeat 
other normative reasons by simply exceeding them in normative 
                                                        
17 (2006b pp.286-287).  
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force or by the more complicated method of ‘defeating’ that 
Darwall mentions here, as both count as versions of 
overridingness. The important point is that Darwall seems to claim 
that accepting what he calls ‘supremacy’, the view that moral 
obligations provide conclusive reasons for action, pushes us 
towards thinking that some form of Weak Overridingness is true. 
Darwall makes a similar point elsewhere when he moves from the 
claim that, ‘it can never be rational to do what morality forbids,’ 
to the claim that, ‘moral obligations always give agents conclusive 
reasons for acting that outweigh or take priority over any 
potentially competing considerations.’18 This thought, that the 
explanation for rationalism will come from some version of 
overridingness, may also explain why, as mentioned previously, 
some philosophers have applied the label The Overridingness 
Thesis to views that are really forms of rationalism.  
 
However, overridingness does not provide the only explanation 
for rationalism. It is possible to accept rationalism without 
accepting either version of overridingness. If the following 
constraint on what can be counted as a moral requirement is taken 
as a necessity claim then we have an explanation that does not 
appeal to either form of overridingness: 
 
The Constraint Thesis (Constraint): If an act, , is not against the 
balance of reasons then -ing is not morally wrong. 
 
This is not a version of overridingness. According to Constraint, 
rationalism is explained by the fact that unless an act is against 
what the agent has most reason to do then it cannot be morally 
wrong. It is important to be clear on how this view differs from 
                                                        
18 (2006a p.26). Emphasis added.  
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Weak Overridingness. It would be easy to think that Constraint 
tells us that in order to be counted as a reason that makes an act 
morally forbidden, that reason must always override all non-moral 
reasons. This, though, would be a mistake. Constraint does not say 
that any moral reasons will always take priority over non-moral 
reasons. It merely states that it is a necessary condition for moral 
prohibitions that they are against what we have most reason to do, 
all things considered.  
 
Unlike overridingness, then, Constraint does not commit those 
who hold that acts of supererogation exist to the view that moral 
reasons, or a subset of moral reasons, are decisive from the all 
things considered normative point of view but not from the moral 
point of view. As we saw in §6.1, if we accept the possibility of 
acts of supererogation then we seem forced to accept that moral 
reasons are not always morally overriding. It would be odd, 
though, to accept that moral reasons are not morally overriding 
but maintain that they are rationally overriding. Constraint avoids 
this problem, as it does not state that any subset of moral reasons 
will always be decisive from the all things considered point of 
view. Those who accept Constraint are committed only to the 
view that an act cannot be morally wrong unless it is against the 
balance of reasons to perform. This view can allow that moral 
reasons are not always rationally decisive. This gives us reason to 
think that those who accept both moral rationalism and hold that 
supererogatory acts exist should accept Constraint.  
 
Overridingness and Constraint provide two different explanations 
for rationalism. The view that rationalism should be viewed as a 
constraint is not unique to me, it is also held by Portmore. 
Interestingly, despite having a different view of rationalism to 
Darwall, Portmore’s defence of the view rests on an argument 
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given by Darwall.19 While Portmore uses this argument to support 
the truth of rationalism he does not show that this argument 
provides equal support for both his and Darwall’s versions of the 
view. This is important, as we might think that the reason that 
Darwall, and others, accept Weak Overridingness is that the 
arguments given to support rationalism push us to understand it in 
this way. If this is the case then rationalism will remain an 
unappealing view to hold if we accept the existence of acts of 
supererogation. It is this thought that I will investigate in the next 
two sections of this chapter.  
 
Portmore does not address this thought. His argument for 
accepting Constraint is that this is the form of rationalism that we 
are pushed towards if we reject both Strong Overridingness and 
the claim that moral reasons are morally overriding.20 My defence 
of Constraint will take a more direct approach. I will argue that it 
is Constraint and not overridingness that is supported by the 
intuitions commonly appealed to by those seeking to defend 
rationalism, and that both Darwall’s and Portmore’s arguments 
depend on. I will start by looking at the intuitions that are 
commonly appealed to in support of rationalism. I will then argue 
that these intuitions support Constraint and not overridingness.  
 
6.3 Why accept Moral Rationalism? 
 
There are three intuitions that are commonly appealed to in 
support of rationalism. In this section I will motivate these 
intuitions and show why they provide support for rationalism. I 
will not attempt to provide a conclusive defence of rationalism. 
                                                        
19 Portmore (2011 pp.42-51), Darwall (2006 pp.96-99). See also 
Skorupski (1999 pp.170-171). 
20 (2011 pp.41-42).  
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My aim is the more modest one of showing that those who accept 
it for the reasons commonly given in support of the view are not 
thereby given any reason to accept some form of overridingness.  
 
The first intuition that is commonly appealed to in support of 
rationalism is that moral requirements place rational constraints on 
our actions. If someone has a moral obligation to act in a 
particular way then we do not think that she is free to choose how 
to act. Rather, we think that to violate this moral requirement 
would be to act against the balance of reasons. Those who think 
that I have a moral obligation to help the lost child rather than 
attend the job interview would likely also think that this settles the 
question of what I have most reason to do. As many have pointed 
out, this point seems to be presupposed by our practice of blaming 
those who freely and knowledgably act wrongly.21 We think it 
appropriate to blame those who freely and knowledgably perform 
a wrong act. To be blameworthy, though, it seems reasonable to 
think that we must judge that the agent did not have sufficient 
reason to act as she did. It would, after all, be odd to blame me for 
failing to help the child while acknowledging that this is what I 
had most reason to do. In order for blame to be appropriate, then, 
we must think that by violating a moral requirement the agent 
acted against the balance of reasons. If we accept these two claims 
then we can conclude that if an act is morally required it must be 
an act that the agent had most reason to perform.22  
 
                                                        
21 This point is made by Darwall (2006a p.97), Gibbard (1990 
p.299), Portmore (2011 p.43), Shafer-Landau (2003 p.192), 
Stroud (1998 p.176) and Williams (1995 pp.40-44). 
22 This is a simplified version of the argument given by Portmore 
(2011 p.43-44) and Darwall (2006a pp.95-99).  
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The second intuition is that moral requirements provide a rational 
justification for action.23 If there are two acts available one of 
which is morally required and the other morally forbidden then 
there does not seem to be any need to give a further rational 
justification for performing the required act rather than the wrong 
act. Imagine that Alice tells Jack that he has a moral obligation to 
stop eating meat. The next day Jack tells Alice that he has become 
vegetarian. Now imagine that in response Alice accuses Jack of 
acting against the balance of reasons. I think most people would 
agree that this would be a strange thing for Alice to say. Assuming 
that Alice’s views have not changed, we would think that Alice is 
guilty of some kind of confusion, insincerity or irrationality. The 
reason why we would think this is that if an act is morally 
required then this seems to be all that is needed in order to 
rationally justify performing it. Rationalism provides the perfect 
explanation for this intuition. The reason we are justified in acting 
in line with our moral requirements is that it is always against the 
balance of reasons not to do so.  
 
We might worry about this intuition. While it seems plausible to 
think that we always have most reason to perform a morally 
required act when we have a choice between a required act and a 
forbidden act, we might worry that things are less straightforward 
when more options are available. As we saw in Chapter 4, there 
are some acts of supererogation that promote the agent’s self-
interest to a greater degree than the minimally permissible 
alternatives. Surely in cases such as these there is more reason to 
perform the supererogatory act than the required act. After all, 
these acts are better supported by both moral reasons and by the 
                                                        
23 This point is made by Shafer-Landau (2003 p.192) albeit for the 
weaker claim that moral requirements always provide some reason 
for action. 
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agent’s self-interested reasons than the minimally permissible 
alternative. This, though, need not overly concern us. The thought 
behind this intuition is simply that we are rationally justified in 
acting in line with our moral requirements rather than not doing 
so. If violating a moral requirement is always against the balance 
of reasons then we will always have most reason to fulfil a moral 
requirement in some way, whether that is by performing a 
minimally permissible act or by performing a supererogatory 
alternative.  
 
The third intuition is that demonstrating that an act was in line 
with the balance of reasons serves as a moral justification for 
action.24 Showing that an act was in line with what an agent had 
most reason to do seems sufficient to show that the act was not 
morally wrong. It would be odd for someone to claim that an act 
was in line with what she had most reason to do but also morally 
impermissible. Again, rationalism is able to provide the perfect 
explanation for this thought; the reason that this is sufficient moral 
justification is that moral requirements are always in line with 
what there is most reason to do. As a result, showing that an act is 
not what an agent has most reason to do is sufficient to show that 
it is not morally required.  
 
6.4 Moral Rationalism De Dicto and De Re 
 
Before we are in a position to assess whether the intuitions used to 
defend rationalism support overridingness or Constraint, we must 
first distinguish between two different ways of understanding 
rationalism. This will allow us to see exactly what form of 
rationalism these intuitions support.  
 
                                                        
24 Darwall (2006 p.98). 
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Rationalism says that it is a necessary truth that morally required 
acts are what there is most reason to do. This claim can be read in 
two ways, de dicto and de re. The best way to understand the 
difference between de re and de dicto necessity is through an 
example. Consider the following claims:  
 
Claim 1: Necessarily, husbands are married. 
 
Claim 2: Husbands are necessarily married.  
 
These seem similar but have different truth conditions. Claim 1 is 
a claim about de dicto necessity while Claim 2 is a claim about de 
re necessity. The truth or falsity of Claim 1 depends on the truth 
or falsity of the following conditional proposition: if x is a 
husband then x is married. This claim is true; it is impossible to be 
an unmarried husband. Claim 2, on the other hand, is a claim 
about the individuals in the actual world that are husbands. This 
claim tells us that these individuals are necessarily married. This 
claim is false, for any man in this world who is married there are 
many possible worlds where he is unmarried.  
 
Contrast this with the following example: the current Prime 
Minister of the UK is necessarily the offspring of Mary Fleur 
Cameron and Ian Donald Cameron. In this example the de re 
necessity seems much more plausible. When we ask whether it is 
possible that the actual person, David Cameron, who is Prime 
Minister could have been the offspring of other people it seems 
plausible to think that he could not. We can imagine possibilities 
about David Cameron, he could have died young, never had 
children or entered politics. Plausibly, however, he could not have 
had different parents. Note that the equivalent de dicto necessity 
claim is much less plausible here. It would have been possible for 
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someone who was the offspring of different parents to have been 
Prime Minister instead.  
 
The difference, then, between de dicto necessity and de re 
necessity is that with the former the necessary connection is one 
that exists between the application of the term while with the latter 
the application determines what it is that the necessary connection 
applies to. In the husband example, it is the application of the term 
‘husband’ that is necessarily connected to being married rather 
than the people who are picked out by this term. On the other 
hand, in the second example, it is the person picked out by the 
term ‘Prime Minister of The UK’ who is necessarily connected to 
being the offspring of Mary Fleur Cameron and Ian Donald 
Cameron.  
 
Let’s now apply these two kinds of necessity claims to 
rationalism: 
 
De Dicto Moral Rationalism: Necessarily, if an act, , is morally 
wrong then -ing is against the balance of reasons. 
 
De Re Rationalism: If an act, , is morally wrong then necessarily 
-ing is against the balance of reasons. 
 
De Dicto Rationalism says that in every possible world, if an act is 
morally wrong then it is against the balance of reasons to perform 
it. De Re Rationalism, on the other hand, says that all of the acts 
that are morally wrong in this world have the essential property of 
being against the balance of reasons. This is a property that will be 
present in every possible worlds. If De Dicto Rationalism is true 
then it will be the application of the term ‘moral wrong’ that is 
necessarily connected to being against the balance of reasons. On 
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the other hand, if De Re Rationalism is true then it is the acts 
picked out by this term that have the essential property of being 
against the balance of reasons. 
 
To see which form of rationalism these intuitions support consider 
how we ought, in general, to test claims of de dicto and de re 
necessity. To test Claim 2 above we must ask whether there is a 
possible world where someone is a husband without a spouse. To 
test Claim 3 we must consider someone who is a husband in this 
world and ask whether there is a possible world where he does not 
have a spouse. We can use the same tests to see whether 
rationalism is best understood as a claim of de dicto or de re 
necessity. To test for de dicto necessity we must ask whether there 
is a possible world where an act is both morally wrong and not 
against the balance of reasons for the agent to perform. To test for 
de re necessity we must ask whether any act that is morally 
required could fail to be what there is most reason to do in some 
other possible world. In the former we are testing the application 
of ‘morally required’ across possible worlds and in the latter we 
are using the term ‘morally required’ to pick out the acts that we 
will test across possible worlds.  
 
Clearly, the intuitions considered in §6.3 support only a de dicto 
necessity claim. When we say that moral requirements provide 
rational justifications and constraints, we do not mean that the acts 
that are morally required in this world are ones that will provide 
these constraints and justifications in all possible worlds. Rather, 
what we mean is that in order for it to be appropriate to apply the 
term ‘morally required’ to an act in any given world, the act must 
be one that provides rational justifications and constraints in that 
world. Similarly, when we say that a rational justification serves 
as a moral justification we do not mean that there is no possible 
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world in which there could be most reason to perform an 
alternative act to an act that is morally required in this world. 
Rather, we mean that for any possible world, if such an alternative 
exists then the act is not morally required in that world.  
 
6.5 De Dicto Moral Rationalism, Weak Overridingness 
and The Constraint Thesis 
 
In §6.4 I argued that the intuitions that support rationalism support 
only the de dicto reading not the de re reading. I will now argue 
that accepting this provides greater support for Constraint than for 
Weak Overridingness. 
 
Constraint says that an act cannot be morally wrong if it is not 
against the balance of reasons for the agent to perform. If we 
understand this as a necessity claim then this claim is logically 
equivalent to De Dicto Rationalism. This can be clearly seen when 
we place the two claims side by side: 
 
De Dicto Moral Rationalism: Necessarily, if an act, , is morally 
wrong then -ing is against the balance of reasons. 
 
Constraint Thesis: Necessarily, if an act, , is not against the 
balance of reasons then -ing is not morally wrong. 
 
These claims are logically equivalent, accepting De Dicto 
Rationalism commits us to accepting Constraint and vice versa. 
As a result, Constraint provides the best fit for De Dicto 
Rationalism. It explains why, in any possible world, if an act is 
morally wrong then it must be the case that it is against the 
balance of reasons to perform in that world. 
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Overridingness, on the other hand, says that it is a necessary truth 
that moral reasons, or a subset of moral reasons, override all non-
moral reasons. It is worth noting at this stage that if it were De Re 
Rationalism that the considerations appealed to in §6.2 supported 
then overridingness could explain rationalism while Constraint 
could not. We could not explain the claim that the moral 
obligations of this world will be what there is most reason to do 
across all possible worlds by appealing to Constraint, as this only 
constrains what can be classed as a moral obligation in one world 
to the balance of reasons in that world. A de re form of 
overridingness would be able to explain De Re Rationalism, as 
this form of overridingness holds that the acts that are required in 
this world are supported by reasons that are overriding across all 
possible worlds.  
 
However, as we have seen, it is the de dicto reading not the de re 
reading that is supported by the intuitions examined in §6.2. 
Overridingness is able to provide an explanation for De Dicto 
Rationalism but only if it is also understood as a de dicto necessity 
claim. We can rewrite the two forms of overridingness as de dicto 
claims in the following way: 
 
Strong De Dicto Overridingness: Necessarily, moral reasons 
always override all non-moral reasons from an all things 
considered normative perspective. 
 
Weak De Dicto Overridingness: Necessarily, moral requirements 
always provide or are supported by reasons that override all non-




Like Constraint, these views place constraints on the correct 
application of moral terms. However, they are different 
constraints. Strong De Dicto Overridingness places a restriction 
on what can be counted as a moral reason; they must be reasons 
that override all non-moral reasons. Weak De Dicto 
Overridingness places a constraint on what can be counted as a 
moral requirement; these must either be supported by or provide 
reasons that override all non-moral reasons. Combining either 
with the claim that moral reasons fully determine an act’s moral 
status gives us an explanation for De Dicto Rationalism.  
 
While both Constraint and overridingness are consistent with De 
Dicto Rationalism it should now be clear that this form of 
rationalism provides more support for Constraint than for 
overridingness. As we have already seen Constraint and De Dicto 
Rationalism are logically equivalent. This means that if we accept 
De Dicto Rationalism then we are committed to accepting 
Constraint as well. In contrast, neither version of overridingness 
follows from De Dicto Rationalism, as they both make additional 
claims about the nature of moral reasons or moral requirements 
that De Dicto Rationalism on its own provides no support for. 
Strong Overridingness makes the additional claim that in order to 
class any reason as a moral reason it must be one that is capable of 
overriding all non-moral reasons. Similarly, Weak Overridingness 
makes the additional claim that moral requirements must provide 
or be supported by reasons that override all non-moral reasons. 
Neither follows from accepting De Dicto Rationalism, as it is 
silent on the reason why violating moral requirements is to act 
against the balance of reasons. Nor does it follow from the 
intuitions used to support rationalism, as these are also silent on 
whether moral reasons or some subset of moral reasons override 
other reasons. We cannot move from De Dicto Rationalism to 
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overridingness without giving an additional argument to convince 
us that this is the reason that De Dicto Rationalism is true. In the 
absence of such an argument, we have no reason to think that 
accepting rationalism for the reasons given in §6.3 gives us reason 
to accept some form of overridingness.  
 
To sum up, the form of rationalism that is supported by the 
intuitions commonly given in favour of the view is logically 
equivalent to Constraint. Although both forms of De Dicto 
Overridingness are consistent with this view, they do not follow 
from it. In order to move from De Dicto Rationalism to some 
version of overridingness we need an additional argument that 
explains why the constraint should be understood in this way. We 
have no reason to think, then, that accepting rationalism gives us 




In this chapter I have investigated the implications of accepting 
the existence of supererogatory acts for both overridingness and 
moral rationalism. I argued first, in §6.1, that accepting that 
supererogatory acts exist gives us good reason to reject 
overridingness. The reason for this is that if we accept that 
supererogatory acts are better supported by moral reasons that the 
minimum that morality demands then existence of such acts 
shows that moral reasons are not morally decisive. If we accept 
this then it seems like we have good reason to think that moral 
reasons cannot be rationally decisive either. However, those who 
accept that supererogatory acts exist need not reject moral 
rationalism as a result of this. As I showed in §6.2, The Constraint 
Thesis offers an alternative way of understanding moral 
rationalism. Unlike overridingness, the combination of Constraint 
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and the existence of supererogatory acts does not have 
problematic implications. Moreover, as I showed in §6.3 to §6.5, 
the considerations that count in favour of accepting moral 
rationalism provide stronger support for Constraint than 
overridingness.
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Chapter Seven: Do We Need Room For 
More Deontic Categories? 
In the introduction we saw that dividing acts into the three 
categories of the obligatory, the indifferent and the forbidden 
leaves no room for acts that go beyond what is required. We need 
to add the category of the supererogatory to this classificatory 
scheme in order to make room for these acts. Some have argued 
that this four-fold classification is not sufficient either, as there are 
acts that it is unable to accommodate. Before finishing, it is worth 
considering whether a moral scheme that makes room for the 
supererogatory goes far enough. I will argue that none of the 
arguments used to support these additional categories succeeds in 
showing the need to make room for additional deontic categories 
in order to accommodate acts that cannot be classed as obligatory, 
indifferent, forbidden or supererogatory. I will start, in §7.1, by 
looking at the category of suberogation, before turning my 
attention first, in §7.2, to quasi-supererogation and then, in §7.3, 
to forced supererogation. I will argue that there is no need to make 
room for any of these deontic categories to accommodate acts that 
cannot be accommodated by the existing deontic categories. There 
may, however, be other reasons to allow these categories. It may 
be that although these categories are not needed to accommodate 
acts that lie outwith the existing scheme, they provide useful ways 
of labelling certain actions. I will argue that while this may be true 
for the category of suberogation it is not the case for quasi-
supererogation or forced supererogation.  
7.1 Suberogation 
After supererogation, the category of suberogation or offence is by 
far the most popular proposed addition to the traditional tripartite 
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deontic scheme.1 This category is supposed to be the mirror image 
of supererogation. While supererogatory acts are (roughly) 
optional and good, suberogatory acts are optional but bad. It 
seems reasonable to think that if such acts exist then it will not be 
enough for a moral theory to make room for the supererogatory, it 
must also make room for the suberogatory.   
There are two ways of defending the need for this category. The 
first is by claiming that a moral scheme that fails to make room 
for a new category of the suberogatory will be incapable of 
accommodating all of the possible acts that might be performed. 
The second is by claiming that this classification is useful in 
helping us understand difficult moral issues. I will start this 
section by investigating the arguments of the first kind. I will 
argue that given the definition of supererogation in defended 
Chapter One, there is no need to make room for a new category in 
order to accommodate acts that could not otherwise be 
accommodated by a four-fold deontic scheme. However, this does 
not mean that giving this label to certain actions will not be useful. 
There might, then, be reason to use this term to pick out a class of 
acts that are already accommodated in the deontic scheme. This, 
though, is a claim that I will remain neutral on. 
7.1.1 Claims From Moral Experience 
Before we look at the arguments in depth, though, it is worth 
explaining the common starting point of all these arguments. 
Chisholm, Driver and Mellema have all argued that it is a familiar 
part of moral experience that some acts are both morally bad and 
                                                        
1 Those who support making room for suberogation include 
Chisholm (1963), Chisholm and Sosa (1966b), Driver (1992), 
Ladd (1957 pp.125-130) and Mellema (1987;1991; 2005).  
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morally permissible. In this section I will investigate how this 
claim is motivated. 
Chisholm supports the claim that acts can be morally bad and 
morally permissible by appealing to our intuitions about the 
following example:2  
Suppose A knows concerning B, whom A dislikes, that the 
loss of B’s employment would result in great tragedy for B 
and his family; that there is another man, C, who could do 
B’s work but no more satisfactorily than B does it; and that 
B’s employer, even if he knew the foregoing, would 
replace B by C if he thought that C were available. One 
might plausibly argue that, if A were deliberately to bring 
the availability of C to the attention of B’s employer, his 
act would be permissible but at the same time heinous and 
inhuman.3  
According to Chisholm, A’s act in this example is both morally 
bad and morally permissible. Of course, we might disagree with 
Chisholm’s diagnosis of the case but let’s grant him that for now.4 
Driver and Mellema’s defence of this claim are a little more 
complex. They first defend the existence of a particular kind of 
moral situation and argue from this to the conclusion that some 
acts are both bad and permissible. Driver begins her argument by 
pointing to the existence of ‘morally charged’ situations.5 These 
are situations where we are faced with the choice of two 
permissible acts. Either we perform a morally good act or a 
morally bad act. No neutral act is available. Driver gives several 
examples of such situations.  
The first is that of a passenger who boards a train and has a choice 
of seats. If he chooses his preferred seat he will prevent a couple 
                                                        
2 Chisholm uses the term ‘offence’ rather than suberogation. For 
the sake of clarity I will stick to using the term ‘suberogation’.  
3 Chisholm (1963 p.5). 
4 Heyd claims that this act is morally forbidden (1982 p.128). 
5 Driver (1992 p.286). 
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behind him from sitting together. If he chooses a less preferred 
seat then the couple will be able to sit together. In this case there 
is no morally neutral option. If the passenger chooses to take the 
seat and prevent the couple behind him from sitting together then, 
according to Driver, he does something bad. On the other hand, if 
he decides to give up the seat to let the couple sit together then he 
has performed a morally good act.  
The second example Driver gives is of two brothers Roger and 
Bob.6 Bob is suffering from kidney failure and will die unless he 
can get a transplant. Roger is the only compatible donor. Like the 
previous example, Driver claims that in this case there is no 
morally neutral option. If Roger donates the kidney then he 
performs a praiseworthy act. If he chooses not to then he will be 
blameworthy.  
In both of these examples, Driver claims, the good act is 
supererogatory. The alternative act, on the other hand, is 
permissible, as follows from the fact that the alternative is 
supererogatory. If it were not then the alternative would be 
obligatory, as it would be the only permissible act. Nevertheless, 
Driver claims that in these examples the non-supererogatory act is 
“worse than the situation calls for”.7 These are acts that, “we 
ought not to do, but which would not be forbidden.”8 They are bad 
but permissible.  
Mellema’s argument to support the need to make space for 
suberogation begins by appealing to the existence of a special kind 
of moral dilemma, which he calls a ‘blame dilemma’.9 Moral 
                                                        
6 Driver (1992 p.287). 
7 (1992 p.290).  
8 (1992 p.291) 
9 Like Chisholm, Mellema names this category offence rather than 
suberogatory. For the sake of clarity I will continue to call this 
category suberogation.  
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dilemmas are traditionally defined as situations in which all of the 
acts available to an agent involve violating a moral obligation.10 
However, Mellema argues that there is another form of moral 
dilemma, one in which the agent must choose between different 
blameworthy alternatives. These dilemmas are far less 
problematic than the previous kind, as they will not face problems 
of inconsistency.11 Mellema gives an example of such a case in 
the following:  
Suppose that Jones owns an autographed copy of Carnap’s 
Meaning and Necessity and promises it to two different 
people on the occasion of his imminent retirement. To 
avoid the objection that one of these promises is deceitful, 
suppose that the two persons are identical twins whom he 
has taken to be one and the same person.12  
Mellema claims that in this case Jones will be blameworthy 
whatever he does. Mellema then argues that, if we accept that 
ought implies can, then we must accept that at least one of these 
acts is permissible. After all, Jones cannot give the book to both 
people and so if we accept this principle then it cannot be the case 
that he ought to do so. If we accept this point then whichever act 
is permissible will be both permissible and blameworthy.  
So far we have looked at examples given by Chisholm, Driver and 
Mellema that they claim give us good reason to accept the 
possibility of acts that are bad but not forbidden. Chisholm and 
Driver provide an additional reason to accept the existence of such 
acts. They claim that accepting the existence of the supererogatory 
puts pressure on us to accept the existence of acts that are bad but 
not forbidden. In Chisholm’s words, “If there is such a thing as 
                                                        
10 For a defence of the claim that moral dilemmas exist see 
Marcus (1980), Nussbaum (1986 Ch. 2, Ch.3) and Williams (1973 
Ch.11). 
11 Conee (1982) argues that a consistent moral theory will not 
generate moral dilemmas.  
12 Mellema (2005 p.293). 
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‘non-obligatory well-doing’ then it is plausible that there is also 
such a thing as ‘permissive ill-doing’.13 Driver makes a similar 
point. She claims that a familiar point amongst those writing about 
supererogation is that there is a distinction between acts we ought 
to do and acts we are obliged to do.  If we accept this then there 
seems little reason to reject the possibility of acts we ought not to 
do but are not obliged not to do.14 The point both are making is 
that if we allow that moral goodness and moral obligation can 
come apart then we should accept that moral badness and moral 
prohibition may also come apart. This seems like a reasonable 
point to make. However, this does not, as yet, give us reason to 
think that we need to make room for a new deontic category. In 
the remainder of this section I will investigate whether accepting 
the possibility of acts that are bad but not forbidden gives us 
reason to introduce a new category into our deontic scheme.  
7.1.2 Do We Need To Make Room for A New Category of 
Actions?  
Chisholm claims that the possibility of acts that are morally bad 
but morally permissible creates the need for a new deontic 
category. In his words: “A system of moral concepts which 
provides a place for what is good but not obligatory, should also 
provide a place for what is bad but not forbidden.”15 According to 
Chisholm, in order to provide a place for such acts we must create 
a new deontic category. To support this claim Chisholm presents 
the following analysis of the deontic scheme that includes 
supererogation but not suberogation: 
Obligatory: An act that is good to do and bad not to do 
Forbidden: An act that would be bad to do and good not to do. 
                                                        
13 (1963 p.5). 
14 (1992 p.291). 
15 Chisholm (1963 p.5). 
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Supererogatory: An act that would be good to do and not good or 
bad not to do. 
Indifferent: An act that is neither good nor bad to do and neither 
good nor bad not to do.16 
These categories are unable to accommodate the existence of an 
act that is bad but permissible to perform. As a result, Chisholm 
claims we need to make room for the following additional 
category: 
Suberogatory: An act that is bad to do but neither good nor bad 
not to do.17  
A system of moral concepts that provides a place for what is good 
but not obligatory, should also provide a place for what is bad but 
not forbidden. 
In brief, Chisholm’s argument is that without the category of 
suberogation our deontic scheme will be unable to accommodate 
the claim that some acts are bad but permissible. These acts are 
simply unclassifiable on the above system. As a result, if we 
accept the claim that some acts are morally bad and morally 
permissible then we need to make our set of moral classifications 
compatible with this. The only way for Chisholm’s 
                                                        
16 Summarized from Chisholm (1963 pp.10-11). 
17 Chisholm (1963 pp.10-11). We might worry about the 
coherence of Chisholm’s definitions of supererogation and 
suberogation. As we saw in Chapter One there is good reason to 
think that ‘more good’ is synonymous with ‘better’. Presumably, 
‘more bad’ is also synonymous with ‘worse’. It will presumably 
be worse to omit an act of supererogation than to perform it. 
However, this makes it unclear how omitting an act of 
supererogation could be neither good nor bad. After all, if it is 
worse than the alternative then it must be both less good and more 
bad than the alternative. If this is the case then it is unclear how it 
could be neither good nor bad not to do. For now, though, let’s set 
this worry to one side.  
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characterization of the range of deontic concepts to accommodate 
acts of this sort is to create a new category.  
To see the appeal of this claim we can consider how Chisholm’s 
division of the deontic field looks in the absence of suberogation:  
 Performance  Non-
Performance 
Obligatory Good  Bad 
Prohibited Bad Good 
Supererogatory 
Performances 















Chisholm distinguishes between supererogatory performances 
(acts that are supererogatory to perform) and supererogatory non-
performances (acts which are supererogatory to omit).18 To not 
demand one’s rights on certain occasions may, for instance, be 
classed as a supererogatory non-performance. In order to see the 
appeal of Chisholm’s claim we must make two stipulations. First, 
if the performance of an act is good then its non-performance 
cannot also be good and vice versa. Similarly if performing an act 
is bad then its non-performance cannot also be bad and vice versa. 
This does not rule out the possibility of situations in which more 
than one good act or more than one bad act are available. Rather, 
it is simply to say that if an act is good the non-performance of 
that act, by itself, can at best be morally neutral. Of course, in 
                                                        
18 (1963 p.10). 
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situations where only two bad acts, x and y, are available then by 
not performing act x we will be performing a bad act, y. However, 
what is bad in this case is the performance of y not the non-
performance of x. 
With these stipulations in hand we now are able to see the appeal 
of Chisholm’s claim. In the absence of suberogation there are two 
possible combinations missing from this division of the deontic 
categories. First an act could be bad to do and neither good nor 
bad not to do. Second, an act could be neither good nor bad to do 
but bad not to do. In order to capture the full range of possibilities 
we must introduce a new category. This gives us the following, 
comprehensive division of the range of deontic possibilities: 
 Performance  Non-
Performance 
Obligatory Good  Bad 
Prohibited Bad Good 
Supererogatory 
Performances 

























This shows why Chisholm claims that it is plausible that if 
supererogation is possible then so is suberogation. Given 
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Chisholm’s stipulation, his range of deontic concepts covers every 
other possible combination. It would indeed be odd to rule out the 
possibility of suberogatory performances and non-performance. 
Chisholm’s claim, then, is that without the concept of 
suberogation there will be some acts that are unclassifiable in the 
our deontic scheme. In the remainder of this section I will argue 
that given the analysis of supererogation that I have defended up 
to now, we can reject Chisholm’s claim that we need to create a 
new deontic category in order to classify acts that are morally bad 
but morally permissible.  
The first step of this argument is to point out that The Symmetry 
Argument will not work with the analysis of supererogation I 
defended in Chapter One. To recap, I argued that the best analysis 
of supererogation is the following:  
Supererogation: An act, , is supererogatory for an agent A, at 
time t, if and only if -ing is better than the minimum that 
morality demands of A at t and there is no other obligation that 
forbids A from -ing or for which -ing is the minimum that 
morality demands of A. 
The important point for our purposes here, though, is simply that 
supererogatory acts are better than the minimum required in a 
given situation and the above analysis should be seen as a way of 
spelling out what this means in more detail.  
There are two ways in which we might attempt to mirror this 
analysis in order to give us an account of suberogation.  
Worse than Minimum: A suberogatory act is morally optional and 
morally worse than the minimum morality demands in that 
situation.  
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Worse than Maximum: A suberogatory act is morally optional and 
morally worse than the morally best act available.  
Unfortunately for those who claim we must make room for the 
suberogatory, both of these attempts to mirror supererogation fail 
to capture the claims about moral experience given in §7.1.1.  
The problem facing Worse Than Minimum is the more severe as 
this looks like an incoherent concept. We can see why by noting 
that an act that is morally worse than the minimum that morality 
requires must be morally forbidden. After all if some act is the 
minimum that is needed in order for a duty to be fulfilled then to 
do less than this is to violate duty and act impermissibly. 
However, an act that satisfies Worse Than Minimum is morally 
optional and so cannot be morally impermissible.19  
While Worse Than Maximum is a coherent concept there are two 
problems with defining suberogation in this way. First, this 
account will not pick out any acts that cannot be accommodated 
by the existing categories. The minimum that morality demands 
will be an act that is worse than the morally best act available and 
morally optional. In fact it seems plausible to think that an act 
could be supererogatory and also be worse than the best available 
act. For example, suppose I have promised to spend an hour 
helping my friend move house. We might think that given this 
promise, it is now morally obligatory to do so, though previously 
it was not. Now suppose that the morally best thing to do in this 
situation would be to spend the whole day helping. If I decide to 
help for two hours then this act will be both morally better than 
the minimum morality demands (an hour of helping) and morally 
worse than the morally best act available (a whole days helping). 
If we take Worse Than Maximum to be our account of 
                                                        
19 McNamara (2011 pp.227-8) makes a similar point.  
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suberogation then all of the acts it picks out will already be 
classifiable as either supererogatory or obligatory.  
Moreover, Worse Than Maximum also fails to capture the claims 
about moral experience made in §7.1.1. In the previous example 
helping for two hours is worse than the maximum but we would 
be unlikely to say that it is a morally bad. Of course, this does not 
mean that there will never be situations in which an act that meets 
the conditions given by Worse Than Maximum are both morally 
bad and morally permissible. The point, though, is that Worse 
Than Maximum will not help us in identifying or classifying these 
acts.  
So far I have argued that the account of supererogation that I 
defended in Chapter One provides no resources for a mirror image 
of supererogation that is able to capture the claims from moral 
experience made in §7.1.1. However, the problems for those who 
argue that there is a need to make room for suberogation go 
further than this. Not only does the account of supererogation I 
have given present no resources for defenders of suberogation to 
offer a version of The Symmetry Argument, it also leaves no 
space for a deontic category with distinct parameters that is able to 
capture the claims from moral experience made in §7.1.1. To see 
why, consider the following illustration of how the acts are 








Minimum Morality Requires 
Morally Forbidden 
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According to the definition of supererogation that I have 
defended, when an act is not morally indifferent, these three 
deontic categories exhaust the range of possibilities.  Any further 
deontic categories we add in will be ones that overlap with 
existing categories. For example, if we were to introduce Worse 
Than Maximum then this category would include all acts from the 
minimum morality requires to the second best supererogatory act. 
To sum up, given the most plausible analysis of supererogation, 
there is no need to create a new deontic category to accommodate 
acts that cannot be categorized in the above scheme.  
7.1.3 Suberogation As A Useful Classificatory Tool 
In the last section we looked at Chisholm’s argument that unless 
we make room for the concept of the suberogatory, there will be 
some acts that our deontic scheme will be unable to classify. We 
saw that this is not the case if we accept the definition of 
supererogation defended in Chapter One. We might think that this 
is all there is to be said on the matter. There is though, another 
reason that has been put forward by those wishing to defend the 
need for the supererogatory. Driver has argued that introducing 
the concept of the suberogatory allows us to, “explain and clarify 
some problems in ethics”.20 
Driver claims that this category also allows us to solve a problem 
facing those who think that abortion is morally permissible but 
that having multiple abortions is bad. Driver claims that even 
those committed to a woman’s right to an abortion might find 
something morally suspect about someone who has nine abortions 
without having an excuse. This seems odd, if abortion is 
permissible, as the pro-choice activist thinks it is, then why are 
multiple abortions bad? If we accept the possibility of acts that are 
                                                        
20 (1992 pp.294-295).  
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bad but permissible then we can say that although getting an 
abortion is permissible, to do so without an excuse is bad. While a 
single abortion might not be that bad, by the time someone has 
nine abortions without an excuse then perhaps this is a significant 
moral failing.21 Accepting the existence of suberogation, then, 
allows us to say that there is nothing contradictory about this 
combination of beliefs.  
Of course, we might think that we can say all this without the need 
for a new concept to describe these acts. We could, after all, 
simply say that these acts are bad but permissible. However, 
Driver claims that there is reason not only to accept that such acts 
exist but to introduce a new term to pick out these acts. She 
defends this claim in the following way:   
In embracing the suberogatory, we allow for another 
useful distinction in our moral language. It provides a way 
of evaluating actions which accurately reflects many moral 
judgements we do make - judgements lying in the dark 
corners between right and wrong.22 
By introducing this term, then, we will not only be able to 
describe our moral judgements more precisely, we will also be 
kept alert to the fact that permissible acts may, nevertheless be 
bad.  
Liberto challenges this defence of the suberogatory. Liberto 
claims that the examples appealed to by supporters of 
suberogation fail to show the need to make room for a new 
deontic concept. Liberto argues that these are difficult cases in 
applied ethics. The question of whether Roger has an obligation to 
donate his kidney to Bob or the train passenger to give up his 
preferred seat are questions that raise issues concerning, amongst 
                                                        
21 (1992 p.293).  
22 (1992 p.295).  
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other issues, how much self-partiality is morally permissible.23 
Liberto claims that the reason that such cases are problematic is, 
“because categorizing them takes a lot of work, not necessarily 
because the categories are insufficient.”24 According to Liberto 
making space for the suberogatory, “is neither useful nor 
necessary in handling the problem cases.”25 While it may be 
tempting to posit a new category to avoid this applied ethical 
work, this is a temptation that should be avoided. Liberto’s point 
is that we should avoid positing the need for this ethical category 
until this work is complete. 
Liberto is right to point out that we need both more information 
and the answers to some difficult applied ethical questions before 
we can say whether we need the category of the suberogatory to 
handle Driver’s cases. However, this is not enough to show that 
the concept is not a useful one. After all, the possibility remains 
that once we have the information that Liberto claims is needed 
we will discover that Driver’s assessment of these situations is 
correct.  
Moreover, even if we accept Liberto’s claim that we do not yet 
have good reason to think that some acts are suberogatory, it does 
not follow that there is no use for the concept of suberogation. We 
might think that allowing for the category of suberogation allows 
us to capture a feature of moral phenomenology that is not 
reflected by the existing deontic categories. Even if we think that 
further work in applied ethics might show Driver’s diagnosis of 
the cases she gives to be in error, we might think that the very fact 
that we cannot immediately dismiss this diagnosis as being wildly 
counter-intuitive is enough to show that we can conceive of an 
                                                        
23 (2012 p.400).  
24 (2012 p.400). 
25 (2012 p.402). 
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act’s being morally bad without being morally wrong. Perhaps the 
fact that we can at least conceive of its being the case that an act 
could be bad without being forbidden is sufficient reason to make 
room for this concept in our moral thinking, even if it turns out 
that there are no acts that fall into this category. Even if Driver’s 
assessment turns out to be wrong, we might think that making 
room for this category will have been useful in making us aware 
of possible answers to applied ethical questions which we might 
otherwise have overlooked. 
Perhaps, then, there is a use for the concept. Of course, if we 
accept Driver’s argument we must give some account of what it is 
for an act to be suberogatory. As we saw in the previous section, 
there is no mirror image of the supererogatory that captures this 
concept. Perhaps, though, rather than attempting to mirror the 
most plausible analysis of supererogation, we could accept the 
original definition of these acts as morally bad and morally 
permissible. Perhaps it could be claimed that the fact that 
suberogation picks out a recognizable feature of moral 
phenomenology justifies making room for such a category 
regardless of whether acts that meet this description will also meet 
the descriptions given by the other deontic categories.  
For our purposes though, the important lesson to take from this is 
that if there is a need for the concept of suberogation, it is not as a 
fully separate deontic category but as a useful label. 
7.1.4 Summary 
To sum up, I have argued that given the account of supererogation 
I defended in Chapter One, we can accept all of the claims from 
moral experience that supporters of suberogation appeal to 
without needing to accept the existence of a new deontic category. 
In addition, this account of supererogation leaves no room for The 
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Suberogatory as a distinct deontic category. While it would be 
possible to accept the existence of such a category regardless of 
this, doing so will pose no threat to the adequacy of the four-fold 
deontic scheme.   
7.2 Quasi-Supererogation 
Let’s now turn our attention to another proposed addition to the 
range of deontic categories, The Quasi-Supererogatory. Gregory 
Mellema has argued that we need to make room for this category 
to accommodate acts that are praiseworthy to perform and 
blameworthy to omit.26 In this section, I will argue that Mellema’s 
argument is unsuccessful.  
7.2.1 Mellema’s Argument 
As we have seen, Chisholm argued that there are five deontic 
categories: the obligatory, the indifferent, the forbidden, the 
supererogatory and the suberogatory. Mellema argues that this 
division omits two important combinations. Mellema illustrates 
this by listing all the possible combinations of praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness for morally optional acts (those that are 
permissible to perform or omit). Mellema characterizes Chisholm 
as allowing for the possible combinations amongst the morally 
optional acts:27    
 
                                                        
26 (1987). Horgan and Timmons (2010 p.32) also use the term 
‘quasi-supererogation’ to refer to acts that go beyond duty but the 
non-performance of which requires justification. My use of the 
term will follow Mellema’s not that of Horgan and Timmons. 
27 It is worth noting that although Chisholm (1963 pp.10-11) 
analyzes these acts in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (and again in 
Chisholm and Sosa (1966b p.327)), Mellema uses the terms 
‘praiseworthy’ and ‘blameworthy’. The root of this terminological 
mistake seems to be that Mellema sees ‘praiseworthy’ as roughly 
equivalent to ‘morally good’ (1991 p.24). 
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When we look closely at this way of dividing up the deontic 
categories we can see that there are four combinations that are 
missing. The first is acts that are praiseworthy to perform but 
blameworthy not to perform. Mellema uses the term quasi-
supererogation to refer to these acts. The second are acts that are 
blameworthy to perform and praiseworthy not to perform. 
Mellema uses the term quasi-suberogation to refer to these acts.28 
                                                        
28 (1987 p.144). 
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The final two combinations are acts that are praiseworthy both to 
perform and omit and acts that are blameworthy both to perform 
and omit. Mellema does not focus on these combinations, as he 
views such acts as unlikely to be possible for human agents.29  
Having demonstrated that there is space for these two new deontic 
categories, Mellema then argues that there are acts that are 
plausibly seen as members of these categories. Mellema’s starting 
point is to imagine a case where an agent refrains from performing 
an offence. Mellema gives the following as an example of such a 
case. Suppose S is in a restaurant and is sitting next to an 
obnoxious man who is making mocking gestures and loud jokes 
about the physical disabilities of S’s wife. As a result, S is 
strongly tempted to walk over to the table and empty the contents 
of the obnoxious man’s plate onto his lap. Mellema claims that if 
S can resist this temptation then he does something 
praiseworthy.30 On the other hand, if he succumbs to temptation 
then he acts in a blameworthy way. In both cases these acts are 
morally optional. In the first case he will have performed a quasi-
supererogatory act and in the second case he will have performed 
a quasi-offence. 
Mellema’s claim, then, is that there are some acts that do not fit 
into Chisholm’s categories. In order to accommodate these acts 
we need to add the following categories onto Chisholm’s scheme:  
Quasi-Supererogation: An act that is praiseworthy to perform and 
blameworthy to omit.  
Quasi-Suberogation: An act that is blameworthy to perform and 
praiseworthy to omit.  
                                                        
29 (1987 p.150 Fn.3). 
30 (1987 p.146).   
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Note that the force of this argument comes not from the example 
that Mellema gives but from its structure. If acts of offence exist 
then, claims Mellema, there will be cases where it is praiseworthy 
to refrain from performing the offence. Once we have accepted 
that it is possible for an act to be blameworthy and morally 
optional it seems reasonable to think that there will be occasions 
where refraining from performing the blameworthy act will be 
praiseworthy. Even those who do not find Mellema’s example 
particularly persuasive have reason to take the structure of his 
argument seriously. Once we have accepted that refraining from 
performing a morally optional act can be praiseworthy then we 
have accepted the existence of two kinds of act that cannot fit into 
the standard deontic scheme. As a result, if we want to give a 
deontic scheme that can capture the full range of possibilities we 
must make room for two new categories. Nevertheless, in the next 
section I will show that Mellema’s argument is unsuccessful.  
7.2.2 Mellema’s Dilemma 
As with my argument against the need for the category of 
suberogation, I do not intend to say anything against Mellema’s 
claims from moral experience. As with the suberogatory, we can 
accept everything Mellema says about his example without 
accepting that it gives us any reason to make room for a new 
deontic category. The reason for this, as I will demonstrate in this 
section, is that Mellema’s argument faces a dilemma.  
The first step in identifying this dilemma is to note that the way in 
which ‘The Standard Position’ is outlined is somewhat 
misleading. It is true that Chisholm’s division of the deontic 
categories is unable to accommodate the existence of acts that are 
morally optional and that meet the criteria given by quasi-
supererogation and quasi-suberogatory. However, the reason for 
this is that the definition Mellema gives for acts of quasi-
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supererogation and quasi-suberogatory are already taken by the 
categories of the obligatory and the forbidden. For Chisholm an 
obligatory act is one that is praiseworthy to perform but 
blameworthy not to perform, while a forbidden act is one that is 
blameworthy to perform and praiseworthy not to perform.31 By 
leaving out these categories from the way he lays out The 
Standard Position, Mellema creates the misleading impression that 
we need to create two new deontic categories to accommodate 
acts that meet these criteria. 
We might think that although the way Mellema sets out The 
Standard Position is misleading, this does not create any major 
problems for his thesis. After all, the claim he is defending is that 
acts of quasi-supererogation are not only praiseworthy to perform 
and blameworthy to omit but that they are also neither obligatory 
nor forbidden to perform or omit. While the categories of the 
quasi-supererogatory and the quasi-suberogatory have similar 
definitions to the categories of the obligatory and The Forbidden, 
the former are morally optional while the latter are not. In fact, 
Mellema makes it clear that this is what distinguishes quasi-
supererogation from the obligatory and quasi-offence from the 
forbidden.32 
However, while this response would allow Mellema to maintain 
that                     quasi-supererogation and quasi-suberogation are 
distinct categories, it does so at a cost. The problem with this 
response is that it means that the definitions Mellema gives for 
these categories are incomplete. The complete definitions should 
read as follows:  
                                                        
31 (1963 p.10). 
32 (1987 p.147). 
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Quasi-Supererogation (Revised): An act that is morally 
permissible and praiseworthy to perform and morally permissible 
and blameworthy to omit.  
Quasi-Suberogation (Revised): An act that is morally permissible 
and blameworthy to perform and morally permissible and 
praiseworthy to omit.  
These definitions capture the claims that Mellema makes about 
moral experience while marking these categories out from the 
obligatory and the forbidden. Unfortunately for Mellema’s 
argument, though, once we allow moral permissibility to feature 
in our definition of deontic terms then we are able to define the 
five categories that exist in The Standard Position in a way that is 
able to capture Mellema’s claims form moral experience without 
creating any new categories.  
Obligation (Revised): An act that is morally permissible to 
perform and morally impermissible to omit. 
Prohibition (Revised):  An act that is morally impermissible to 
perform and morally permissible to omit. 
Supererogation (Revised): An act that is morally optional and 
praiseworthy to perform. 
Suberogation (Revised): An act that is morally optional and 
blameworthy to perform. 
Morally Indifferent (Revised): An act that is moral optional and 
neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy to perform or to omit. 
These revised definitions retain what is distinctive about 
supererogation and suberogation. Although the performance of 
supererogatory acts is praiseworthy and suberogatory acts 
blameworthy, unlike obligations and prohibitions these acts are 
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morally optional. The most important point for our purposes, 
though, is that these definitions are able to accommodate 
Mellema’s claim that there are acts that meet the criteria given by 
his definitions of quasi-supererogation and quasi-suberogation 
without the need to create new deontic categories.  
This, then, is a dilemma for Mellema’s argument. Mellema must 
either accept that we need to introduce moral permissibility into 
our definitions of deontic categories or reject this. If he rejects this 
then the categories of quasi-supererogation and          quasi-
suberogation will be indistinguishable from those of obligation 
and prohibition. If he accepts this then we can revise our 
definitions of supererogation and suberogation in a way that 
allows these categories to remain distinct from obligation and 
prohibition and accommodate acts that meet the criteria given by 
Mellema’s definitions for     quasi-supererogation and quasi-
suberogation. While the first option will leave Mellema unable to 
define his new categories in a way that distinguishes them from 
existing categories, the second option removes the need to create 
any new categories.    
Someone sympathetic to Mellema’s position might claim that 
these definitions fail to capture all of the relevant necessary 
conditions for supererogation and suberogation. After all, 
Mellema began his argument by claiming that it is a necessary 
condition for supererogatory acts that they are not blameworthy to 
omit. Similarly, Mellema also claimed that it is a necessary 
condition for offences that they are not praiseworthy to omit. If we 
accept these two necessary conditions then the revised definitions 
are inadequate and there is a need for two new deontic categories 
after all.  
However, while it is true that accepting these necessary conditions 
would present the need for two new deontic concepts, Mellema 
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does not provide any reason to suggest that these are rightly seen 
as necessary conditions of supererogation and suberogation. In 
effect, then, accepting Mellema’s argument that there exist 
morally optional acts that are praiseworthy to perform and 
blameworthy to omit as well as morally optional acts that are 
blameworthy to perform and praiseworthy to omit presents us 
with a choice. We either take Mellema’s argument to show that 
the conditions that Mellema stipulates as necessary for 
supererogation and offence are overly restrictive or we accept the 
need for new deontic categories. As Mellema fails to give us any 
reason reject the first option his argument fails to support his 
thesis that we need to make room for these two deontic categories. 
At best, his argument in fact supports the disjunctive thesis that 
we must either make room for two new deontic categories or 
revise the necessary conditions for supererogation and offence that 
Mellema presents at the start of his paper.  
To make matters worse for Mellema’s argument, if we accept that 
parsimony is a virtue of any classificatory scheme then we seem 
to have good methodological reason to opt for the latter of these 
disjuncts. Of course this is at best a defeasible reason to favour 
this option and if good reason can be found to favour instead 
creating new deontic categories then this will likely outweigh any 
concerns for parsimony. However, in the absence of such reasons 
the right conclusion to draw from Mellema’s argument for the 
existence of acts that meet the criteria for quasi-supererogation 
and quasi-suberogation is not to create these new deontic 
categories. Rather we should reject the claim that no 
supererogatory acts are blameworthy to omit and no offences 
praiseworthy to omit.  
7.2.3 Summary 
 241 
In this section we have looked at Mellema’s argument in support 
of the claim that we need to make room for two new deontic 
categories, quasi-supererogation and      quasi-suberogation. I have 
shown that Mellema’s argument in support of his claim that acts 
meet the criteria he offers for these two categories at best provides 
support for a disjunctive conclusion. Either we make room for 
these additional categories or we reject the claim that no 
supererogatory acts are blameworthy to omit and no suberogatory 
are praiseworthy to omit. Moreover, if we accept that parsimony is 
a virtue of any classificatory scheme then we appear to have good 
reason to opt for the latter option. In the final section of this 
chapter we will look at another attempt to show the need for a new 
deontic category and see that this also fails to give us any reason 
to expand our range of deontic categories.  
7.3 Forced Supererogation33 
So far I have argued that accepting the need to accommodate the 
category of supererogation does not give us any reason to think 
that we should also make room for the categories of suberogatory 
or quasi-supererogation. In the final section of this chapter I will 
argue that there is no good reason to accept the category of forced 
supererogation either. In a recent paper, Cohen has offered a 
defence of the view that we should make room for this category.34 
Cohen argues that there is a need to make room for a new deontic 
category between the obligatory and the supererogatory. Acts of 
forced supererogation are acts that are supererogatory to perform 
but wrong not to perform. In this section I will argue that Cohen’s 
argument does not show the need for this new deontic category. 
At best, Cohen’s argument shows that there is not a uniform 
                                                        
33 Section 7.3 is largely based on Archer (2014b).  
34 Cohen (Forthcoming).  
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relationship between moral obligations, praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness.  
Cohen argues that we need to make room for the following 
additional form of deontic classification: 
Forced Supererogation: Performance is praiseworthy and 
nonperformance is wrong but not blameworthy.35  
As Cohen accepts, to justify allowing this new concept into our 
explanatory scheme we must show that there are good reasons to 
do so that outweigh the considerations of parsimony that count 
against doing so.36  
7.3.1 The Argument From Moral Experience 
Cohen argues that without Forced Supererogation we cannot do 
justice to our moral experience. Cohen gives three examples to 
support this claim. For the sake of brevity I will look only at the 
first:  
Case 1: Your brother is suffering from a rapidly 
progressive lung disease, which is fatal without treatment. 
The only treatment is lung transplantation, which has a 
significant negative impact on one’s prospective quality of 
life. You are the sole matching donor.37 
To show that we need to make room for Forced Supererogation 
Cohen needs to persuade us that the act of donating a lung in this 
case cannot be accommodated by any of the existing deontic 
concepts and that it meets the three conditions listed in the 
definition. 
I am willing to accept Cohen’s assessment that performing this act 
is especially praiseworthy and that nonperformance of this act 
                                                        
35 Cohen (Forthcoming p.4).  
36 (Forthcoming p.15). 
37 (Forthcoming pp.1-2).  
 243 
would not be blameworthy. It is the task of showing that the act is 
wrong to omit that causes problems.  
Cohen defends this claim in the following: 
Although one is not wrong not to donate one’s own lung, 
even if there are no other matching donors, things are 
different when it is for one’s own brother. (…) This 
personal factor creates particular obligations, which are 
notoriously difficult to account for in classical deontic 
classifications.38 
Cohen is arguing that the personal request creates a special 
obligation, which in turn makes the non-performance of the act 
morally wrong. Importantly for Cohen these special obligations 
are often more demanding than ordinary obligations. 
The problem with this argument is in the final step. We are told to 
accept that these acts are wrong because there is a special 
obligation to perform them. However, this argument only works if 
these special obligations generate moral obligations, which would 
make their non-performance morally wrong. However, if this is 
the case then we can no longer say that these acts go beyond duty. 
If, on the other hand, they do not generate moral requirements 
then Cohen’s argument in support of the claim that the non-
performance of these acts is morally wrong is unsound. 
Cohen makes two responses to the worry that these acts should be 
viewed as obligatory. First, he argues that classing these acts as 
obligatory ignores the special praise an agent deserves for 
performing such an act. The cases he mentions are all 
praiseworthy in a way that moral obligations normally are not. 
This Cohen claims, gives us reason to reject the claim that these 
acts are obligatory. 39   
                                                        
38 (Forthcoming p.6). 
39 (Forthcoming p.7). 
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However, if Cohen is right to say that these special obligations do 
not generate moral obligations then we have no reason to think 
that non-performance is morally wrong. Non-performance will of 
course violate a special obligation but if we accept Cohen’s claim 
then there will be no violation of a moral obligation. The claim 
that these acts are worthy of special praise does nothing to help 
Cohen avoid this dilemma. We must either accept that the 
performance of some moral obligations is worthy of special praise 
or reject the claim that the non-performance of such acts is 
morally wrong. 
Cohen does not acknowledge this dilemma but there is good 
reason to think that he would opt for the first horn. This certainly 
seems to be the natural way to interpret the following, “acts of 
FSE (Forced Supererogation) are especially praiseworthy in a way 
that Obligations normally are not.”40 This is also the most 
charitable interpretation. Consider a firefighter who, in the course 
of her job, runs into a burning building to save someone’s life. 
This act is praiseworthy but given her job it is also obligatory. If 
Cohen is conceding that sometimes performing an obligatory act 
is especially praiseworthy then he is committed, at pains of 
inconsistency, to accepting the following revised definition of 
obligation: 
 
Obligation 2: Performance is not normally especially 
praiseworthy and non-performance is both blameworthy and 
wrong. 
However, revising the definition of obligation in this way means 
that the praiseworthiness of the act in Case 1 no longer gives us 
any reason to create a new deontic category. Instead we can accept 
                                                        
40 (Forthcoming p.7). 
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that this is one of the unusual cases where fulfilling an obligation 
is especially praiseworthy.  
Cohen’s next response is to claim that we would not regard the 
nonperformance of the act in Case 1 to be blameworthy.41 Cohen 
gives two reasons to accept this. First, a failure to perform the act 
would not be violating anyone’s rights and so no one could 
legitimately blame the agent for a failure to perform the act. 
Second, the obligations generated by friendship are a special case, 
as a failure to act in line with such obligations can change the 
nature of the relationship in such a way that there are no longer 
any grounds for blame.  
However, in order for these acts to count as wrong to omit Cohen 
is going to have to accept another revision to the definition of 
obligation: 
Obligation 3: Performance is not normally especially 
praiseworthy and non-performance is wrong and is normally 
blameworthy. 
If this is our definition of obligation then the fact that it would not 
be blameworthy to fail to perform the act in Case 1 gives us no 
reason to think that it is not obligatory.  
In summary, Cohen’s argument faces a dilemma. To defend the 
claim that the      non-performance of these acts is morally wrong 
he needs to show that the agent has a moral obligation to perform 
the act. However, in defending this claim Cohen commits himself 
to revising his definition of moral obligation. This revised 
definition removes the need for a new deontic category to 
accommodate acts that meet the criteria given by forced 
supererogation. As a result, Cohen must either accept that such 
                                                        
41 (Forthcoming p.8).  
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acts are not conceptually possible or accept that there is no need to 
make room for a new deontic category to accommodate them.  
7.3.2 The Missing Combination Argument 
Cohen also argues that we need this new category in order to 
capture the full range of deontic possibilities. Cohen lays out the 
positive half of the deontic field in the following way:42 
 
 
Is Failure to Act    
Blameworthy? 
                                                                  Yes                      No 
Is Failure to act Wrong?                                                                                                        
Y                          Yes 
       No  
  
Cohen claims that unless we accept the existence of Forced 
Supererogation we will be left with a missing box in this diagram, 
meaning that we have failed to capture all of the possible 
combinations.  
However, this table ignores the question of whether or not these 
acts are praiseworthy to perform. As such it is a misleading 
representation of the factors Cohen takes to determine an act’s 
deontic status. Given Cohen’s taxonomy, the following is a more 
accurate representation of the possibilities:  
                                                        







      
Is performance 
praiseworthy?  
 Yes  No 
Failure to perform blameworthy 
and Wrong 
? Obligation 





Failure to perform neither wrong 
nor blameworthy  
Supererogation ? 
Failure to perform blameworthy 





As the empty spaces in this grid demonstrate, accepting the new 
deontic category of forced supererogation does not capture the full 
range of combinations of the components Cohen takes to 
determine an act’s deontic status. Clearly, then, allowing forced 
supererogation into our conceptual scheme will not provide a full 
answer to the question of how to represent the range of options. 
The problem for this argument is that obligation is going to have 
to take up more than one space on this matrix. As we have already 
seen with the firefighter example, it is possible to be worthy of 
praise for performing an act that is morally required. This means 
that obligation will also have to fill the gap on the top left of this 
matrix. Once we have accepted that obligation occupies more than 
one space in the diagram Cohen’s argument loses its force. The 
need to account for acts that are praiseworthy to perform and 
wrong but not blameworthy to omit no longer appears to require a 
new deontic category. We could instead say that obligation fills 
this box as well. Moreover, as we have seen, Cohen’s defence of 
the claim that there are acts of this sort relies on the definition 
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given by Obligation 3. However, Obligation 3 can fill all of the 
boxes in the first two rows of the diagram, including that occupied 
by Forced Supererogation. We should not, then, accept the need to 
allow forced supererogation into our conceptual scheme on the 
basis of Cohen’s claim that we must do so to capture the full range 
of deontic possibilities.43  
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have looked at three attempts to show that 
making room for supererogation is not enough and that in order to 
accommodate every kind of action we must expand our range of 
deontic categories even further. I have argued that none of these 
attempts are successful. The set of categories that includes the 
obligatory, the forbidden, the indifferent and the supererogatory is 
able to accommodate all possible acts. Of course, this does not 
mean that at some point in the future a persuasive argument might 
not be given to show that there is good reason to divide these 
categories into subcategories. In the absence of such an argument, 
though, there is no reason to think that this set of categories is 
insufficient.
                                                        




In the first half of this thesis I investigated how supererogation 
should be defined. I argued that it should be defined in the 
following way: 
Supererogation: An act, , is supererogatory for an agent A, at 
time t, if and only if -ing is better than the minimum that 
morality demands of A at t and there is no other obligation that 
forbids A from -ing or for which -ing is the minimum that 
morality demands of A.  
I defended this definition both against similar definitions and 
against Dorsey’s very different account. I then defended this 
account against two ways in which it might be argued that it is 
insufficient. First, against the claim that only praiseworthy acts 
can be supererogatory. Second, against the claim that only acts 
performed with altruistic intent can be supererogatory.  
In the second half of this thesis I investigated three issues in moral 
philosophy that up to now have either ignored or not paid 
adequate attention to either the existence of acts of supererogation 
or the nature of the supererogatory.  
First, I looked at the issue of the relationship between moral 
reasons, non-moral reasons and moral obligation. I argued that 
one of the most prominent positions in this debate, the view that 
what prevents the morally best act from being morally obligatory 
are the costs to the agent, rests upon an implausible view about the 
nature of the supererogatory.  
I then investigated the debate about motivational judgement 
internalism, the view that there is an internal connection between 
moral judgements and motivation. I argued that appreciating the 
difference between moral goodness and moral requirements gives 
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motivational judgement internalists good reason to restrict their 
claim to moral requirements. One way to justify this move is to 
claim that internalism is explained by the truth of moral 
rationalism, the view that moral requirements are always in line 
with what there is most reason to do.  
However, as I explained, this raises a problem as moral 
rationalism is often thought to be depend upon the truth of moral 
overridingness. However, I argued that it is possible to accept 
moral rationalism without accepting overridingness. Indeed the 
explanation for moral rationalism that is compatible with 
supererogation appears to be better supported by the intuitions 
commonly appealed to by those seeking to argue for rationalism 
than the explanation offered by overridingness.  
I finished by looking at the question of whether we need to make 
room for more deontic categories than the forbidden, the 
indifferent, the required and the supererogatory. I showed that 
many of the arguments put forward in support of these categories 
rest upon mistaken assumptions about the nature of 
supererogation.  
I hope to have shown that the existence of acts of supererogation 
has important implications for a number of debates within moral 
philosophy. There are a number of relevant issues that I have not 
sought to explore in this thesis. Most obviously, I have not sought 
to provide a solution to the paradox of supererogation, the puzzle 
of trying to explain the connection between moral obligations and 
reasons for action that leaves room for the supererogatory. I have, 
though, sought to show some problems for existing solutions. The 
question of how this puzzle ought to be resolved is one that I 
intend to investigate in later research. Similarly, in normative 
ethics it has long been recognized that both consequentialists and 
deontologists should have something to say about the 
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supererogatory. In recent years those seeking to give a virtue 
ethical account of right action have also acknowledged the 
importance of supererogation.1 However, it is far from clear that 
any of the attempts to provide a virtue ethical account of right 
action that leaves room for a distinction between supererogatory 
and obligatory acts are successful.  
Of course, it is not only those investigating theoretical moral 
philosophy who should pay attention to the importance of 
supererogation. There remains a wide range of debates in applied 
ethics for which it is of the utmost importance that the distinction 
between moral goodness and moral obligation is given sufficient 
attention. To give just one example, Ben Saunders has recently 
pointed out how a prominent argument in support of The Principle 
of Procreative Beneficence, which states that prospective parents 
have a prima facie obligation to select the child who will have the 
best expected life, is unsuccessful because it fails to pay attention 
to this distinction.2
                                                        
1 For example, Brännmark (2006) and Kawall (2009). 
2 Saunders (Forthcoming). For the argument Saunders criticizes 
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